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ORDER WITHOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: OPEN SCIENCE IN INFLUENZA
Amy Kapczynskif
Today, intellectual property (IP) scholars accept hat IP as
an approach to information production has serious limits. But
what lies beyond IP? A new literature on "intellectual produc-
tion without IP" (or "IP without IP") has emerged to explore this
question, but its examples and explanations have yet to con-
vince skeptics. This Article reorients this new literature via a
study of a hard case: a global influenza virus-sharing network
that has for decades produced critically important information
goods, at significant expense, and in a loose-knit group-all
without recourse to IP. I analyze the Network as an example
of "open science," a mode of information production that dif-
fers strikingly from conventional IP, and yet that successfully
produces important scientific goods in response to social need.
The theory and example developed here refute the most pow-
erful criticisms of the emerging "IP without IP" literature, and
provide a stronger foundation for this important new field.
Even where capital costs are high, creation without IP can be
reasonably effective in social terms, If it can link sources of
funding to reputational and evaluative feedback loops like
those that characterize open science. It can also be sustained
over time, even by loose-knit groups and where the stakes are
high, because organizations and other forms of law can help
to stabilize cooperation. I also show that contract law is well
suited to modes of information production that rely upon a
"supply side" rather than "demand side" model. In its most
important instances, "order without IP" is not order without
governance, nor order without law. Recognizing this can help
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us better ground this new field, and better study and support
forms of knowledge production that deserve our attention, and
that sometimes ustain our very lives.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 1997, a three-year-old boy was admitted to a
hospital in Hong Kong, critically ill. Tests showed that he had
influenza, a virus that has circulated in humans for thousands
of years.1 Far more striking was the type of flu that he had
contracted-an avian type, H5N1, that had never before been
seen in humans.2
While Ebola and Zika have more recently captured the
headlines, there is no existing virus more dangerous than in-
fluenza.3 In 1918-1920, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50
to 100 million people around the world, most of them young
adults.4 A similar pandemic today could take the lives of hun-
1 Christopher W. Potter, Chronicle of Influenza Pandemics, in TEXTBOOK OF
INFLUENZA 3, 3 (Karl G. Nicholson et al. eds., 1998).
2 J.C. de Jong et al., A Pandemic Warning?, 389 NATURE 554, 554 (1997).
3 Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 24,
26 (2005) ("[Of the more than 1,500 microbes known to cause disease in humans,
influenza continues to be the king in terms of overall mortality."). See also Sonia
Shah, Is Bird Flu Back?, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2016, at 6 (noting that the H5N1
pandemic of 2009 killed an estimated 200,000 people).
4 See, e.g., K. David Patterson & Gerald F. Pyle, The Geography and Mortality
of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, 65 BULL. HIST. MED. 4, 19 (1991).
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dreds of thousands and perhaps millions of people in the
United States alone.5
Influenza pandemics occur when radically new strains that
evade our immunities emerge and become transmissible be-
tween humans.6 The new avian strain, therefore, was of major
concern to influenza scientists.7 The one institution most criti-
cal to our ability to respond to it is a little-known network
called the World Health Organization's "Global Influenza Sur-
veillance and Response Network," or "GISRS"8 (here, simply
"the Flu Network" or the "Network").
The flurry of activity that followed the emergence of H5N1
shows the work of the Network at its most dramatic. Immedi-
ately after the boy was hospitalized, scientists from two Net-
work Collaborating Centers were sent as a rapid response team
to Hong Kong.9 Working with local authorities and a WHO
Task Force, the team traced the virus to poultry in northern
Hong Kong, and traced the boy's contacts to determine whether
he had recently had contact with sick chickens.10 More cases
soon emerged, and new evidence suggested that the virus pro-
voked a catastrophic immune response in humans, frequently
causing organ failure and death. "x Investigators worked ex-
haustively, putting in eighteen-hour days, knocking on doors,
tracing contacts, and gathering blood, sputum, and chicken
5 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN 18
(Nov. 2005).
6 See infra Part I.
7 Michael Rosenwald, The Flu Hunter, SMITHSONIAN, Jan. 2006, at 183,
184-85.
8 Typically pronounced "gis-ris."
9 See Gretchen Reynolds, The Flu Hunters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at
41-42. See also Rend Snacken et al., The Next Influenza Pandemic: Lessons from
Hong Kong, 1997, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 195, 197 (1999) ("Investigation
of the circumstances urrounding each case was undertaken by the local authori-
ties with assistance from the World Health Organization Collaborating Centers in
the United States and Japan."); id. (noting that a WHO Task Force initiated a
"technical investigation and evaluation of the Hong Kong situation," and that a
small staff from Japan and the US "Join[ed] local authorities in collecting informa-
tion needed for risk assessment"); see also infra p. 126 (describing the role of
Collaborating Centers in the Network).
10 See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 42 (describing the investigation); Snacken et
al., supra note 9, at 197 (describing the Task Force). Contact tracing helps deter-
mine whether the virus has become transmissible between people, which can
inaugurate a new pandemic. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 39.
11 K. Y. Yuen et al., Clinical Features and Rapid Viral Diagnosis of Human




droppings.12 They shipped virus samples on dry ice to the
Network's labs in Atlanta, Melbourne, London, and Tokyo for
analysis. The scientists at those labs too worked late into the
night, analyzing the thousands of samples shipped to them and
beginning the work needed to develop a vaccine. 13
The virus was not yet transmissible between humans, but
given how deadly it was, it was critical to slow the process by
which it could reproduce and mutate. The scientific team rec-
ommended that every chicken in Hong Kong be slaughtered,
and the government agreed.14 In four days, 1.5 million chick-
ens were killed, effectively ending the epidemic in poultry, and
H5N1 in humans, in the city. 15 The moment was a dramatic
success for the Flu Network.16
Though it is almost unknown, the WHO's Flu Network is
critically important to global health. It provides our global ar-
chitecture for predicting and responding to pandemic flu, and
it also plays a central role in our response to seasonal flu,
which is a major public health concern in its own right.17 The
Flu Network collects and examines millions of virus samples a
year, chooses the virus strains that go into flu vaccines, and
helps to refine seed viruses that are used to manufacture the
seasonal flu vaccine every year. If you have been vaccinated
against the flu, the Network, in a sense, is a part of you. Your
immune system carries its traces around.
A study of the Flu Network is valuable not only because of
its critical importance to global health. The Network also pro-
vides a pivotal example for current intellectual property (IP)
scholarship. IP scholarship has for decades been centered on a
simple account: IP is necessary to achieve the information pro-
12 Patricia Guthrie, CDC Virus Fighters Go Where the Action Is, ATLANTA J.
CONST., http://www.cdc.gov/excite/careers/fighters.htm [https://perma.cc/
UX7J-R9DD] (last visited Aug. 2, 2014); Reynolds, supra note 9, at 42.
13 Guthrie, supra note 12.
14 Reynolds, supra note 9, at 38; Rosenwald, supra note 7, at 184; Miriam
Shuchman, Improving Global Health-Margaret Chan at the WHO, 356 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 653, 655 (2007).
15 Kelvin K.W. To et al., The Emergence ofInfluenza A H7N9 in Human Beings
16 Years After Influenza A H5N1: A Tale of Two Cities, 13 LANCET INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 809, 818 (2013).
16 Aleksandr S. Lipatov et al., Influenza: Emergence and Control, 78 J. VIROL-
OGY 8951, 8955 (2004); Shuchman, supra note 14, at 654-55.
17 In the United States, for example, seasonal influenza causes, on average,
tens of thousands of deaths each year. See William W. Thompson et al., Mortality
Associated with Influenza and Respiratory Syncytial Virus in the United States,
289 JAMA 179, 185 (2003); William W. Thompson et al., Influenza-Associated
Hospitalizations in the United States, 292 JAMA 1333, 1333-34 (2004).
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duction that we as a society desire.1 3 But over the last few
years, the field has come to recognize that IP as an approach
has both significant costs and substantial limits.19 In re-
sponse, an important new scholarly literature on "intellectual
production without intellectual property," or "IP without IP"
has emerged.20
This new literature has two primary strands. The "norms-
based" strand argues that norms sometimes provide a viable
alternative to formal intellectual property law.2 1 CaSe studies
18 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL AGE 11-17 (6th ed. 2012) (summarizing the standard efficiency-based
justification for IP); see also id. at 11 (describing this as "the dominant paradigm
for analyzing and justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection);
infra Part I. I use the term "information" here in the sense in which it is used in
the IP and economics literature, to refer to a broad range of immaterial resources,
from scientific formulas and data, to cultural products in their intangible form (for
example, musical compositions or the text of a novel).
19 For example, IP can be costly because exclusive rights in information can
be extraordinarily hard to define, trace, and value, making transaction problems a
still more serious issue here than they are in the realm of tangible property. It is
limited because it covers only some intellectual goods and indeed cannot be
extended symmetrically across different kinds of information goods. See infra
Part I.
20 Mario Biagioli coined the term "IP Without IP," but it was made salient by
Rochelle Dreyfuss. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodat-
ing Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1437, 1437 n.*, 1439 (2010).
21 See, e.g., Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellec-
tual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. Sci. 187, 187 (2008)
(arguing that norms-based IP is used by French chefs to protect new recipes);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emer-
gence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy,
94 VA. L. REv. 1787, 1809-12 (2008) (arguing that comedians' social norms offer
significant protection for creators' incentives to produce new content); see also
David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller
Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEx. L. REV. 1094, 1146 (2012) (discussing extralegal
regulation in roller derbies); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians'
Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123
passin (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) (describing the role of norms in sustaining
creation among magicians); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 511, 577-84 (2013) (explaining why tattooers "have opted consistently for
informal social norms rather than the formal property-like rules of copyright
law"). This strand has been strongly influenced by the work of law and norms
scholars. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124-30
(1992) (discussing the diamond industry's reliance on internal norms and proce-
dures to handle disputes); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGH-
BORS SETTLE DISPUTES 176-78 (1991) (discussing how neighbors often settle
disputes outside of courts). The norms-based IP without IP literature should be
distinguished from a contiguous literature that questions the need for IP in vari-
ous industries, such as fashion, but that does not invoke norms as an alternative
means to support creative work. See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal
Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyright-
able?, 24 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1121, 1155 (2007); Kal Raustiala & Christo-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1539
in this vein have shown that groups such as magicians, stand-
up comedians, and French chefs successfully create immate-
rial goods, relying on informal norms that typically resemble IP
rights and that are backed up by reputational sanctions.2 2 A
second "commons-based" strand of this literature has emerged
from Yochai Benkler's work. 2 3 Drawing on examples such as
open source software and Wikipedia, Benkler argues that the
advent of networked digital computers has unleashed the po-
tential for more open and collaborative forms of information
production.2 4  He describes commons-based production as
driven primarily by social motivation and/or strategies of indi-
rect appropriation.25 It operates, he argues, via emergent coop-
eration and involves "rare use of formal processes; never of law
or managerial fiat." 2 6
pher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1718-32 (2006). These studies focus not on
norms, but on special qualities of particular creative goods or markets that make
low-IP environments a stable equilibrium.
22 For example, one such account focuses on magicians, who invent new
magic tricks with regularity, although IP law provides little effective protection for
such tricks. The secret, the author argues, is in the informal norms that stand in
for-and seem to closely track-formal IP law. These norms, for example, forbid
the copying of tricks created by others, unless the tricks have been widely shared,
published, or sold. There is also a strong norm against revealing the secrets of
magicians to non-magicians. Violations of these norms can result in serious
reputational harm, and forms of retaliation, such as "not be[ing] invited to give
lectures, .. . perform in magic competitions, or ifeature] in trade publications."
Loshin, supra note 21, at 138.
23 See YocHAi BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETwORKs (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). The
banner of the commons has been taken up by many, and most prominently by
Madison, Frischmann, Strandburg. See Michael Madison, Brett M. Frischmann
& Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment,
95 CORNELL L. REv. 657 (2010).
24 BENKLER, supra note 23, at 99-102. Benkler also refers to this mode as
.peer production," which is characterized by "peers who interact and collaborate
without being organized on either a market-based or a managerial/hierarchical
model." Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 23, at 381.
25 See id. at 424-25; BENKLER, supra note 23, at 99. Indirect appropriation
facilitates the more open forms of production that Benkler describes in market
settings, such as when lawyers or open-source software firms sell services without
asserting exclusive rights over the information produced in the process. Benkler,
Coase's Penguin, supra note 23, at 424-25.
26 Yochai Benkler, Commons and GrowtL The Essential Role of Open Com-
mons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1499, 1554 (2013). Elsewhere he
recognizes that open source software licenses may play an important role in
stabilizing cooperation. See Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 23, at 445
("This commitment would require specific licenses that secure access to work over
time to everyone, including contributors."). Implicitly, he suggests that this is not
reliance on law in some sense, because it seeks only to secure the commons from
incursions from IP, so that in a world without IP, open source software might not
require even this form of recourse to law. See id.
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Skeptics, however, have remained unpersuaded that this
emerging literature reveals a robust or important alternative to
IP. They argue that the norms-based strand focuses on "niche"
settings, where the value of information is low and where
groups are close-knit.2 7 If groups are large or loose-knit, and/
or where asset values or capital costs are high, in turn, they
argue that "IP without IP" will "tend to be replaced by property-
based arrangements."28 They contend, drawing on the existing
law and norms literature, that a system that relies on norms
backed up by reputational sanctions will work well only if peo-
ple are closely enough connected to one another to observe
rule-breaking and to care about their reputation in the group.
If the information goods being produced have more value, then
participants may also have stronger incentives to defect. If
capital costs are high, self-funding will be difficult. But without
property, groups may have difficulty accessing external fund-
ing. If, however, "IP without IP" can only operate in these set-
tings, then it truly may be a "niche" phenomenon that does not
deserve substantial attention.
The "commons-based" strand identifies more valuable
forms of creation that often emerge from large and dispersed
groups. But here too, capital costs tend to be low. With its
focus on intrinsic motivation and technology, the commons-
based literature also arguably offers a too-rosy conception of
unmediated social cooperation.29 Critics point out that such
27 See Robert P. Merges, Economics of Intellectual Property Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, at *7 (Francesco Parisi ed., forthcoming), http:/
/papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2412251 [https://perma.cc/
EAE4-UFWW]; see also Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1755 (2010) (arguing that "the sharing model works in
settings that are small in scale, size, value, and diversity"). The term "close-knit"
is important to the law and norms literature, because it describes the conditions
under which individuals, acting informally, are thought to be able to enforce
norms successfully. While it sometimes is taken to describe the small size of a
group, more accurately understood, a group is close-knit "when informal power is
broadly distributed among group members and the information pertinent to infor-
mal control circulates easily among them." ELLICKSON, supra note 21, at 177-78;
see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit
Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 359, 359-360 (2003) (citing Ellickson's definition and
contrasting close-knit groups with loose-knit groups).
28 Barnett, supra note 27, at 1755; see also Merges, supra note 27, at *7
("[O]nce groups grow beyond a certain size, and the economic value of their activi-
ties passes some threshold, informal norms cease to work.").
29 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Salil K. Mehra, Wikitruth through Wikiorder,
59 EMORY L.J. 151, 155 (2009) (arguing that work on commons-based peer pro-
duction "generally hals] not articulated a mechanism that would coordinate such
altruistic production"); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Review: Wealth Without Markets?,
116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1493-95 (2007) (arguing that Benkler does not "adequately
confront" the problem that commons-based communities are vulnerable to mall-
15452017]1
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systems do not address the power of bad actors-or "trolls"-to
sabotage cooperation.3 0 They argue that market-proprietary
production is better able to discipline such actors and so is
more durable.3 1 Contemporary empirical accounts of several of
the leading examples from the commons literature also show
them as more complex and fraught than first supposed.
Wikipedia today, for example, is governed by an extraordinary
array of rules and sanctions, and has an active and formal
internal dispute settlement system.32
Finally, both strands of the "IP without IP" literature have
not clearly confronted the most analytically powerful aspect of
the market-based account: the claim that markets not only
produce information but also direct investments appropriately
toward collective social aims. The canonical defense of IP is
that it directs investment "efficiently," because it permits dis-
persed market signals of preference to drive investments in new
information.3 3 The strong version of this argument is clearly
problematic, given both the long-standing critiques of efficiency
as a value34 and the pervasive problem of market failures in
information production.35 But the canonical defense of IP does
at least respond to the normative sensibility that underpins the
field: innovative activities should both be reasonably effective
and serve socially defined priorities.3 6
Magicians and comedians produce creative works, to be
sure, but do they produce enough of them, or the right kind,
from a social perspective? The norms literature has largely
cious users). This is perhaps particularly so given what we know about the
preconditions of cooperation in the tangible commons. See the Ostrom discus-
sion infra Part IV.
30 Strahilevitz, supra note 29, at 1495; Hoffman & Mehra, supra note 29, at
160.
31 Strahilevitz, supra note 29, at 1495.
32 See DARIUsz JEMIELNIAK, COMMON KNOWLEDGE? AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WIKIPEDIA
17-22, 29-84 (2014).
33 See infra notes 74-75; 81-82.
34 See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191,
200-01 (1980) (providing a normative critique of wealth maximization).
35 See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intel-
lectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REv. 970, 981-93 (2012).
36 These values are typically understood as welfarist in nature. See William
Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 177 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). In the United States
in particular, the field is structured by collective priorities rather than, say, con-
ceptions of authors' rights. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 11-12
(making this point and suggesting that this value inheres in the U.S.
Constitution).
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ignored the question.3 7 If commons-based peer production is
driven in significant part by individual motives, may it some-
times produce the wrong kinds of goods from a social perspec-
tive? The commons literature tends to assume this question
away by describing commons-based creation as "intrinsically"
or "socially" motivated.38
I To counter critics, the field needs examples of "IP without
IP" that are capital intensive and produce valuable social
goods. The most informative examples will involve loose-knit
groups that are able to sustain cooperation over time, despite
threats from within and without. The most normatively attrac-
tive instances of "IP without IP" will also have mechanisms to
link investment to social aims.
This Article describes just such a case.39 The Flu Network
is capital intensive, produces goods of enormous social value,
and has operated successfully for decades without any signifi-
cant recourse to intellectual property rights. It has succeeded
despite its global reach and loose-knit nature,40 and despite
significant internal conflict, including a recent crisis so signifi-
cant that the Network nearly collapsed. That crisis triggered
37 Many of the central contributions in the literature do not address alloca-
tion at all. See Fagundes, supra note 21; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 21;
Loshin, supra note 21. But see Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 21, at 1856-57
(noting that the informal IP regime encourages jokes that are "point-of-view"
driven and so harder to steal). The leading examples in the literature focus on
information goods produced in market settings, such as comedy clubs and res-
taurants, and presumably would draw upon the same normative defense that the
market-exclusionary account draws on, that links market signals to social value.
But at times they also invoke intrinsic motivations, and could be read to suggest
that there are other values at stake in the system (the transcendence of art, for
example) that also shape its productive output. They also tend to say little about
the potential problem that without property, the goods in question may be pro-
duced but in inadequate supply. But see, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 21,
at 1858-59 (implying that a greater role for formal IP in comedy might have little
net effect on the amount of comedy produced, because it would increase returns
but also transaction costs).
38 This tends to obscure the reality of social conflict and hierarchy, as well as
a tendency for individuals and groups to have particular-and sometimes exclu-
sive-interests. Many more of Wikipedia's editors are men than women, and from
the global North rather than the South, likely contributing to significant gendered
and geographic disparities in coverage. See, e.g., Tom Simonite, The Decline of
Wikipedia, 116 MIT Tech. Rev. 51, 52 (2013) ("Among the significant problems
that aren't getting resolved is the site's skewed coverage: its entries on Pok[6]mon
and female porn stars are comprehensive, but its pages on female novelists or
places in sub-Saharan Africa are sketchy."); Wikipedia, Gender Bias, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender bias onwikipedia [https://perma.cc/CYH7-
GHLS] (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
39 For more on the value of the case study approach and the methods that I
use here see Appendix A.
40 See infra subpart III.B.
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years of high-level diplomatic negotiations and led to legal
agreements that provide an exceptionally good window into the
norms and rules that are central to the Network's success.4 '
The Flu Network, as I will describe, works via a distinct
model of information production that we can call "open sci-
ence." Although a schematic description of open science has
existed for several decades, the model has received almost no
attention in the legal literature.4 2 In open science, those mak-
ing new discoveries freely share them rather than excluding
others. In exchange, they earn reputational credit, which in
turn can lead to increased funding and salary. Information
sharing allows scientists to judge the quality of one another's
41 This conflict also provides methodological advantages, because it facili-
tates "process tracing." See Appendix A.
42 The foundations of the open science system were first described by the
sociologist Robert Merton, who famously emphasized the importance of priority
and sharing to scientific work. See generally Robert K. Merton, Priorities in Scien-
tific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology ofScience, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 635, 645-46
(1957) (making these points). Drawing directly on Merton's work, Partha Das-
gupta and Paul David proposed a schematic model of open science two decades
ago. See Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, Toward a New Economics of Science,
23 RES. POL'Y 487, 499 (1994). Their model has been invoked sporadically in the
legal literature, but has never received sustained attention. See, e.g., Bemardita
Escobar Andrae, Scientific Productivity and Gender Performance Under Open and
Proprietary Science Systems: The Case of Chile in Recent Years, 19 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 799, 799-800 (2011) (briefly describing Dasgupta and
David's account of open science); Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Vari-
ables, and Science Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1601, 1622 (2010) (citing
David's concept of open science in passing); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic ofReciproc-
ity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REv. 71, 91 (2003) (invoking
Dasgupta and David in a broader discussion of theories of collective action). The
importance of public funding to science has been recognized by some in the IP
literature, but as will become clear, understanding open science-what makes it
work well, or fail-requires far more than simple recognition of the role of public
funding in science. While the existing literature has taken note of Merton's ac-
count of scientific norms, it also has focused dominantly on the obligation to
share, and not engaged with the more elaborate open science model-and with
potential failures within open science-the way I do here. See, e.g., Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,
97 YALE. L.J. 177, 180-81 (1987) (relying on Merton to argue that there is a
tension between norms in biotechnology and the recent expansion of patents in
that domain); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Researcly Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 90 (1999) (invoking
Mertonian "communism" in science, and arguing that scientific sharing is plausi-
bly efficient and should be reinforced by law). Robert Merges and Kathy
Strandburg have sought to develop an understanding of science as distinct from
the market-exclusionary system, in ways compatible with the account I develop
here. See Katherine Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of Research Materials
and Tacit Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIEs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
85, 92 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press. 2010); Robert P.
Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case ofScientific Research,
13 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145, 146 (2009). Neither, however, engages with the
processes, cycles, and tensions of open science as I do here.
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work. Financial support typically comes from governments,
which rely significantly upon scientific reputation and priori-
ties to inform their decisions. Open science works very differ-
ently than the market-exclusionary model of information
production but, like that same system, has plausibly effective
mechanisms to mobilize decentralized information and to dy-
namically link investment to social aims.
The case study developed here helps validate the open sci-
ence model, but it also offers some important correctives to it.
For example, rules in open science-such as those mandating
credit or forbidding exclusive appropriation through patents-
are often more difficult to enforce than the basic model sug-
gests. There is also more potential for misalignment between
states' interests and scientists' interests than the basic model
predicts. The basic model also can give us no reason to think
open science will respond adequately to global aims or needs,
given the potential for conflict between funders and the simple
fact that many states lack the resources and/or the structures
of political accountability that are presupposed in the basic
model. Open science, as I describe, will in fact have difficulty
generating investment in accordance with global need, and will
tend to respond more to polities with more resources and with
more accountable governments.
A closer look at the example offered by the Network, how-
ever, also allows us to better understand how conflicts such as
these are managed in open science. Addressing these tensions
in the Network has required not merely norms, intrinsic moti-
vations, and technology-the resources stressed in the existing
"IP without IP" literature. It has also required recourse to orga-
nizations and to law. By linking an empirical analysis of the
Network to the most sophisticated body of literature that ana-
lyzes the informal cooperation of groups-the literature
spawned by Elinor Ostrom's work on the commons-I show
that the Network has used organizations and law to serve many
of the same functions that are important to cooperation in
groups managing common-pool resources. Organizations and
law help clearly define group and resource boundaries, facili-
tate the monitoring and enforcement of rules, manage the in-
terpretation and revision of norms, and mediate the group's
relationship to the "outside." They can also be critical to the
cultivation of a shared ethos and of trust, which are also cru-
cial for cooperation, especially in loose-knit groups where en-
forcement is inevitably imperfect. Finally, organizations and
law in the Network have also helped those within it cultivate a
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sense of purpose. A close study of the Network, in fact, requires
us to move beyond a simplified rational actor model of open
science and "IP without IP," as we begin to recognize the role
that law and organizations play in sustaining both.
The account developed here decisively refutes the most im-
portant criticisms of the "IP without IP" literature. First, it
shows that capital-intensive production without IP can be sus-
tained over time to produce information goods of extraordina-
rily high value. Generalizing from the Network's experience, I
suggest that even where capital costs are high, creation with-
out IP can be effective and responsive to social aims, if reputa-
tional and evaluative circuits can be linked to a source of
capital, as in open science. Second, the account here shows
that loose-knit groups can cooperate, even under extraordinary
strain. But criticisms of the "IP without IP" literature have
some merit: that cooperation is not likely to be sustained under
strain by norms alone. Rather, where stakes are high and
groups are loose-knit, cooperation without IP likely requires
recourse to organizations and law. In its most importance in-
stances, order without IP will not be order without law, nor will
it be order without constraint or coordination.
This is emphatically not to say, as some critics have, that
"IP without IP" inevitably relies upon forms of exclusion that
"operate with an approximately equivalent effect" to IP itself.4 3
In the Network, organizations and law are being used instead to
produce the kinds of governance and interpersonal goods de-
scribed by scholars like Ostrom and Elizabeth Anderson, in the
support of a production system that is more oriented toward
sharing rather than exclusion. The law deployed here is, in
addition, not conventional IP law but rather contract law. Al-
though contract law lacks some of the power of IP, it may be
perfectly adequate to sustain "IP without IP," especially when it
supports not a demand-side model but a supply-side model
that is contingent upon cooperation among an identifiable
(even if not close-knit) group.
In the pages that follow, Part I provides background on
influenza, and describes the key information production tasks
required to respond to the threat of seasonal and pandemic flu.
Part II develops a detailed empirical account of the Flu Net-
work, based upon three-dozen interviews, as well as patent
analysis, citation analysis, analysis of sample and sequence
sharing, and archival research. Part III describes the system of
43 Barnett, supra note 27, at 1754.
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production that sustains the Network, drawing on the existing
model of open science. It then returns to the example of the
Network to clarify some of the allocative mechanisms (and po-
tential problems) of the basic model, and to describe how the
Network has succeeded, particularly in periods of enormous
strain. Part IV derives lessons from the case study, arguing
that the next wave of this literature should focus on a new set
of examples and also return to old examples, to see them anew
in the wake of the lessons that the Flu Network has to teach us.
I
INFLUENZA, IP, AND OPEN SCIENCE
A. Influenza: A Primer
Colloquially, we often call any sudden and severe respira-
tory illness "the flu." True influenza, however, is caused by a
distinct family of RNA viruses.4 4 It usually has mild effects in
its seasonal form-fever, aches, and respiratory symptoms that
last up to a week-but it can be extraordinarily lethal when a
new pandemic strain emerges.45 A pandemic like the one in
1918-1920 could take the lives of nearly two million people in
the United States alone.4 6
Influenza pandemics have emerged with some regularity
over the last century,4 7 and new influenza pandemics today are
considered inevitable, given the nature of the virus and condi-
tions of contemporary agriculture and travel.48 The core prob-
lem is the volatile nature of the influenza virus itself. Influenza
mutates constantly. Small mutations in the virus cause pre-
44 GEORGE DEHNER, INFLUENZA: A CENTURY OF SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH RE-
SPONSE 23 (2012).
45 See supra notes 4-5.
46 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, supra note 5.
47 de Jong et al., supra note 2, at 554.
48 See W. Bruine De Bruin et al, Expert Judgments of Pandemic Influenza
Risks, 1 GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 178, 189-90 (2006) (discussing the likelihood of an
influenza outbreak); Richard J. Webby & Robert G. Webster, Are We Ready for
Pandemic Influenza?, 203 SCIENCE 1519, 1520-21 (2003) ("Influenza experts agree
that another influenza pandemic is inevitable and may be imminent."); see also
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON REENGINEERING THE INFLUENZA VACCINE PRODUCTION EN-
TERPRISE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, at v-vi (2010) [hereinafter
PCAST REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/PCAST-Influenza-Vaccinology-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SWF-VACE]
(framing the importance of effective vaccine supply as a matter of when, not if, the
next influenza pandemic occurs); Patrick Adams, The Influenza Enigma, 90 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 250, 251 (2012) (describing risk factors thought to increase
the risk of pandemic outbreaks, such as intensification of agriculture).
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dictable waves of sickness almost every year.4 9 Seasonal flu is
less serious than pandemic flu, but still can be deadly to the
vulnerable, and particularly the elderly.50 The virus can also
change in more radical ways, reshuffling its genome, typically
in an animal host, resulting in strains that are radically differ-
ent from any that have circulated before.5 1 Pandemics occur
when radically new strains that evade immunities emerge, and
become transmissible between humans.
Two kinds of measures are critical to the public health
response to both pandemic and seasonal flu: "social counter-
measures" that aim to contain its spread, and "medical coun-
termeasures" such as vaccines and treatments that can
prevent infection and improve survival rates.
Social countermeasures range in intensity from, for exam-
ple, hand-washing to school closings and travel restrictions.
Their efficacy depends on characteristics of the pandemic
strain, as well as on how early the measures can be enacted.52
The Network's rapid reaction to H5N1 via the poultry cull in
Hong Kong was critical to stopping human cases there, for
example, and significantly slowed the advance of new human
cases to other regions.53 Once a new strain emerges that is
transmissible between humans, models suggest it might still
be contained to a particular region, if it is only moderately
infectious.5 4 A highly infectious strain, however, will inevitably
spread quickly around the world, even in the face of highly
intrusive restrictions such as bans on air travel.55
Medicines that directly combat the influenza virus exist,
but recent studies suggest hat they may alleviate some symp-
49 Alan J. Hay, The Virus Genome and Its Replication, in TEXTBOOK OF INFLU-
ENZA 43, 43 (Karl G. Nicholson et al. eds., 1998).
50 See Thompson et al., Mortality Associated with Influenza, supra note 17, at
185; Thompson et al., Influenza-Associated Hospitalizations, supra note 17, at
1333.
51 JAN WILSCHUT & JANET E. MCELHANEY, INFLUENZA 45-46 (2005). Pandemic
strains like the one that struck in 1919 have been traced to flu viruses that
circulated in birds, so scientists are particularly concerned when they see a new
avian flu that is capable of infecting a human. de Jong et al., supra note 2, at 554.
They are still more concerned when that flu can also infect other animal hosts,
and shows signs of being very lethal. See Rosenwald, supra note 7, at 183.
52 Arin Dutta, The Effectiveness of Policies to Control a Human Pandemic: A
Literature Review 40-44 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No.
4524, 2008).
53 See infra text accompanying notes 192-93.
54 Dutta, supra note 52, at 40. Social control measures such as school clos-
ings may also slow the rate of spread of influenza. See, e.g., Gerargo Chowell et
al., Characterizing the Epidemiology of the 2009 Influenza A/H1NI Pandemic in
Mexico, PLOS MED., May 24, 2011, at 6-7.
55 Dutta, supra note 52, at 42.
1552 [Vol. 102:1539
2017] OPEN SCIENCE IN INFLUENZA 1553
toms yet have no significant effect on flu-related complica-
tions.5 6 Flu vaccines, therefore, are the most important
medical countermeasure against influenza. Indeed, they are
often described as the single most important tool in this con-
text,57 because they are the only one that can provide pro-
longed individual protection against infection.58
Influenza vaccines have been around since the 1940s, and
are still largely made in the same way that they were then-by
growing live influenza viruses in eggs, purifying and killing
them, and administering them by injection.59 Such vaccines
appear to be reasonably or even highly effective, but only if they
are well matched to circulating strains.6 0
The traditional mode of vaccine production, however, may
be inadequate in a pandemic. Egg-based production of vac-
cines is difficult to scale up quickly.6 1 It is also slow, taking at
least five months, and at times up to a year.62 With seasonal
flu, early strain selection leaves eight to nine months to pro-
56 Tom Jefferson et al, Neuraminidase inhibitors for preventing and treating
influenza in adults and children, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2014,
Issue 4. Art. No.: CDO08965. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CDOO8965.pub4.
57 See, e.g., Key Facts About Seasonal Flu Vaccine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/keyfacts.htm [https://perma
.cc/KL3Z-TXPD] ("An annual seasonal flu vaccine is the best way to reduce your
risk of getting sick with seasonal flu and spreading it to others.").
58 Questions and Answers on Pandemic Influenza Vaccine, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (May 9, 2007), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/keyfacts.htm [https://per
ma.cc/ VP57-S2ZA].
59 PCAST REPORT, supra note 48 at 11; Interview with John McCauley, Direc-
tor, WHO Collaborating Ctr. for Reference & Research on Influenza, U.K. (Nov. 18,
2011).
60 See, e.g., Kristin L. Nichol, Efficacy/Clinical Effectiveness of Inactivated
Influenza Virus Vaccines in Adults, in TEXTBOOK OF INFLUENZA 358, 361 (Karl G.
Nicholson et al. eds., 1998) (collecting studies that report between 70 and 90
percent efficacy for years when the vaccine is well matched); Tom Jefferson et al.,
Vaccines for Preventing Influenza in Healthy Adults, 2010 Cochrane Database of
Sys. Rev. 1, 7 (2010) (estimating 73% efficacy in healthy adults); Michael T.
Osterholm et al., Efficacy and Effectiveness of Influenza Vaccines: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 12 LANcET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 36, 39 (2012) (estimat-
ing 59% efficacy in healthy adults); Vaccine Effectiveness - How Well Does the Flu
Vaccine Work?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
flu/about/qa/vaccineeffect.htm [https://perma.cc/CZ4R-XHW8] ("[Riecent stud-
ies show vaccine reduces the risk of flu illness by about 50% to 60% among the
overall population during seasons when most circulating flu viruses are like the
vaccine viruses.").
61 Egg-based production, for example, relies upon the availability of millions
of fertilized chicken eggs of a precise age, raised in special, sterile environments.
The number of eggs required is also enormous. The third-largest consumer of
eggs in the UK is a flu vaccine manufacturing plant. See PCAST REPORT, supra
note 48, at 34.
62 A Description of the Process of Seasonal and H5N1 Influenza Vaccine Virus
Selection and Development, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 10 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www
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duce the vaccine.63 In a serious pandemic, however, this delay
significantly undermines the ameliorative potential of vac-
cines.64 Egg-based production may also not work for a pan-
demic avian strain, because avian strains can kill the eggs in
which they are grown.65
In the wake of H5N1, governments have therefore poured
enormous sums into improving vaccine manufacture, much of
this going to the private sector.66 The new technologies under
experiment are numerous and complex,67 but nearly all of
them would still depend upon the use of circulating virus
strains as the basis for the vaccine, and have received substan-
tial public sector support.68
.who. int/influenza/resources/documents/influenza v ccine-virusselection/en
[http://perma.cc/8R27-G8UD] [hereinafter WHO Selection Description].
63 PCAST REPORT, supra note 48, at 2.
64 For example, it was nearly six months after the identification of the HlN1
outbreak that the first doses of the pandemic vaccine became available, which
was too late to provide protection for most of the population in the United States.
Id. at 2. It would have taken nearly a year to produce enough vaccine to protect
the whole U.S. population against H1N1. Id. at vi.
65 See Anatole Krattiger et al., Intellectual Property Management Strategies to
Accelerate the Development and Access of Vaccines and Diagnostics: Case Studies
on Pandemic Influenza, Malaria and SARS, 2 INNOVATION STRATEGY TODAY 67, 76-77
(2006).
66 The U.S. Congress, for example, appropriated nearly $6 billion to improv-
ing pandemic preparedness in 2007. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR
REs. & TECH., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FUNDING 1-2 (2007), https://www.medi-
calcountermeasures.gov/barda/documents/hhspanfluspending-0706.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZQP-JE7X. Some of this money went to improve global sys-
tems such as the Flu Network. Id. at 2. About $1.5 billion went directly to private
sector companies, to help these companies improve manufacturing facilities and
techniques, and to meet regulatory demands, particularly in order to speed along
non-egg based technologies for pandemic vaccines. Id.; see also Kevin Freking, 5
Drug Companies Get Flu Vaccine Funding, WASH. POST (May 4, 2006, 8:40 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/04/
AR2006050400893.html [https://perma.cc/C7G4-4gM8] (reporting that several
drug manufacturers received more than $1 billion in Federal funding in 2006 to
fund development for speedier mass production of virus vaccines).
67 For an accessible overview of recent influenza vaccine technology develop-
ments, see generally PCAST REPORT, supra note 48. The most important of these
include cell-based manufacture (which is increasingly viable and could eliminate
the need for eggs), live attenuated vaccines (which are old but only recently used
more widely), and dose-sparing adjuvants. See id., at 34-35, 46.
68 There is some hope that a universal vaccine may be possible, which would
be based upon parts of the virus that do not change, and so provide broad and
perhaps long-term protection, and not rely on access to this year's strains for the
vaccine. PCAST REPORT, supra note 48, at 51-52. Recent research suggests hat
this pathway may have promise, but it is still highly uncertain whether it will
succeed. Id. at 53-55; Antionetta Impagliazzo et al., A Stable Trimeric Influenza
Hemagglutinin Stem as a Broadly Protective Immunogen, 349 SCIENCE 1301, 1301
(2015). Notably, public sector funding has also been key here: researchers at the
U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease are leading one of the
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Synthesizing this, we can identify two key types of informa-
tional needs where influenza is concerned. The first is surveil-
lance. New strains of influenza emerge constantly, and
circulate around the world quickly.69 To have effective vac-
cines, as well as to prepare hospitals and other health agencies
for particularly severe seasons or new pandemics, scientists
must constantly monitor the virus as it evolves around the
world. New viruses must be typed, so scientists can isolate
which strains are circulating and quickly identify any radical
new strains that might result in a pandemic outbreak. Scien-
tists also must track the health effects of different circulating
strains (identifying how many cases are showing up in hospi-
tals, how severe they are, and the like), to develop an accurate
picture of the dangers of different strains. As I will describe,
these are among the key tasks of the Flu Network.
A second set of informational needs relate to medical cout-
termeasures. Vaccines, in particular, are considered the most
urgent and promising domain of development. To generate an
effective vaccine for seasonal and pandemic flu, scientists must
select the appropriate strains to be included in vaccines, isolate
corresponding viral strains, and modify them to grow well in
industrial settings.70 Scientists also need reagents that allow
evaluation of the potency of new vaccines-a critical regulatory
step, particularly because vaccines are produced in slightly
different form each year.7 1 Last, there is a need for forward-
looking research that can help speed vaccine production, move
us away from egg-based production, and-though there is a
major new initiatives, and another involves key collaborators from the public
sector. See Hadi M. Yassine et al., Hemagglutinin-Stem Nanoparticles Generate
Heterosubtypic Influenza Protection, 21 NATURE MED. 1065, 1065 n. 1 (2015) (NIAID
team); Impagliazzo et al., supra note 68, at 1301 (involving researchers from
public sector).
69 Colin A. Russell et al., The Global Circulation of Seasonal Influenza A
(H3N2) Viruses, 320 Sci. 340, 341 (2008). New strains have long been thought to
typically emerge in East and South-East Asia (where influenza circulates continu-
ously), and spread westward across the world, making surveillance in this region
a high priority. Id- but see Patrick Adams, The Influenza Enigma, 90 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 250, 251 (2012) (providing evidence that viral patterns of circulation
may not be this predictable).
70 WHO Selection Description, supra note 62, at 7. To make seed strains for
avian strains (which kill eggs), scientists must use synthetic methods, via a pro-
cess known as "reverse genetics." WHO Selection Description, supra note 62, at 9;
PCAST REPORT, supra note 48 at 24-25.
71 See Conversations with the Director: Michael Shaw, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/about/cdcdirector/con-
versations/shaw.html [https://perma.cc/T5MT-YCY2] (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
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great deal of uncertainty about the viability of this approach-
ideally develop vaccines with more universal potential.7 2
B. The Economics of Information Production in Influenza
The economics of information goods begin with the insight
that information has the qualities of a public good: it is non-
rivalous and also difficult to exclude in the absence of strong
legal entitlements (or, IP rights).73 As a result, if we want "effi-
cient" levels of production of information goods in markets, we
may need exclusive rights regimes.7 4
This forms the basis of the canonical justification for IP.7 5
If information is expensive to produce but cheap to reproduce,
actors in competitive markets will not produce as much of it as
we wish from a social perspective. IP rights help create dy-
namic incentives for the production of information, because
they allow investors to exclude competitors for a period of time
and so recoup their investment.
It is also widely recognized, however, that IP generates inef-
ficiencies from both static and dynamic perspectives.76 The
non-rivalrous nature of information means that its marginal
cost-the cost needed to produce an additional unit for con-
sumption-is zero.7 7 In static perspective, only at a price of
zero, then, will information be consumed at socially optimal
amounts. IP also creates dynamic inefficiencies because infor-
mation is an input and output of its own production.78 Supra-
marginal cost pricing suppresses uptake by producers.7 9 This
is why leading information economists, harkening back to the
foundational work of Kenneth Arrow, actively debate the com-
72 See supra note 68.
73 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVIY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 623-24 (Nat'1 Bureau Comm. for Econ. Res., Comm. on Econ.
Growth of the Soc. Sci. Res. Council ed., 1962).
74 Efficiency in this context is usually defined via either the Kaldor-Hicks or
wealth-maximizing criterion. Fisher, supra note 36, at 177.
75 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 18, at 12-13; Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033,
1037-40 (2005).
76 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 23, at 36-40 (outlining such inefficiencies);
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATIONS AND INCENTIVES 140 (2006) (same).
77 See Arrow, supra note 73, at 614-15.
78 For more on this problem, and additional drawbacks such as the potential
for racing, see Kapczynski, supra note 35, at 982.
79 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law. 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29, 30-31 (1991).
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parative efficiency of IP and various alternatives, such as gov-
ernment grants and prizes.8 0
The most powerful defense of the superiority of IP over
these other approaches is based on a simple challenge: How
will governments know which information resources we want,
and how much we should spend?"' The main virtue of IP over
other alternatives is said to be its allocative advantage: because
it relies on prices and markets, it is thought to be a good tool for
mobilizing decentralized information about demand.8 2 Alloca-
tion, it turns out, is the key to economic arguments about
information production. Because information is non-rivalrous,
concerns about conservation or depletion that are important in
the tangible property context are here irrelevant. You cannot
deplete information, but you can waste the resources you in-
vest in developing information, or make poor decisions about
which information goods to invest in.
The allocative argument for the market-exclusionary ap-
proach is powerful. But recent scholarship on IP has sharp-
ened our understanding of its limits. For example, property
regimes require frictionless transactions if efficient allocation is
to occur. But transaction costs are particularly acute where
information is concerned, because of intense uncertainties re-
lated to the bounds of IP rights, as well as their value.8 3 There
80 See Arrow, supra note 73, at 623; Brian D. Wright, The Economics of
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
691, 691, 697-98, 701 (1983).
81 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 19-20 (1969).
82 See id. at 12-13; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 24 (2003).
83 For example, entitlements in information are often unclear, because the
metes and bounds of information are far more difficult to map than the metes and
bounds of tangible resources. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spil-
lovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 274-75 (2007). The bounds of associated legal
entitlements are also often unclear. See, e.g., id. at 275 (noting that "[ilt is diffi-
cult-and in many cases impossible-to know whether one is 'trespassing' upon
another's IP right," and describing the uncertainties generated by the idea/ex-
pression distinction and fair use in copyright, as well as the lack of an indepen-
dent invention defense in patent law). To this can be added major problems in
identification of owners, especially in copyright. See, e.g., David R. Hansen et al.,
Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1,
4-14 (2013) (discussing the pervasive problem of being unable to locate, through
a reasonably diligent search, the owners of old copyrights). Information produc-
tion is also characterized by high levels of uncertainty, making informational
imperfections and asymmetries in bargaining particularly likely. See, e.g., Robert
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 83-84 (1994) (noting that strategic bargain-
ing problems may be especially common in the context of patent law because
advances in technology are particularly hard to value).
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are many settings, additionally, where even if market actors
have strong IP rights, they will underinvest in information
goods. Externalities are one issue here: IP rights will under-
value solutions to pollution problems, for example, because of
pervasive externalities in the "market" for pollution.84 Dis-
counting and the unpredictable nature of innovation are an-
other: IP works poorly to incentivize basic R&D, for example,
because of the high degree of uncertainty and long periods of
time before it yields commercial application.15
Already implicit in this account are several important rea-
sons that market exclusion will not be adequate to produce
most of the information goods we need to address influenza.
The facts, data, and virus samples that are essential to high
quality flu surveillance are classic "basic" information goods.
They must be able to be accessed by many parties and recom-
bined readily to be useful, and it is hard to assign a value in
advance to any particular fact, datum, or sample. IP law also
provides very little protection for these kinds of information
goods.8 6 This may not be a coincidence because an IP law that
did extend to these goods would function poorly to produce the
goods that we need. This is not only because of discounting
84 See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for
Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 CHI. L. REv. 1781, 1812-22 (2015). On the
externality problem in IP more generally, see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note
83.
85 Economists have long concluded that markets are likely to underproduce
"basic" science. See Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 304 (1959); see also Dasgupta & David, supra
note 42, at 490 (discussing the economics of basic research and the divergence
between private and social returns to basic research outlays). The more upstream
a set of research inputs are, for example, the more significant transaction costs
problems are likely to be. Early stage research is likely to be unusually uncertain
in value, making licensing negotiations particularly difficult. See LANDES & POS-
NER, supra note 82, at 307; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 76, at 141 (emphasiz-
ing the problems of information asymmetry in licensing).
86 Patent law only covers new inventions and processes, and excludes from its
scope products of nature, such as wild-type viruses. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2016)
(making eligible for patents "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter"). Also unpatentable are abstract ideas, natural correla-
tions, and discovered facts. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70-71 (2012). Finally, genetic sequences identical to those
found in nature are increasingly considered unpatentable. See Ass'n for Molecu-
lar Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116-19 (2013); D'Arcy v
Myriad Genetics [2015] HCA 35 (Austl.). Copyright law does not cover facts, and
provides no protection for databases absent some level of creativity in their crea-
tion. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1999). Euro-
pean law protects databases under a sul generis regime in certain circumstances,
but this is unusual and not a very robust form of protection. See Directive 96/9/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 25-26.
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and transaction cost dynamics, but also because much of this
information is highly non-excludable even in the presence of
property rights.8 7
The second set of information goods, related to medical
countermeasures and vaccines in particular, are also difficult
to produce in sufficient amount in markets, but for different
reasons. Here, there is much more scope within existing IP law
for exclusive rights. For example, patent claims may cover
modified genetic material,88 diagnostic reagents,89 processes of
making vaccines or therapeutics,9 0 and therapeutic agents
such as small molecule drugs or the viral particles that could
be important to universal vaccines.9 1 For seasonal flu, patents
are a poor incentive, nonetheless, because the xisting technol-
ogies work fairly well (given access to the surveillance goods
described above) .92
Pandemic flu is a far graver concern, but its unpredictabil-
ity creates significant barriers to market-led investment. A se-
rious new flu pandemic is considered inevitable, but rather like
a major earthquake, its timing is highly uncertain.93 One
study surveying experts revealed that they predicted a 100%
chance that a new flu pandemic will occur in the next thirty
years.9 4  But patents last only twenty years, and the dis-
87 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability
and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1902-05 (2013) (providing a theory
and examples of non-excludability and analyzing its implications for patent schol-
arship). One of the Network's most important roles is to announce a new pan-
demic. Such information is extraordinarily valuable, but is not in any practical
way excludable, even if law permitted it to be treated as property.
88 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2115 (concluding that
modified DNA is patentable subject matter); see also Directive 98/44, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 13 (stating in Article 3(2) that
"biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by
means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previ-
ously occurred in nature").
89 See U.S. Patent No. 5,156,949 (filed Dec. 24, 1987) (claiming reagent for
detecting HIV); U.S. Patent No. 6,074,816 (filed Sept. 16, 1994) (claiming reagent
for detecting hepatitis C virus).
90 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (making eligible for patents "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter").
91 Two recent major papers on advances toward universal vaccines, for exam-
ple, disclose patent applications related to the research in question. See Impag-
liazzo et al., supra note 68; Yassineet al., supra note 68.
92 Externalities play a role in undermining incentives for improvements as
well: vaccination confers benefits on others, and individuals may not take these
benefits fully into account when deciding whether to be vaccinated.
93 See supra note 48.
94 Bruine De Bruin et al., supra note 48, at 183-84.
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counted present value for firms of profits many years away
quickly diminishes.
Moreover, in a true pandemic setting, with millions criti-
cally ill, patent holders would be under unthinkable political
pressure to voluntarily permit use of the patent. And in the
alternative, consistent with international law, countries could
simply override patents.9 5 For example, at the highpoint of the
concern about a new avian flu pandemic, it became clear that
one suite of patents could be an impediment to public scien-
tists working to create reference strains for H5N1 vaccines.9 6
The company holding the patents immediately publicly an-
nounced that it would license them to government organiza-
tions and developing countries at no cost, to develop vaccines
for public health purposes.97
In fact, IP will plausibly be least efficacious for some of the
most important kinds of information goods. We might call this
an example of the "bell curve" of property law. Where property
is of low value, or very high value, private property systems
may be difficult to establish or administer. At low value, the
costs of the formal system will often be higher than the re-
wards.98 But where the value of property is exceptionally
high-as would be a patent on a key vaccine component in a
global pandemic-states are unlikely to tolerate property-as-
sovereignty and will act on their own sovereign authority to
override it.@9
Therefore, it is of little surprise that, as implied above and
described in more detail below, the vast majority of the scien-
tific goods we need for influenza have long been produced not
95 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (providing processes for compulsory
licensing of patents).
96 INITIATIVE FOR VACCINE RESEARCH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., MAPPING OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RELATED TO THE PRODUCTION OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINES 18
(2007) (hereinafter IVR REPORT 2007).
97 Id.
98 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 356 (1967).
99 See, e.g., Dealing with Anthrax: Patent Problems Pending, THE ECONOMIST
Oct. 27, 2001, at 14 (describing how, after the anthrax attack in the United States
in 2001, the Canadian government sought to buy a stockpile of generic anthrax
treatments, only relenting when the patent-holding company dramatically re-
duced the price and increased supply); Jill Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer Agrees
to Slash Price for Cipro Drug, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2001, at A3 (describing Bayer's
dramatic reduction of the price for its anthrax drug to the U.S. government after
the HHS secretary threatened to procure generics despite Bayer's patent after the
2001 anthrax attack).
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via markets but via government funding. 00 That funding
might be considered the answer to how information is pro-
duced without IP, but funding alone does not answer any of the
most acute questions posed by the IP literature: How can such
funding work well? What is its logic, when and how might it
succeed or fail, and how, in particular, can it address the criti-
cal allocative question at the center of contemporary informa-
tion economics, and the field of IP law?
The Flu Network provides an excellent case for the explora-
tion of these questions. It is a critical element of our global
scientific and public health infrastructure. It has proven re-
markably stable and successful over time.101 It has operated
for decades without any significant recourse to intellectual
property. How then, has the Network motivated and organized
its work? It is to our case study of the Network's long history,
crisis, and recent reconstruction that we now turn.
100 See supra note 66 (describing government funding of new vaccine technol-
ogies); see also infra subpart II.B (describing the activities and government fund-
ing of the Flu Network). There is some private financing, and a great deal of
private sector patenting (see Appendix B) in influenza research, focused almost
uniformly on medical counter-measures. But much of this receives public fund-
ing, for the reasons described above.
101 WORLD HEALTH ORG., STRENGTHENING RESPONSE TO PANDEMICS AND OTHER PUB-
LIc-HEALTH EMERGENCIES: REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) AND ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (H1NI)
2009 at 75-76 (2011) (in a report by an independent review committee, describing
the Network's rapid response to the H IN 1 swine flu outbreak, concluding that the
Network "had worked well and facilitated the timely detection, identification, ini-
tial characterization and monitoring of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus," and
noting that this was "the first time that a worldwide laboratory initiative was well-
coordinated for an extended period of time"). See Nancy J. Cox et al., Influenza
Global Surveillance for Epidemic and Pandemic Variants, 10 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
467, 469 (1994) (describing the Network as "quite successful"); Interview with
Alan Hay, Former Director, WHO Collaborating Ctr. for Reference & Research on
Influenza, U.K. (Nov. 18, 2011) (commenting that the Network "is still held up
as .. . a prime example[ ] of an international network that works"); see also J.M.
Wood, Selection of Influenza Vaccine Strains and Developing Pandemic Vaccines,
20 VACCINE B40, B40 (2002) (noting the Flu Network as "one of the most success-
ful of the WHO programmes"). For evidence that its strain selection has worked
relatively well, see L. SteinbrCick, T.R. Klingen & A.C. McHardy, Computational
Prediction of Vaccine Strainsfor Human Influenza A (H3N2) Viruses, 88 J. VIROLOGY
12123, 12128 (2014) (66% accuracy); see also Colin A. Russell et al, Influenza
Vaccine Strain Selection and Recent Studies on the Global Migration of Seasonal
Influenza Viruses, 26 VACCINE D31, D32 (2008) (noting that "substantial mis-
match" between WHO strain selections and circulating strains is "infrequent" but
that strain selection could be further improved through better understanding of





A. History and Structure
When the World Health Organization was launched in
1947, one of its first initiatives was the creation of the Flu
Network.102 With 1919 still very much in living memory, the
impetus was clear-by tracing and collecting new flu strains, if
a dangerous new strain emerged, "it might perhaps be possible
to prevent world-wide spread of the disease by means of pro-
phylactic immunization."0 3
The Network began, as it would operate for decades, in
largely informal fashion. 10 4 Several early participants were lu-
minaries in the scientific world, such as Jonas Salk, who in-
vented the polio vaccine.0 5 Through personal contacts, a
small network of elite scientists was developed to share viruses,
techniques, and reagents across borders.106
Since then, the Network has grown substantially and be-
come much more formal in nature. But its basic structure has
remained the same for decades. "National Influenza Centers"
(which I will call "national labs") are responsible for the ground-
level work needed to create the "surveillance-related" informa-
tion goods described above. Today, there are more than 140 of
these labs, in more than 110 countries-0 7 a number that has
been significantly and very deliberately increased over time.108
These national labs work with local doctors and hospitals,
or with sentinel surveillance sites, to collect nose and throat
swabs of sick patients, and to test them for the influenza virus.
102 M.M. Kaplan, The Role of the World Health Organization in the Study of
Influenza, 288 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON SERIES B BIOLOGICAL SCI.
417, 417 (1980).
103 World Health Org., Priority Comm., Proposal for the Setting Up of a Com-
mittee on Influenza Made by the Representative of the Netherlands, U.N. Doc. No.
WHO.IC/P/1 (Apr. 3, 1947) (on fie with author).
104 The Network's institutional home was just "a couple of laboratory rooms
and some animal quarters" in London. Kaplan, supra note 102, at 418.
105 In the 1940s, Salk helped create the first successful influenza vaccine, and
was an early collaborator with the Network. CHARLES HERBERT STUART-HARRIS &
GEOFFREY C. SCHILD, INFLUENZA: THE VIRUSES AND THE DISEASE 165 (1976). Other
famous scientists involved with the Network included Sir Christopher Andrewes,
whose team had first isolated the influenza virus, and who led the London lab.
See Kaplan, supra note 102, at 129; MRC NAT'L INST. FOR MED. RESEARCH, A CEN-
TURY OF SCIENCE FOR HEALTH 233, 238-39 (2015).
106 Kaplan, supra note 102, at 417-19.
107 See National Influenza Centres, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 12, 2017), http:/
/www.who.int/influenza/gisrslaboratory/nationalinfluenza-centres/lst/en
[https://perma.cc/T753-P7BR] [hereinafter Network NICs].
108 Kaplan, supra note 102, at 419.
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Where the virus is present, they perform preliminary genetic or
antigenic analysis to identify the particular sub-strains circu-
lating. 0 9 They also collect relevant epidemiological data (for
example, about flu hospitalization rates) and provide weekly
updates on the influenza situation in their country during their
flu season.1 10
After their preliminary analysis, national labs forward both
representative strains and novel strains on to a WHO "Collabo-
rating Center"-labs that also play a critical role in surveil-
lance, but that in addition generate information goods critical
to medical countermeasures to the flu. For decades, there were
only two CCs-one in London and the other in the US (now, at
the CDC)-which constituted the main scientific leadership of
the Network.11 1 Today, the group is more diversified, with CCs
in Melbourne, Tokyo, Memphis, and most recently Beijing. The
CCs can analyze influenza viruses in much more depth, and
each is a very substantial research institution in its own
right.112 Their terms of reference are also much more demand-
ing than for the national centers. They are required to do more
in-depth analysis of the viruses and data sent on by national
labs, and to share this information with the WHO and other
Network labs.'13 When outbreaks such as H5N1 occur, CCs
are required to help WHO member states by investigating and
responding.114 They also create standard reagents and an-
tisera for labs around the world, which helps standardize diag-
nostic and laboratory practices and facilitates the regulation of
vaccines."5
109 See WHO Global Influenza Program, Terms of Reference for National Influ-
enza Centers, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_1abora
tory/national influenzacentres/terms of-reference fornationalnfluenzascen
tres.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8WD-N5CK].
110 WHO Selection Description, supra note 62, at 4.
111 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101; Kaplan, supra note 102, at 420.
112 For example, all CCs must have Biosafety Level 3 laboratories. See Core
Terms of Reference for WHO Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on
Influenza, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.who.int/entity/influ-
enza/gisrs laboratory/collaboratingcentres/whocccoretor2006.pdf?ua= 1
[https://perma.cc/9RQS-46PF] [hereinafter WHO CC Terms].
113 See WHO CC Terms, supra note 112.
114 These duties are formalized in terms of reference, and labs can be de-
designated if they fail in their assigned tasks. For more on enforcement of these
rules, see infra pp. 168-70.
115 See WHO Selection Description, supra note 62, at 8; WHO CC Terms, supra
note 112. The CCs provide antisera and reagents for free to WHO labs, but may
ask for cost-reimbursement if for-profit clinics want to use them. See Conversa-
tions with the Director: Michael Shaw, supra note 71. Standardization of diagnos-
tic kits and other reagents can dramatically increase efficiency, much as
interchangeable parts on an assembly line do.
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Perhaps most remarkable is the extensive involvement that
the CCs have in the creation of flu vaccines. Twice a year, the
CCs meet with other Network experts, with no manufacturers
in the room, and decide which strains should be included in
seasonal flu vaccines."6 Their recommendations are made
public," 7 and while countries are not required to follow them,
in practice they almost always do.11 When potential pandemic
strains emerge, a similar but much accelerated process is fol-
lowed, in an attempt o protect people and regions that are later
affected with a vaccine matched to the pandemic strain.
CCs and the Network's "essential regulatory labs" (ERLs)
also play a critical role in the creation of information needed to
facilitate influenza vaccines. They help to make the modified,
"high-growth" virus strains that grow well in industrial set-
tings. 11 These seed strains are then transferred, free of
charge, to vaccine manufacturers (typically in the private
sector). 120
B. Motivation in the Network
For the Network to function well, governments must sup-
port it financially. And, its scientists must collect high-quality
samples, rapidly and accurately analyze them, and quickly for-
ward the relevant strains to the WHO Network. Also critical,
116 In a normal year, they meet in February to discuss the Northern hemi-
sphere, and in September to discuss the Southern hemisphere. See WHO Selec-
tion Description, supra note 62, at 6; Reynolds, supra note 9, at 39.
Manufacturers are excluded because there are possible conflicts of interest, for
example because companies may favor strains that are easier to produce or that
they have existing experience with. See Interview with Masato Tashiro, Director,
WHO Collaborating Ctr. for Reference & Research on Influenza, Japan, in Geneva,
Switz. (Nov. 16, 2011).
117 WHO Selection Description, supra note 62, at 6.
118 Interview with Terry Besselaar, WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response Sys. (Nov. 8, 2011); Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101; Interview
with John McCauley, supra note 59; see also WHO Selection Description, supra
note 62, at 9 (noting that sometimes a national regulatory agency will instead
require an antigenically similar strain).
119 WHO Selection Description, supra note 62, at 7 (describing three labs, one
of which is a WHO lab, and another that is closely linked to the Australian CC,
that undertake this work). When pandemic strains are involved, the process may
require synthetic production of seed strains, as happened with H7N9. Summary
of Status of Development and Availability of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Candidate
Vaccine Viruses, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 25, 2013), http://www.who.int/entity/
influenza/vaccines/virus/candidatesreagents/summary_ah7n9cvv_201305
25.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8UM-AERP].
120 Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118; Interview with Masato
Tashiro, supra note 116. Today, vaccine manufacturers benefitting from such
materials are expected to make a financial contribution to facilitate pandemic
preparedness. See infra note 153.
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and demanding, is the work done in the CCs to select the best
strains for vaccines, optimize seed strains, design reagents for
diagnosis, and evaluate vaccine quality. When a new pandemic
strain emerges, work in the Network requires enormous ef-
fort.121 Why do countries support the Network? And why do
scientists in the Network, who are not compensated irectly for
participating in the Network, nonetheless participate?1
2 2 How
do they coordinate their work and mobilize effort with very little
centralized hierarchy? What generates the intensity of effort in
pandemic periods, what facilitates the broad collaboration that
the Network requires for its success, and what stimulates the
path-breaking scientific work that occurs in the most sophisti-
cated labs in the Network?
Here, and when discussing scientific motivation in the Net-
work, I rely significantly on interviews with Network partici-
pants.12 3 Humans, of course, are complicated, and do not
always understand or accurately report their own motives.1
2 4
Where possible, I therefore supplement interviews with data
from other sources, to determine if other evidence is consistent
with what is described by Network scientists.12 5  Notably,
where other-regarding motives and norms are consistently re-
ported, we can also discern a social logic at work that demands
concern for others. Values in the Network, as I will later de-
scribe, are important, even though they do not invariably coin-
cide with behavior.
121 See, e.g., Interview with Michael Shaw, Senior Advisor for Lab. Sci., WHO
Collaborating Ctr. for Reference & Research on Influenza (Feb. 5, 2014) (describ-
ing long hours for CDC scientists when new pandemic strains emerge).
122 Network scientists typically are salaried employees whose compensation is
not keyed in a granular way toward their performance, or even to the hours that
they work. See Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 121 (indicating that
scientists are not paid overtime at the CDC, though certain technicians are eligi-
ble for overtime). Scientists working for firms that operate in the market-exclu-
sionary mode may be compensated in similar ways, raising interesting questions
about whether R&D firms, on the inside, follow something more like a market
exclusionary model or something more like open science.
123 See Appendix A for details of the interview methodology.
124 People may, for example, have poor access to their true motivations, or if
they are aware of their motives, may be inclined to misreport them. They might
emphasize other-regarding concerns, for example, and minimize the degree to
which they act out of self-interest. For more on this, see Appendix A.
125 For example, if facts show (as they do) that scientists in the Network are
not directly compensated from the publication of a paper or sharing of a sample,
this fact is important to show that another form of motivation likely supports
these activities. Similarly, if scientists report open sharing of their data, it matters
that such reports are validated in the norms recently codified by the Network, and
in the databases that host such data.
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1. Government Funding and Motivation
The Network's activity does not correlate to a market-ex-
clusionary mode of information production. Formal intellec-
tual property rights have played no role in supporting the
Network's activities, from its inception through to the present
day. Network labs have only rarely sought patents related to
influenza, and this only recently.12 6 There is no evidence that
any of these patents have been licensed, and some Network
members have perceived the few Network-relevant patents that
they hold as "defensive" in nature. 12 7 As will soon become
clear, these patents did nonetheless have implications for the
Network. In the crucible of the 2005 return of H5N1, they
became a focal point for accusations that some labs were be-
traying the ethos and rules of the Network.12 8
Instead of relying on IP, funding for Flu Network labs has
historically come almost exclusively from public sources-over-
whelmingly government, with modest additional support from
other non-profit sources such as foundations.12 9 Indeed, gov-
ernment support is a precondition for designation as a Network
lab.13 0 Because the vast majority of funding flows from na-
tional governments directly to their laboratories, there is no
centralized accounting of the annual running costs of the Net-
work. It has been estimated, however, at about $56 million. 131
The WHO's budget for Network activities is much smaller,
around $2 million in 2011.132 As this reflects, the WHO has
126 See Appendix B at 5-6.
127 Id. at 7.
128 See infra subpart II.C.
129 WORLD HEALTH ORG., STRENGTHENING THE WHO GLOBAL INFLUENZA SURVEIL-
LANCE NETWORK (GISN), REPORT OF THE 3RD MEETING WITH NATIONAL INFLUENZA CEN-
TRES (NICS) HELD IN HAMMAMET, TUNISIA 13 (2011) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING GISN
REPORT], http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs laboratory/GISNMeetingReport
apr201 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2CA-DBBP; see also Interview with Alan Hay,
supra note 101 ("[Mlost of the national labs are being funded nationally."); Inter-
view with Wenqing Zhang, Team Lead, Virus Monitoring, Assessment & Vaccine
Support (VMV), WHO (Oct. 1, 2013) (explaining that those that are not supported
directly by governments get funding through their status as academic institu-
tions, or through foundations).
130 Interview with Wenqing Zhang, Team Lead, Virus Monitoring, Assessment
and Vaccine Support (VMV), WHO (Nov. 15, 2011).
131 Id.; Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the Sharing of Influ-
enza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, World Health Assembly
Res. WHA 64.5, at 21 n.1 (May 24, 2011) [hereinafter PIP Framework], http://
apps.who.int/gb/pip [https://perma.cc/SV9V-YCMK] (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
132 Interview with Wenqing Zhang, supra note 130. Before H5N1 the WHO
provided no direct funding to national labs, but after H5N1 more resources were
provided, allowing the WHO limited funds for capacity building and targeted
training courses in certain developing countries. Id. Recent contributions from
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historically been responsible for coordinating the Network,
while national governments directly support the labs.133
Why do governments pay these costs, and why do they
participate in the Network? Critically, many governments, par-
ticularly in developed and wealthier developing countries, are
concerned about flu surveillance nationally and want high
quality vaccines.13 4 They want national capacity, and de-
ploying this capacity for the purposes of the Network is a low
cost way to improve vaccines.13 5 Being part of a global scien-
tific network is understood to increase the skills and informa-
tion-base of local scientists, and to give states a voice in the
transnational activities of the Network.13 6
Developing countries that do not use the seasonal flu vac-
cine, but where pandemic strains have been active recently,
may see local influenza surveillance as an important invest-
ment as well. 17 This is less true, however, in countries with
industry have given the WHO additional resources that are now primarily directed
to capacity building in local labs. See infra note 153.
13 See W. Chas. Cockburn, The Programme of the World Health Organization
in Medical Virology, in 6 PROGRESS IN MED. VIROLOGY 175, 177-78 (J.L. Melnick ed.,
1964) (describing the Network in the 1960s as comprised of "national centres
[that] freely give their voluntary collaboration" and identifying WHO's role as coor-
dination, standardization, and collection of information); Interview with Alan Hay,
supra note 101 ("WHO may have had some little startup money or things, but in
general, they don't [fund the labs;] all the time that I've known, WHO didn't give
anything really.").
134 See, e.g., Interview with Anne Kelso, Director, WHO Collaborating Ctr. for
Reference & Research on Influenza, Austl. (Oct. 29, 2013) (describing Australia's
motivation as including interest in the southern strain selection process and
pandemic preparedness).
135 See, e.g., Interview with Ian Gust, Former Member, WHO Expert Comm. on
Virus Diseases, Former Head, Austl. CC (Oct. 16, 2013) ("[Elach of the laborato-
ries which is involved in the WHO Network is already involved in diagnostic or
public health work in their own countries for which they are being funded by their
national or state government. And it's simply a matter of provision of information
that they're already collecting or strains of viruses that they're already collecting
and passing those onto a third party . . . [Participating in the GISRS is] not
without cost. But it's usually built into the cost of running those centers.").
136 See, e.g., Interview with Anne Kelso, supra note 134 ("[Ilt's to the country's
advantage to be part of this Network, to get the inside information, to get the extra
assistance that might flow"); id. (citing the benefits of "having a seat at the table");
Interview with John McCauley, supra note 59 ("I would suspect the benefits of
joining in [for countries] is actually just being part of the community and the
network and to actually know what's going on and therefore be able to advise
when something happens."). This is consistent with what others have observed:
governments tend to be willing to support transnational scientific collaborations
where they see the local benefits as sufficiently large to justify the local expendi-
ture. See CAROLINE S. WAGNER, THE NEW INVISIBLE COLLEGE: SCIENCE FOR DEVELOP-
MENT 107 (2008).
137 Interview with Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General for Health, Sec.&
Environ., World Health Org., in Geneva, Switz. (Nov. 7, 2011) ("[T]his system has
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very limited human and financial resources, and where there is
no emergent pandemic strain or clear impact of seasonal flu.'13
For these reasons, national labs in some developing countries,
and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, tend to be less well-
funded for influenza-related activities and concomitantly less
able to participate in some of the Network's activities.1 3 9 His-
torically, the WHO office provided little direct financial support
to national labs and instead provided support via the provision
of some reagents as well as training.14 0 This has frustrated
some in the national labs, especially where they feel they have
insufficient capacity, for example in terms of the necessary
laboratory equipment, to provide what the WHO requests.14 1
In the aftermath of the H5N1 crisis, the WHO began to
receive funds from donor governments for capacity building,
and so has begun to provide modest support to national labs,
primarily through a virus shipment fund where labs can send
influenza viruses to the WHO CCs for free as well as training
courses.1 4 2 Donor governments also have at times funded na-
tional labs directly, or provided the WHO with earmarked funds
to meet particular needs of national labs. 14 3 The US CDC, for
example, has funded training and shipping fees for national
labs in the Network for a number of years.14 4 Countries thus
are differently situated with respect to their own perceived na-
some role to play in detecting and preparing for a pandemic, so that affects
everybody, and that brings in developing countries as well as developed coun-
tries"); see also Interview with Yuelong Shu, Director, WHO Collaborating Ctr. for
Reference & Research on Influenza, China (Nov. 26, 2013) (explaining that China
is more concerned with pandemics than the seasonal flu).
138 For example, in tropical countries there is no seasonality to influenza,
making its burdens less obvious. See Interview with Masato Tashiro, supra note
116; C&cile Viboud et al., Influenza in Tropical Regions, 3 PLOS MED. 468, 468
(2006).
139 See Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118 (describing the capacity
of the Network in Africa as a significant issue, ameliorated to some degree with
new funds made available after H5N1); see also Interview with Ian Gust, supra
note 116 (describing some national labs historically as having provided very few
samples); Interview with JM Heraud, Head, Virology Unit & Nat'l Influenza Ctr.,
Madag. (Feb. 6, 2014) (describing the funding for his lab in Madagascar, which
comes almost entirely from donors, with very little from the government itself).
140 See Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118.
141 Id.
142 Id. Post H5N1, resources from donor governments have increased, and
have been used by the WHO to address such gaps, for example by funding modest
capacity-building in labs particularly in Africa, and covering the shipping costs for
national labs that are sending viruses to CCs (paid for by a fund created by the
CDC). See Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118; Interview with Wenq-
ing Zhang, supra note 130.
143 Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118.
144 Id.
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tional interest in influenza itself, and that has historically gen-
erated a certain divide within the Network, with countries that
perceive little for themselves at stake providing less support for
their own scientists to participate in Network activities.'4 5
Network scientists also report that funding for Network
activities has been inconsistent. In the early years, WHO oper-
ated on "a shoestring," with insufficient funds to keep staff on
long-term contracts and to consistently fund Network meet-
ings.14 6 Funds for Network activities sharply increased after
the H5N 1 outbreak, but decreased thereafter, in the shadow of
the global financial crisis.14 7 The Network has also been af-
fected by the general funding situation of the WHO, which has
been extremely precarious in recent years. 1 4 8 Since the 1980s,
member states have withdrawn much of the WHO's institu-
tional funding, leaving the agency-the Network's WHO office
included-reliant on so-called "extra-budgetary" contribu-
tions.149 These voluntary contributions by states and donors,
earmarked for particular projects, now make up nearly 80% of
the agency's budget. 1o
To address needs for funding for activities in periods where
state support is insufficient, Network scientists have some-
times proposed contributions from private companies.11 For
most of the history of the Network, these were rejected, because
of concerns about conflicts of interest. 152 The Network's new
legal Framework-the agreement brokered in 2011 to resolve
145 Interview with Keiji Fukuda, supra note 137 (describing not all countries as
sharing the same "level of interest" in influenza); Interview with Ian Gust, supra
note 135 (describing some national labs as historically having provided few sam-
ples to the Network).
146 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101.
147 Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118.
148 See Kate Kelland, The World Health Organization's Critical Challenge: Heal-
ing Itself REUTERs (Feb. 8, 2016, 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/investi-
gates/special-report/health-who-future/ [https://perma.ce/P5CU-9P4S]
(describing the "budget pressures" facing WHO since the global financial crisis).
149 World Health Org., Sixty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Proposed Pro-
gramme Budget 2014-2015, U.N. Doc. No. A66/7, at 12 (April 19, 2013).
150 Id. The WHO also now relies heavily on non-state actors for support. The
Gates Foundation, for example, provides 10% of the WHO's voluntary contribu-
tions, making it the third largest contributor after the US (16%) and the UK (11%).
World Health Org., Voluntary Contributions by Fund and by Contributor, 2015,
U.N. Doc. No. A69/INF./3, at 2, 8-9 (May 13, 2016).
151 For example, in the early 2000s, a proposal to obtain Network funding from
industry was rejected. Interview with Ian Gust, supra note 135.
152 Id.; see also Interview with Masato Tashiro, supra note 116 (describing
complex negotiations to ensure that the Australian CC was fully publicly funded,
after a vaccine manufacturing company with which it had ties was privatized).
There were some very minor exceptions. For example, the CC in London in recent
years had received a small amount of funding from industry to help support work
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the conflict-broke new ground by for the first time demanding
a significant financial contribution from industry. But it also
deliberately fenced this funding off to tasks involving pandemic
preparedness, with the intent that industry funds not displace
government funding of the Network.15 3
Scientists in the Network have, over the years, found ways
to deliberately cultivate support from states for their work, for
example, by "showing [countries] that the lab capacity devel-
oped for flu is applicable for other diseases as well," and "get-
ting across the message that developing capacity for influenza
helps you in other ways."154 The WHO has also supported and
facilitated burden-of-disease studies, so that scientists could
then "go into a country and show that this many people are
dying [and] you're also having this dollar amount of impact in
your economy due to people missing work, having to stay home
and take care of sick children-you know, things that they
probably hadn't even thought about."15 5
At a macro level, then, the priorities of the Network are
established by governments, when they make decisions about
how and whether to fund the labs. These decisions are deeply
informed by scientists, however, and scientists also make the
more granular decisions about Network priorities and prac-
tices. Particularly in its early years, the day-to-day governance
of the Network was delegated to scientists themselves. Still
today, scientists, who run the national labs and who occupy
positions in the WHO office, make key decisions.15 6 The Net-
to make viruses adapted to their vaccine-making process. McCauley interview,
supra note 59.
153 See PIP Framework, supra note 131, art. 6.14.3, at 21; see also Interview
with Wenqing Zhang, supra note 130 (noting that the reasoning was that Network
labs "should be supported by the government"). Contributions began in 2011; the
total contributed by the end of 2015 was nearly $31 million. WHO, PARTNERSHIP
CONTRIBUTION ANNUAL REPoRT 2015 63 VHO/OHE/PED/2016.01. The funds are
administered by the WHO, and have been spent primarily to enhance laboratory
and surveillance capacity, with the remainder for activities such as risk-comnu-
nication. Id. at 65. The partnership contribution has the potential, over time, to
both substantially increase the resources available to the Network, and to invite
more industry influence over the Network. The structure of disbursement, how-
ever, appears to be designed to minimize industry influence, with WHO deciding
on allocations and priorities, guided by an advisory board that includes no repre-
sentation from industry. Id. at 51.
154 Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 121.
155 Id.
156 For example, significant decisions, such as the one to undertake a separate
annual recommendation for vaccines for the Southern Hemisphere, have histori-
cally always been made "by the WHO or through consultation with representatives
from the network and from the CCs, ERLs and National Influenza Centers." Inter-
view with Wenqing Zhang, supra note 132. The Network also has an "expert
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work itself is also uniformly described as a "voluntary" one. 157
As Hay described it, until the emergence of H5N1 and the re-
cent watershed negotiations, there were also very few formal
rules inside of the Network.15 8 Decisions were not made hier-
archically, from the governmental level down, but organically
and horizontally, from scientist to scientist.159 For example, in
the 1990s, the Network decided to begin making formal recom-
mendations for the composition of the flu vaccine twice a year
rather than once a year, to better serve the needs of Southern
countries (whose seasonal flu occurs during their winter,
which is our summer). 1 6 0 The decision was made by Network
scientists, led by emerging scientific practice and consensus
rather than a top-down directive from states.
2. Scientific Motivation in the Network
In interviews, Network scientists cited a variety of factors
when asked to describe why scientists contribute to the Net-
work, and why they exert such effort to advance influenza sci-
group" from the CCs that facilitates technical decision-making. Id. The most
significant outputs of the Network, such as the annual vaccine strain recommen-
dations, are made entirely by scientists, who meet annually at meetings convened
by the WHO. See WHO Selection Description, supra note 65, at 6.
157 See, e.g., Interview with Wenqing Zhang, supra note 132; see also Inter-
view with Alan Hay, supra note 101 (describing the Network as an informal ar-
rangement involving "anyone who wished to participate"). As experts in influenza,
scientists in the GISRS labs may also have influence on a state's decision to
participate in the GISRS Network. See, e.g., Interview with Marilda Siqueira,
Head, WHO Nat'l Influenza Ctr., Braz. (Oct. 8, 2013). Historically, the Network's
reach has extended across geopolitical lines. Both China and Iran, for example,
are longtime members, and even North Korea today has a national lab. See
Network NICs, supra note 107.
158 See Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101; see also Interview with
Masato Tashiro, supra note 116 (describing the informal process of norm-making
or rule-making in the Network, as "traditional-not [a] rule but an agreement").
159 For example, as Alan Hay, one of the longest-serving and most widely
respected influenza scientists in the Network, put it: "there [were] one or two cases
where their Ministry [of Health] might say [to a National lab], 'Well, why do we
continue to support you to do this?' And I have written one or two, three, I can't
remember, letters of support to those labs as to why what they were doing was
important for the Network .... [Blut ... in many cases what these labs did were
determined by the people running the labs." As Hay described it, "you take
responsibility for doing something, so you have to decide what is necessary for
you to do it ... within the constraints of the budget.... And that's just the nature
of the science that you're trying to do on a day-to-day basis." Interview with Alan
Hay, supra note 101. Hay has worked on influenza for decades, and ran the WHO
CC in London from 1993 to 2009. See Alan Hay, Director of the WHO Collaborat-
ing Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza at the Francis Crick Institute,
UK, INT'L SOC'Y FOR INFLUENZA & OTHER RESPIRATORY VIRUS DISEASES, https://istrv
.org/site/index.php/board-members/10-board/55-alan-hay [https://perma.cc/
E3S4-7HJYI.
160 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101.
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ence, if not in the pursuit of financial gain. Three forms of
motivation or allegiance in particular were cited regularly. A
commitment to public health and an affinity for scientific in-
quiry were often described first, and a desire for credit and
scientific reputation added later. Scientists often described
several of these motivations together, one merging into the
next. They also often characterized these values as a historical
achievement, and as shared by some scientists more than
others.
Consider, for example, these statements from scientists
that are or were important in the CCs and in the Network's
Geneva office:
It's worked because you have a sufficient number of individu-
als that are keen to make it work. It doesn't work because
WHO is telling people what to do, okay? It works because
people understand this is important and they want to be part
of it... . I think it partly is linked to the mentality of that time
[when the Network was created], which is different from the
mentality of today .... [W]hen we graduated, we didn't think
about money. . . . [Ilt was more[,] what were you going to
do.161
[T]here was quite clear understanding in the past that what
we were doing was a public health role, a scientific role. You
know, part of it was fed by the scientific interest. If it didn't
have interest, I wouldn't have done it. You know, you weren't
getting anything [i.e., compensation] out of it. And monitor-
ing what's going on, there's always some twists of scientific
interest that come out of it. And very often just at the techni-
cal level, in the assays you're using that stop functioning and
things like that. So your continuing it feeds into your re-
search interests. 162
If you're involved in public health your ultimate ambition is
to preserve or improve the health of the public. And this is
just one of those ways in which you can do it. 163
161 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101. For similar statements, see Inter-
view with Julian Druce, Head, Nat'l Influence Ctr., Austl. (Oct. 16, 2013) ("[It is all
for the greater good at the end of the day. And I think that everyone that partici-
pates in it does sense that and feel that."); Interview with John McCauley, supra
note 59 (invoking the "global good" when describing why scientists share and
publicize their findings even before publications are accepted); Interview with
Masato Tashiro, supra note 116 ("Our motivation was only the contribution inter-
nationally for . .. vaccine development and selection. . . ."); id. (describing the key
motivation to contribute to the GISRS being "global public health safety").
162 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101.
163 Interview with Ian Gust, supra note 135. Gust is also a long-time flu
scientist, who ran the CC in Australia. See Professor Ian Gust, LONDON SCH. OF
HYGIENE & TROPICAL MED., http: / /www.1shtm.ac.uk/alumni/survey/profes-
sorian-gust.html [https://perma.cc/47HW-YM85] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
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[The Network started from the spirit of] public health needs,
because their memory of the Spanish Flu in 1918 still was
vivid at that time in 1950, or 1940.... [Plublic health good,
collaboration, this type of spirit start[ed] this Network....
[Pleople really were working together out of good willingness
and collaboration. So a lot of our work actually was con-
ducted automatically. . . . There was no legal document,
binding document . .. or people talking about "I'll give you
this, what I could get in return?" . . .. So we were lucky it
started that way.16 4
I think in a lot of cases you see it[-]especially in the develop-
ing countries[-]you see very dedicated people are actually
trying to do something good[.] [Tlhey're trying to make a con-
tribution to society. They're trying to improve the health of
their fellow citizens. . . . [Ilt's an internal drive that's hard to
define. It's the excitement of facing a challenge and
succeeding.6 5
[The genesis of it was pure public health. There's no rea-
son . . . the UN would have gotten together to single out
influenza if it was simply a scientific or technical issue. It
was really the public health concerns about influenza, which
started the discussions. Nonetheless, the maintenance of the
system, particularly through much of the early decades, I
think, relied a lot upon scientific interest, interpersonal rela-
tions, institution to institution relations, and so on. 166
Scientists in the national centers likewise described motiva-
tions that merged the advancement of public health and the
language of scientific interest. As one Australian scientist de-
scribed it, sharing viruses in the Network provides a means
both to protect "the greater good of the population," as well as
to allow scientists to "analyz[e] what's around" and what might
go into the next vaccine.'6 7 A scientist in Brazil described simi-
larly both a sense of public importance of their virus sharing
work, but also a pleasure in the science, noting:
[I]n terms of benefits, . . . it's a very interesting Network
because we can have in more or less real time what happens
in different parts of the world.. . . [Tihat's a very dynamic way
to work. [You asked me] what are your benefits as a scientist
[to participating in the Network]. I think that sharing infor-
mation is, for me, is absolutely an amazing way to work.16 8
164 Interview with Wenqing Zhang, supra note 130.
165 Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 121.
166 Interview with Keiji Fukuda, supra note 137. For a brief bio, see Reynolds,
supra note 9, at 38.
167 Interview with Julian Druce, supra note 161.
168 Interview with Marilda Siqueira, supra note 157.
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Notably, very similar accounts of the importance of both a
sense of public mission and of scientific inquiry to the Network
were offered by Network members decades ago. 169
When asked about why individuals participated in the Net-
work, scientists would refer to credit and self-interest, but also
to a sense of community, as well as the importance of values of
respect and fairness, particularly for those in the national labs.
As one long-time CC head put it,
[Ihf you want people to cooperate in doing something which is
purely altruistic and not necessarily in their own day to day
interest and [that] causes them extra work, you need to make
sure that they realize that there's value in what they're doing,
that the information that they're creating is an effort globally
and that you think they are wonderful and you hope that
they'll continue doing it. . . . [Ilt's like any endeavor in life. If
you want people to do things for you, you have to be nice to
them, and make them feel wanted and trusted and valued.17 0
Many others also noted that a sense of community among the
various labs was critical to the Network's success.17 1 The CCs
also described personal connections with national labs espe-
cially in their region, as well as trainings and technical sup-
port, as an important part of their role. 1 7 2 Through this
process, as one scientist described, CCs and national labs be-
come "intimately connected."173 It was clear from interviews
that many of the scientists in the Network, and particularly in
the CCs, knew each other well. One described the Network as
feeling "a bit like a family."' 74
Scientists also connected participation in the WHO system
with their ability to do their own scientific work, because WHO
accreditation, or credit from the scientific system of publication
169 Cockburn, supra note 133, at 184. The then-head of the Network at WHO
said this when describing its operation: "Virologists will always want as precise an
identification as possible of the viruses they isolate, not only because of the
epidemiological importance of such identification, but also because of the fact
that this is essential for the satisfaction of the natural curiosity of the scientist."
Id.
170 Interview with Ian Gust, supra note 135.
171 See Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118 ("[We try and keep in
touch with [Network scientists and] thank[ ] them for their contributions, it
doesn't matter how small they are, . . . to make them feel part of the Network[.j
[A]nd we do try and invite them to training workshops etc., so at least they're
getting something out of the system."); Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101
(describing the importance of "good personal relationship[s]" and "personal inter-
action," as well as the mutual sharing of information).
172 See Interview with Masato Tashiro, supra note 116.
173 Id.
174 Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118.
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more generally, helped support their efforts to fund their labs.
The Australian head of a national lab, for example, said: "You
do get kudos, you are able to say you're a WHO National Influ-
enza Center. ... [That has value for the individual, and] when
we apply to the government for this or that or the other, it
always helps ...... 175 Scientists in labs in Madagascar and
Brazil both noted that there were important connections be-
tween scientific credit, for example as marked by authorship or
acknowledgement in scientific papers, and government sup-
port for their work.17 6
Both also cited examples of cases where data from their
labs had been used in publications without acknowledgement
of their efforts to gather the data. When asked why this was
problematic, one replied:
I think that sometimes they don't realize the work that has
been [done] by the people in the country that collect data....
I was really involved in setting up of the Network in Madagas-
car. Now I know how [much] work [and] negotiation with
people [it is]. . .. [Slince it is a lot of work . .. all the people
who are working in the Network [should be able to say],
"Look, it's my name, I am acknowledged." . . . [Pleople are
proud of that. . .. And also we have to justify to the Ministry
of Health what we are doing. So imagine [that] all the papers
regarding Madagascar were published by other people with-
out acknowledgment. Look, when I'm going to the Minister of
Health and telling him we are doing this, we are doing that-
these [acknowledgements] are showing the value. 177
Quickly in conversations about motivation, then, issues of
credit emerge, in a language that reflects its importance both
as a reward in itself, and as a signal to funders, who use such
acknowledgement as evidence of the importance or success of
the lab they are funding.17 8 A lead CDC scientist, when asked
why credit was important for scientists in the Network, said:
"Well, there are two drivers; one is just the personal satisfac-
tion of being recognized for what you've done. The other is of
course professional advancement; being able to put something
on your CV when you're asking for promotion or applying for a
different position."'79 While labs in the Network are supposed
175 Interview with Julian Druce, supra note 161.
176 Interview with JM Heraud, supra note 139; Interview with Marilda Si-
queira, supra note 157.
177 Interview with JM Heraud, supra note 139.
178 See Interview with Yuelong Shu, supra note 137 (describing credit as a
"fundamental or a basic principle" of the Network, because credit provides a form
of compensation to national labs for their hard work).
179 Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 121.
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to have committed financial support from their governments,
and thus are 'often less dependent upon grants than other
scientists, publication records and peer recognition can impact
promotions or the level of support a lab receives.8 0 Beyond
that, as one scientist put it, "I think everybody likes to have a
nice fleshy CV. I mean, you being at Yale, I'm sure you under-
stand that."181
In the archive, one can find traces of scientists engaged in
close reading of the reports of the Network, and issuing correc-
tions when they believe that their contributions are insuffi-
ciently recognized.18 2 Other documents also reflect the deep
importance of reputation, for example, with references to scien-
tists getting "very hot under the collar" if possible mistakes in
their work are aired publicly.183 Finally, as discussed below,
one key complaint that brought the Indonesian crisis to a head
in 2007 was that the work of scientists in the national labs was
not being adequately recognized. 184 Some of the strongest evi-
dence of the importance of credit to Network scientists comes
from complaints that the basic scientific obligation to give
credit and to include those who provide materials in your col-
laborations and papers was not always scrupulously
respected.18 5
As these sources reflect, there are a range of ways that
credit and recognition are granted in the Network. Some are
informal, as in the archival example noted above, where un-
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., World Health Org., Second World Health Assembly, World Influ-
enza Centre, Provisional Agenda Item 8.16.4.2, at 5, U.N. Doc. No. A2/62 (June
15, 1949), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/98934/1/WHA2_62_eng
.pdf [http://perma.cc/WR77-T9XY] (issuing a correction that acknowledges that
certain virus samples had been "isolated at the Institut Pasteur, Paris"),
183 Letter from C.H. Andrewes to Dr. C. Klimt (Nov. 6, 1950) (on file with
author) (describing the sensitivities of publicly suggesting that a scientists' results
were the result of contamination).
184 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
185 See Interview with Ian Gust, supra note 135 (describing appropriate credit
as something that sometimes people in the Network "overlooked or forgot" and
noting that "occasionally that caused resentment"); Interview with Anne Kelso,
supra note 134 (describing "cases where laboratories and the individual scientists
felt that they'd been, if you like, done over by other center people, Collaborating
Centers who might have then published data based on their viruses without
acknowledgement or without including them in the research. And this is particu-
larly awkward at the interface between surveillance and research. If a National
Influenza Center has sent viruses to a Collaborating Center for surveillance pur-
poses, and then the Collaborating Center does work that the National Influenza
Center sees as research and publishes a paper without them on it, then that's
understandably disturbing."); see also infra notes 203-12 and accompanying
text.
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published reports of the Network were in dispute.186 Speakers
at Network events are also chosen in part to acknowledge and
reward excellence in the national labs.'8 7 Interviewees also
described a formal system of credit and accreditation that was
of great importance. Several noted that the WHO system of
designating official national labs and CCs was valuable as a
signal to other scientists, as well as governments, of the scien-
tific capacity of the lab.' 88 Most frequently, however, refer-
ences to credit and reputation were linked to the system of
scientific publication. The current head of the London CC,
John McCauley, for example, described scientists in general as
wanting "recognition for observations and discoveries," which
he described as "done through publication."189 The most in-
tense disputes about credit described above were about credit
given in published work, allocated either through co-author-
ship or through references in the acknowledgements ection of
a paper. A "fleshy CV," of course, also measures value largely
in terms of publications.
Scientists in the Network indeed publish regularly. A
search of the leading scientific citation index shows that over
80 percent of the scientists that led a Network lab in 2016 have
authored scientific articles, with over six in ten having pub-
lished articles on influenza.190 This is particularly impressive
given the vast geographic diversity present in the Network, and
the fact that many of the national labs are funded more for
surveillance than research, and include flu only as one disease
among many that they study.19 1 Publications records also ap-
pear to be in fact linked to funding in the way Network partici-
pants suggest: scientists in more well-resourced labs, and
186 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
187 See Interview with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118. Often, in interviews,
scientists would also praise a particular scientist as especially skilled, or having
contributed in particularly important ways to the Network, offering an example of
the importance of informal reputational circuits to scientific reputation. For ex-
ample, several scientists went out of their way to praise the efforts of the Chinese
CC, in particular for quickly releasing all of its data on H7N9, on the same day
that the outbreak was publicly announced. See Interview with Anne Kelso, supra
note 134; Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 121. As this suggests, I was
myself becoming part of the reputational circuit.
188 A key WHO official described the main motivation for scientists in the
Network as "recognition of involvement in public health," which she noted comes
in significant part through both official recognition of Network labs. Interview
with Terry Besselaar, supra note 118.
189 Interview with John McCauley, supra note 59.
190 Appendix C, Table 3.
191 See id. For reasons described in the Appendix, this is also likely an under-
estimate of their contributions.
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especially in the research-intensive CCs, tend to publish
more.192 Both descriptions by Network participants and pub-
lishing patterns, then, confirm the importance of scientific
publishing to the modality of work undertaken in the Network.
C. Crisis
When avian influenza emerged, however, the normal prac-
tices of the Network were put under intense new pressure. The
rapid response to H5N1 in Hong Kong significantly slowed its
spread to other regions. But as expected,19 3 H5N1 evolved and
re-emerged. It underwent reassortments and mutations that
made it tougher, and more deadly to a range of animals, includ-
ing humans.19 4 By early 2004, it had killed millions of birds in
Thailand and Vietnam, and dozens of people.195 WHO warn-
ings about the virus became increasingly ominous, particularly
as human cases turned up that could not immediately be
traced to poultry.'9 6 The symptoms in humans were also wor-
ryingly similar to those of the 1919 flu-not just fever and
coughing, but also encephalitis, acute respiratory distress, and
internal bleeding.197
Indonesia reported its first case in 2005, and soon became
the epicenter of the disease in humans, with an average of five
new cases reported each month.198  The fatality rate was
thought to be above 80%.199 The median age of victims was
just twenty years.200 The result was acute fear of a very deadly
pandemic that quickly began to radiate into political circles.2 01
The Indonesian government scrambled to respond, and
soon found-to its great frustration-that it was unable to buy
192 The mean number of influenza publications for heads of Network labs
generally is 17.5, but for CC heads it is 176. Appendix C, Table 2; see also id. at
Figure 1. The number of influenza publications by scientists based in North
America and Europe is also much higher than, for example, the number by
scientists based in Latin America and Africa. See id. at Table 4.
193 Rosenwald, supra note 7, at 183 (citing Robert Webster, then head of the
CC at St. Jude).
194 See Laurie Garrett, The Next Pandemic?, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 3, 11-12 (2005);
Osterholm, supra note 3, at 25.
195 Reynolds, supra note 9, at 38; see also Garrett, supra note 194, at 12.
196 Garrett, supra note 194, at 13-14.
197 Id. at 14.
198 Endang R. Sedyaningsih et al., Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency and
Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism The Avian Influenza Case of Indonesia, 37
ANNALS ACAD. MED. SING. 482, 483 (2008).
199 Id. at 484. The fatality rate for H5N1 is now thought to be closer to 50%.
See Garrett, supra note 194, at 3.
200 Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 198, at 484.
201 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 194, at 3-4.
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antiviral medicines, or H5N1 vaccines (to ship when they were
completed), because wealthy countries had pre-purchased all
the available supply of both.202 In addition, the Indonesian
Health Minister discovered that one H5N1 vaccine being pre-
pared by an Australian company was based upon an Indone-
sian strain that had been contributed to the Network-and that
Indonesia was considered to have no rights either to the sam-
ples or to the resulting vaccines.203 Finally, the Minister also
learned that research on Indonesian H5N1 strains had been
presented at international scientific meetings, with neither the
permission nor participation of Indonesians.204 Though Indo-
nesia had been contributing virus samples to the Network
since the 1960s, in January 2007, the country announced that
it would cease its contributions to the Network until these con-
cerns were addressed.205
As the Indonesian crisis quickly revealed, there were no
mechanisms in place to ensure adequate global supply of vac-
cines in the case of a pandemic, and nearly all manufacturing
capacity was concentrated in the global North.206 This virtually
ensured that developing countries would have little if any ac-
cess to vaccines in a pandemic. In the firestorm of intense
advocacy that emerged thereafter, concern about patents, in-
cluding in the Network, also became a key focus. Though some
of those at the center of the Flu Network seem to have known
that sporadic patenting was happening before, that fact was
not widely known until now. Particularly influential was a re-
port commissioned by an NGO that was advising developing
countries, that identified many patent applications related to
H5N1, including some coming from WHO labs, that made use
202 See Sm FADILAH SUPARI, IT'S TIME FOR THE WORLD TO CHANGE, IN THE SPIRIT OF
DIGNITY, EQUITY, AND TRANSPARENCY: DIVINE HAND BEHIND AVIAN INFLUENZA 40-42
(2008); Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 198, at 486.
203 SUPARI, supra note 202, at 35-37.
204 Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 198, at 485. A WikiLeaks cable from John
Heffern, then Deputy Chief of Mission in Jakarta, confirms the importance of the
disrespect perceived by Indonesian scientists. See Indonesia - Avian Influenza
Sample Sharing Update, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 13, 2007, 08:51AM), http://www.wiki
leaks.org/plusd/cables/07JAKARTA1053_a.html [https://perma.cc/N785-
ZYGX] ("Endang explained that NIHRD researchers want peer respect in the inter-
national research community.")
205 SuPARI, supra note 202, at 25, 34-35; Sedyaningsth et al., supra note 198,
at 486.
206 World Health Org., Mapping the Global Vaccine Manufacturing Workforce:
Preliminary Results of a Survey Among Vaccine Manufacturers 5 (2011) (unpub-
lished draft report), http://www.who.int/phi/news/DraftSurveyReportPhases
1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K376-6RJD] (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
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of strains contributed by developing countries.2 0 7 The report
warned that such patents "are resulting in a much more com-
plex and limiting field of intellectual property claims than has
ever before existed for influenza vaccine,"208 and that flu-re-
lated patents had already shown the potential to hinder gov-
ernment efforts to prepare for a pandemic.209 Existing patents
could in fact restrict or slow access to vaccines and therapeu-
tics in a pandemic,2 10 though only one identified patent suite
held by a Network lab could have this power.2 11 In the wake of
the recent campaigns to overcome patent barriers to HIV/AIDS
medicines, and patent mappings such as this one, developing
countries nonetheless found much reason for suspicion. As
the Indonesian Health Minister saw it, if the Network's benefits
were distributed according to market logic, Indonesia would be
foolish to not to take its samples directly to companies in ex-
change for vaccines. She in fact explored such a deal, to give
viruses to a private company, and obtain vaccines for the state
in exchange.2 12
There was an immediate outcry when Indonesia suspended
its cooperation with the Network, because of the dangerous
consequences for both flu surveillance and the collection of
vaccine viruses.2 13 What followed was a five year long, very
high-profile global negotiation at the WHO to create a new
framework for the sharing of possible pandemic viruses,2 14 in-
207 EDWARD HAMMOND, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, SOME INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS-
SUES RELATED TO H5N1 INFLUENZA VIRUSES, RESEARCH AND VACCINES 9 (2009). The
report was commissioned by Third World Network, which was a key NGO provid-
ing support to developing country governments during the negotiation. See Inter-
view with Sangeeta Shashikant, Legal Advisor, Third World Network, in Geneva,
Switz. (Nov. 4, 2011). For more on these patents see Appendix B.2.
208 HAMMOND, supra note 207, at 2.
209 For example, the report recounts an incident in which the U.S. government
was forced to threaten to use its march-in rights to get a license from MedImmune
for Sanofi to produce an H5N1 influenza vaccine, a privilege that other govern-
ments would not have had. HAMMOND, supra note 207, at 28.
210 SeeAppendix B.2.
211 See Appendix B. 1 at 6-7 (describing St. Jude's reverse genetics patents,
and the fact that the public sector was permitted to freely use this suite of pat-
ents-licensed to a company called Medimmune-during the avian flu scare).
212 See, e.g., SUPARI, supra note 202, at 27-28.
213 See, e.g., Richard C. Holbrooke & Laurie Garrett, Op-Ed., 'Sovereignty'
That Risks Global Health, WASH. PosT, Aug. 10, 2008, at B7.
214 Discussions were early on limited to viruses of pandemic potential, exclud-
ing those related to seasonal flu. See, e.g., World Health Org., Director-General,
Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits: Interdis-
ciplinary Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, 3, U.N. Doc. No.
A/PIP/IGM/4 (Oct. 9, 2007) [hereinafter IGM-4], http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/
pdf files/PIP!IGM4-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/33N7-VPFL] (last visited Aug. 4,
2014). This was in order to focus attention on the issue of greatest public health
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volving hundreds of health officials and high-level government
officials, including Ambassadors to the U.N. 2 1 5
Country positions of course differed from one another and
evolved over time, but broadly speaking, developing and devel-
oped countries were divided by two key issues. The first was
the nature of any benefit sharing. Developing countries in-
sisted that companies who benefitted from the Network should
be legally bound to contribute a certain amount of vaccines and
treatments to countries in need, and (for some) also to facilitate
the production of vaccines in developing countries through
transfer of technology and licensing of any relevant IP.216 De-
veloped countries supported the creation of a fund and stock-
pile through WHO to improve access to vaccines, but insisted
that any benefit sharing through the Network should be
voluntary.2 17
The second issue of major contention regarded intellectual
property. Developing countries took the position that Network
labs (and initially also any third-party recipients) should be
broadly forbidden to seek IP on Network materials, and also on
concern, and to limit the complexity of the negotiations. Interview with Keiji
Fukuda, supra note 137.
215 See, e.g., World Health Org., List of Participants of the Intergovernmental
Meeting on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses, U.N.
Doc. No. A/PIP/IGM/DIV/2 Rev. 1 (Nov. 22, 2007), http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/
pdf-files/PIP %20IGMDIV2Rev1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8WM-AE6S] (listing
representatives from 109 countries, the United Nations, and other agencies and
organizations); World Health Org., List of Participants in Open-Ended Working
Group of Member States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influ-
enza and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, U.N. Doc. No. A/PIP/OEWG/
DIV/1 Rev. 1 (May 11, 2010), http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/pdfiles/OEWGl/
PIPOEWG%20_DIV1Revl.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UBT-A9Y8] (last visited Aug.
4, 2014) (listing representatives from 79 countries).
216 See, for example, Indonesia's Proposal requiring benefit sharing, and tech-
nology and know-how transfer. World Health Org., Sharing of influenza viruses
and access to vaccines and other benefits: Interdisciplinary Working Group on
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, 3-4, U.N. Doc. No. A/PIP/IGM/5 (Nov. 19,
2007) [hereinafter Indonesia Proposal], http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/pdf-files/
PIPIGM_5-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HY2-CMW6] (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
See also, for example, Thailand's Proposal requiring legally binding obligations on
manufacturers to contribute vaccines, as well as suggesting technology transfer
and know-how requirements. World Health Org., Sharing of influenza viruses
and access to vaccines and other benefits: Interdisciplinary Working Group on
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, 6-8, U.N. Doc. No. A/PIP/IGM/6 (Nov. 19,
2007) [hereinafter Thailand Proposal], http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/pdffiles/
PIPIGMW6-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YQE-3VG2] (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
217 See, e.g., World Health Org., Secretariat, Pandemic Influenza Prepared-
ness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, 3,
U.N. Doc. No. EB 126/4 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Secretariat Report], http://
apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf -files/EB126/B126_4-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5NUV-B8P8] (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1539
broadly defined derivatives thereof.2 18 Developed countries, in
turn, resisted any restrictions on IP either within or outside the
network.2 19
A third set of tensions that emerged during the negotia-
tions related to the practices of scientists within the Network.
Developing countries wanted clear commitments that Network
labs and third-party recipients would acknowledge the contri-
butions of the scientists in national labs, and seek to involve
these scientists in subsequent work.220 Scientists also became
more aware of the existence of patents inside of the Network
during the negotiations, and the matter raised concerns. As
Alan Hay described, suspicions emerged that "some people
were making a lot of money out of' patents related to their
Network work.221 Others reported that there were suspicions
from some in developing countries that the CCs were selling
viruses to industry.222 Although there is no evidence that ei-
ther was correct,223 it spoke to an emerging mistrust in the
Network-particularly coming from developing countries and
their scientists-that began to threaten its practices of free
information sharing.
With so many contentious issues on the table, the negotia-
tions were protracted and difficult. Commentators expressed
deep concern that the process would fail, leaving the Network
218 See, e.g., Thailand Proposal, supra note 216, at § 12(a)(vili) (prohibiting
recipients of GISRS materials, inside or outside the Network, to assert IP rights on
any products derived from, or that incorporate, GISRS materials); Indonesia Pro-
posal, supra note 216, at 4 (same).
219 Developed countries, for example, insisted on a narrow definition of GISRS
materials, and rejected the notion that anything except wild-type viruses-which
would not generally be subject to patents as such-could be excluded from IP
protection. World Health Org., Director-General, Pandemic influenza prepared-
ness: sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits,
Outcome of the resumed Intergovernmental Meeting, 12, U.N. Doc. No. A62/5
Add.1 (May 18, 2009), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf fies/A62/A62_5A
ddl-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/24LL-YTNL] (last visited Aug. 5, 2014); IGM-4,
supra note 214, at app. 3 paras. 4, 7, 30.
220 See, e.g., Indonesia Proposal, supra note 216, at 4 (discussing credit and
involvement); World Health Org., Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to
Vaccines and Other Benefits: Interdisciplinary Working Group on Pandemic Influ-
enza Preparedness, 3-23, U.N. Doc. No. A/PIP/IGM/7 (Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter
Africa proposal], http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/pdf-files/PIP IGM_7-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QA89-N5E9] (same).
221 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101.
222 Interview with Masato Tashiro, supra note 116.
223 As noted in Appendix B, the only evidence I have found of any Network lab
earning income from patents involves the reverse genetics patents at St. Jude,
which are not specific to influenza and arguably stem from basic research that
was much broader than the CC's Network activities. See Appendix B at 7.
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fundamentally undermined.2 2 4 The 2009 "swine flu" pan-
demic, caused by an H IN 1 virus, however, played a critical role
in reigniting the negotiations. It increased the salience of the
risk of a new flu pandemic, and generated renewed political will
to find a resolution.225 Two new co-chairs were appointed at
this point, who brought the parties back together and engaged
in unprecedented outreach to industry, who were brought in to
speak directly to negotiators.226
A key breakthrough in the negotiation was described by
one co-chair as "almost philosophical."227 As he recounted, it
came at a moment when all participants came to agree "that
the principle of both virus sharing and benefits sharing should
go together," and that the "idea was . . . to make the system a
fair system," and to ensure that the benefits-mainly vac-
cines-to be shared would go not to individual countries, but to
the WHO. 2 28 At a key moment, the logic of reciprocity that
characterized the Network, then, was reestablished.
The final breakthrough came in April 2011, when with the
final hours of the negotiation running out, the new co-chairs
gathered together key countries-the United States, United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Finland, Australia, Canada,
China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Egypt, and Turkey-to propose
a "take-it-or-leave it" package with three key elements.229 Two
were "music to the ears of the developing countries": Industry
would contribute half of the running costs of the Network to the
224 See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vac-
cines: Global Health Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza
H5NI and Pandemic Influenza H1N1, PLOS MED., May 2010, at 1, 3 ("The negotiat-
ing path that could lead to a new global access framework for influenza vaccines is
not apparent ... ."); Rachel Irwin, Indonesia, H5N1, and Global Health Diplomacy,
GLoB. HEALTH GOVERNANCE, 2010, http://eprints.1se.ac.uk/28272/1/Irwin Indo
nesia_andGlobalHealthDiplomacy.pdf[https://perma.cc/L6 TQ-PPD2] (noting
that "[a]s the virus-sharing negotiations have continued for three years without
resolution, some of the urgency and political will has been lost").
225 Interview with Juan Jos6 G6mez Camacho, Permanent Representative of
Mex. to the United Nations, in Geneva, Switz. (Nov. 18, 2011) (remarking that
"after H1N1 . . . the awareness and the pressure for these processes to be finished
obviously increased, because it was clear that we were not playing with hypotheti-
cal games"); Interview with Gaudenz Silberschmidt, Head of Int'l Aff., Swiss Fed.
Office of Pub. Health, in Geneva, Switz. (Nov. 17, 2011) (remarking that HINI
"made it easier to move to real commitments in the . . . negotiations").
Silberschmidt has worked for the WHO since 2012, and gave the interview in his
previous role working for the Swiss government.
226 Interview with Juan Jose G6mez Camacho, supra note 225; Interview with
Gaudenz Silberschmidt, supra note 225.




WHO, and would donate a certain amount of real-time produc-
tion of pandemic vaccines to the WHO. 2 3 0 The third was criti-
cal for developed countries: the Framework would include no
compulsory transfers of patents or know-how from companies,
which developing countries had demanded.2 3 1 While IP restric-
tions are imposed inside the Network, there are no mandatory
IP-related conditions imposed by the Network on outsiders.2 3 2
One by one, each country announced that they were willing to
take the deal.2 3 3 The lone hold-out was the United States. The
next morning, the United States announced that it too would
agree. According to sources intimately involved in the negotia-
tions, but who did not wish to be named, the about-face was
the result of late-night phone calls between negotiators and the
CEOs of various multinational companies, who in turn reached
out to U.S. officials in Washington who had not been aware
that the industry supported the deal.
The result was the path-breaking Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework, or "PIP Framework," officially
adopted by the WHO General Assembly a few weeks later.2 3 4
The Framework included important new rules, but also codified
existing rules inside of the Network. As such, it is an excellent
place to look to understand what was critical to the Network's
reconstruction, as well as what aspects of the Network's rules
are most important to its operation.
D. Reconstruction and Rules
The crisis in 2007 was triggered primarily by tensions be-
tween developing and developed countries, rather than among
Network scientists, and its resolution required significant inno-
vations in the Network's legal framework. The informality that
had once characterized virus exchanges in the Network was
replaced by a highly formal system requiring licenses to accom-
pany the transfer of all potential pandemic strains. The Frame-
work developed two "standard material transfer agreements,"
which operate as running contracts that mandate certain re-
sponsibilities for those who receive viruses from the Network,
one for insiders, and another for Network outsiders.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 As I will note, firms have an option, in fulfilling their benefit sharing obliga-
tions, to contribute benefits via voluntary licensing instead of vaccine or drug
donations, but this is not mandatory.
233 See Interview with Juan Jos6 G6mez Camacho, supra note 225.
234 PIP Framework, supra note 131.
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All transfers of virus material to non-Network entities are
governed by the outsider license. Over substantial opposition
from developed countries, these contracts were rendered le-
gally enforceable: disputes are to be referred to binding inter-
national arbitration.235 The most important obligation of the
license applies to manufacturers of vaccines that benefit from
the Flu Network, who are obliged to commit to benefit sharing
in return. While firms have options, it is widely believed that
they will chose to meet their obligations by donating approxi-
mately 10% of their real time production in a pandemic to the
WHO, and reserving another 10% of such production "at af-
fordable prices" to the WHO. 2 3 6 These goods are to be distrib-
uted by the WHO according to public health need.2 3 7 Industry
that benefits from the Network also must contribute financially
to the Network, to "improv[e] global pandemic influenza
preparedness and response," to the tune of approximately $23
million a year.2 3 8
For insiders, a separate contract was drafted, supple-
mented by standard terms of reference for Network labs.2 3 9
These agreements largely track practices in the Network that
had evolved informally. In their emphasis, however-and in
particular in a much-debated provision over IP-they are re-
vealing. Three salient obligations for labs emerge from the
Framework.
The first highlights the importance to Network scientists of
recognition and collaboration. According to their model terms
of reference, labs in the Network must "actively seek the partic-
ipation of scientists .. . from originating laboratories and other
235 PIP Framework, supra note 131, annex 2, art. 5, at 35; see also Interview
with Sangeeta Shashikant, supra note 207 (discussing the United States' resis-
tance to binding arbitration).
236 PIP Framework, supra note 131, annex 2, art. 4.1(A1), at 34. Other options
include licensing and technology transfer to developing country manufacturers.
Manufacturers of anti-retroviral medicines that rely on the GISRS will have a
similar legal obligation, either for licensing or the donation of "at least X treatment
courses of needed anti-retroviral medicine." Id. annex 2, art. 4. 1(A3), at 34.
237 Id. art. 1.8, at 3 ("[T]he benefits arising from the sharing of H5N1 and other
influenza viruses with human pandemic potential should be shared with all Mem-
ber States based on public health risk and need.").
238 Id. art. 6.14.3.1, at 22. The amount is articulated at 50% of the running
cost of the Network, so should increase as those running costs increase. Id. art.
6.14.3, at 21-22. counter-intuitively, given the metric chosen, the "contribution"
was intended not to help defray the existing running costs of the GISRS, but
rather to "improv[e] global pandemic influenza preparedness and response." Id.
art. 6.14.3.1, at 22. For more on its implementation, see supra note 153.
239 Id. annex 1, art. 1.1, at 29 (designating as subject o the license "influenza
laboratories that have been designated or recognized by WHO and have accepted
to work under agreed WHO terms of reference").
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authorized laboratories, especially those from developing coun-
tries, in scientific projects [and publications] associated
with ... clinical specimens ... from their countries . . . ."240
The second highlights the tensions around IP that emerged
in the Network. This rule was new, though it may not require
significant departure from previous practice. It provides that
Network labs "should" not seek to obtain IP "on" a carefully
defined set of Network "biological materials."241 The definition
of biological materials includes not only wild viruses, but also
virus isolates, modified candidate vaccine viruses, and certain
cDNA.2 4 2 The restriction thus clearly reaches certain patent-
eligible subject matter.243 Though couched in the discretion-
ary language of "should," there is some evidence that the WHO
is committed to treating the rule as mandatory.244
Third, the Framework imposes obligations on labs in the
Flu Network to share materials and information, both with one
another and with the general public.245 National labs are obli-
gated specifically to "maintain active communication and col-
laboration with other members of the [Network]," as well as to
inform WHO, national authorities, and the public quickly when
potential pandemic strains emerge.246 CCs are given special
obligations to share information back to national labs, and "to
ensure that up-to-date information and findings of public
health significance are rapidly exchanged . . . ."247
240 Id. annex 1, art. 5.2, at 30-31; see also id. annex 4, at 40-41 (same); id.
annex 5, at 45, 48, 52 (same). Outsiders are also required to "appropriately
acknowledge," for example in publications and presentations, the contributions of
WHO laboratories that provide biological materials to the Network. Id. annex 2,
art. 4.3, at 35; see also id. annex 1, art. 5.3, at 31 (requiring insider recipients to
"acknowledge in presentations and publications" contributions by other Network
scientists and laboratories).
241 Id. annex 1, art 6.1, at 31; see also id. art. 4.1, at 8 (defining "biological
materials").
242 See id. art. 4.1, at 8.
243 Less clear is whether it bars patents of the sort that were previously ob-
tained or sought by the Network. This depends on interpretation of both the
Framework and the complicated claims of the relevant patents or applications.
For an overview of existing evidence on Network patents and patent applications,
see Appendix B.
244 Compare PIP Framework, supra note 131, annex 1, art. 6.1, at 31 ("Neither
the Provider nor the Recipient should seek to obtain any intellectual property
rights (IPRs) on the Materials") (emphasis added), with Interview with Sangeeta
Shashikant, supra note 206 (noting that WHO Director General Chan reportedly
gave countries personal assurances that GISRS labs would not seek such IPRs).
245 See PIP Framework, supra note 131, annex 4, at 41; id. annex 5, at 45.
246 Id. annex 5, at 51-52.
247 Id. annex 5, at 45; see also id. annex 5, at 46 (obliging CCs to share
information about H and N subtyping, as well as gene sequences, not only with
other CCs but also with originating labs).
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All Network labs are also obliged to submit genetic se-
quence data to publicly available databases in a timely man-
ner.2 4 8 This codified a norm that emerged only in 2006, when a
prominent influenza scientist who was not a member of a Net-
work lab objected to the earlier practice of depositing Network
sequence information in a password protected database at Los
Alamos.249 Only a limited number of labs, most of them WHO
labs, had access to this site, perhaps reflecting the concerns of
contributing countries, and perhaps arising out of the desires
of some scientists to keep their information close to allow them
to benefit through exclusive publications. Just a few months
later, a powerful coalition of scientists, including the heads of
the CCs, announced a new initiative to ensure that all H5N1
sequences would be quickly entered into public-access
databases, housed in an organization created for the purpose,
called the GISAID. 250 The new database, EpiFlu, binds all
users of the data with a click-wrap contract to two key condi-
tions, designed to address the fairness concerns raised by de-
veloping countries and their scientists in the negotiations.
Recipients are first obliged to give credit to originating labs and
make "best efforts" to collaborate with them, and second are
required not to seek patents on any data or fraction of data
obtained from EpiFlu.251 EpiFlu has become the repository of
choice for many Network labs, particularly in developing coun-
tries.252 Some Network labs, including the CDC, however, pre-
fer to use a public database that imposes no restrictions on
users, when compatible with their obligations to those who
share samples with the Network.2 53
248 See id. annex 4, at 41; see also id. annex 5, at 46 (obliging CCs to share H
and N and other gene sequences of potential pandemic viruses "to a publicly
accessible database in a timely manner but no later than three months after
sequencing is completed, unless otherwise instructed by the laboratory or country
providing the clinical specimens and/or viruses").
249 Martin Enserink, As H5N1 Keeps Spreading, A Call to Release More Data,
311 Sci. 1224, 1224 (2006).
250 See Martin Enserink, Pushed by an Outsider, Scientists Callfor Global Plan
to Share Flu Data, 313 SCIENCE 1026, 1026 (2006). The Indonesians were also
early adherents to the GISAID model. See SUPARI, supra note 202, at 20-21.
251 See Registration Form for Individual Users, GISAID, http://platform.gisaid
.org/epi3/frontend#4b51bf [https://perma.cc/6WGL-SLZR]. This too is struc-.
tured as a running contract, so that data may not be transferred to anyone not
bound by the same agreement.
252 See Lisa Schnirring, Pandemic Reveals Strengths of New Flu Database,
CTR. FOR INFECTIous DIsEASE RESEARCH & POLICY (June 25, 2009), http://www
.cidrap.urmn.edu/news-perspective/2009/06/pandemic-reveals-strengths-new-
flu-database [https://perma.cc/7N45-X7XC].
253 See Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 121.
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Distilling all of this and combining it with other informa-
tion we have about the Network, we can discern a key set of
rules that govern information exchange and use within and
outside the Network, that, as far as evidence permits us to see,
are often followed. Inside of the Network, labs are reciprocally
obliged to share data and information with one another. These
obligations reflect what leading scientists in the Network de-
scribe as longstanding practices of free exchange within the
Network.254 As Hay put it: "if somebody calls me up and asks
me a question, I give them an answer. . . . Now who else gives
information away freely? .. . [Ilt's just a different way of think-
ing."2 5 5 This norm was articulated also by others, who de-
scribed rapid sharing of samples and information as "one of the
most important rules" of the Network.256 The archives also
reveal that the expectation that viruses and data will be shared
freely has a long history in the Network. Accusations that a
scientist has failed adequately to share virus samples with
others are taken very seriously, and with some umbrage.257
Information exchange is also seen as a primary benefit by
scientists themselves. John McCauley, head of the London CC,
254 See Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101 (noting that giving "informa-
tion freely" was the Network's responsibility); Interview with John McCauley,
supra note 59 (remarking that "there has always been free exchange of human
influenza viruses and exchange of other influenza viruses within the Network").
255 Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101.
256 Interview with Marilda Siqueira, supra note 157.
257 Consider, for example, this exchange between C.H. Andrewes, a leading flu
scientist at the World Influenza Centre at Mill Hill in London, and the coordinator
of the Network in Geneva at the time, Dr. A. Payne. Andrewes writes, of a third
influenza scientist, Dr. Magill: "I take great exception to Magill's statement hat he
has not had access to our strains or data. I have sent information on representa-
tive strains across the Atlantic and have offered others . ... Over several years we
got no tittle of information about his own serological studies-however, I won't
rub that in." Letter from C.H. Andrewes to Dr. A.M.M. Payne, M.D. (June 8, 1953)
(on file with author). At times, Andrewes took such complaints to the broader
community of scientists. For example, in the summary influenza report produced
by the Network in 1952, which would have been sent to all of the labs in the
Network, Andrews included this statement: "In no instance, other than those
mentioned above, has material been sent to the World Influenza Centre [from the
United States], nor has any information come in as to the type of virus." C.H.
Andrewes, Summary Report on Influenza 1951-52 to Dr. A.A.M. Payne (Mar. 12,
1952). Andrewes had underlined it for emphasis. Alarmed, Payne had written
back noting that this sentence had to be omitted in the final report, since "the
cooperating laboratories are entirely independent and are cooperating on a volun-
tary basis, and that therefore we have to be rather careful to retain their good
will." Letter from Dr. A.M.M. Payne, M.D., to Dr. Andrewes (Mar. 25, 1952). When
he learned that Andrewes had already sent these sentences as part of the draft
report directly to the offending scientist, Payne followed up with a letter to that
scientist seeking to smooth things out and to suggest better ways to report their
information. See Letter from A.M.M. Payne to Dorland Davis (Apr. 7, 1952).
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when asked about the benefits of being part of the Network
particularly for those in countries that benefitted little or not at
all from the seasonal flu vaccine, said: "I would suspect the
benefit of joining in is actually just being part of the community
and the Network and to actually know what's going on and
therefore be able to advise when something happens."258 Net-
work scientists are also obliged to provide one another with
credit and to affirmatively seek collaboration. Over and over
again in interviews, Network scientists affirmed the importance
of these rules of information sharing and acknowledgement,
because they help ensure that all in the Network feel that their
work is respected,259 and avoid a "two-speed" system for infor-
mation production or exchange that would leave some labs
behind.260
Self-reported norms requiring sharing of information or
credit might of course not be followed. Indeed, in interviews
scientists noted that these norms are not always followed,
though they tended to suggest that they were followed more
often inside of the Network than outside of it.2 6 1 There is no
easy way to track whether credit is allocated appropriately in
publications, because a baseline would be difficult to establish.
We can, however, use empirical sources to trace the routine
sharing of data and samples by Network labs and by influenza
scientists more generally. Network labs routinely report their
influenza virus sample collection in a WHO database, showing
that they have collected many millions of virus samples over
258 Interview with John McCauley, supra note 59.
259 Interview with JM Heraud, supra note 139; Interview with John McCauley,
supra note 59; Interview with Marilda Siqueira, supra note 157; Interview with
Masato Tashiro, supra note 116.
260 Interview with Catherine Thompson, Healthcare Scientist, Respiratory Vi-
rus Unit, Virus Reference Department, Public Health England, United Kingdom,
in London, U.K. (Nov. 18, 2011).
261 See Interview with John McCauley, supra note 59 (describing examples of
rapid sharing of important data and viruses on the Network before publication,
and expressing the view that inside the Network, although not outside of it, it will
"always be the case" that the "global good"-namely, sharing-will take prece-
dence over more selfish motivations); see also Interview with Masato Tashiro,
supra note 116 (in the Network our "first priority is to share, to give services [to
promote] international health issues, rather than our private publication").
Others were somewhat less anguine. For example, Alan Hay remarked dryly that
"most people want to get something out of all the work they've done rather than
pouring their information for nothing into the lap of someone else who can then
write a very nice paper on it." Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 101. "Scien-
tists," he concluded, "are just as bad as anyone else." Id. See also Nicholas
Zamiska, How Academic Flap Hurt World Effort on Chinese Bird Flu, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 24, 2006, at A6 ("All the scientists should collaborate, but there's still a lot of
competition.... Scientists are human.").
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the last two decades, and made basic information about these
samples available to the public broadly.262 Influenza scien-
tists, including many in Network labs, also regularly upload
influenza virus sequences on GISAID, with the number of
shared samples from each WHO region quite high.263 Thus,
empirical sources can verify that there is a great deal of infor-
mation sharing by the Network, and among influenza scientists
generally.
III
THE MODEL OF OPEN SCIENCE
The existing IP literature offers us no model that can ex-
plain how and why the Flu Network operated well for decades.
Here, I describe a model that can begin to, that of "open sci-
ence."2 M Two decades ago, Partha Dasgupta and Paul David
modeled open science as a coherent system of information pro-
duction, one with currencies and mechanisms that allow it to
produce high quality information in a manner that serves not
only scientists' aims but also social aims. The Network's expe-
rience offers a validation of this basic thesis, along with some
important correctives in our understanding of its allocative
processes, particularly as open science moves beyond the sin-
gle-state setting.
The basic model of open science, like the existing "IP with-
out IP" literature, describes cooperation as a relatively simple
affair. In the Network, it has been anything but. Cooperation
here has not been a mere byproduct of scientific self-interest
(as the open science model at times suggests). Nor can it be
explained as the result of the norms, intrinsic interest, and
technology that are critical to the IP without IP literature.
Rather, sustaining it has required recourse to organizations
and to law. In fact, the Network has used organizations and
law to serve many of the functions that have been demon-
strated to be important to cooperation among groups managing
common-pool resources. Its experience lays the foundation for
a more plausible account of how IP without IP can be sus-
262 See Appendix D.
263 See id. Regional distinctions in the level of samples and sequences hared
exist, as we would expect, but even in Africa, Latin America, and especially Asia,
there is very extensive collection of influenza viruses and information. For details,
see id.
264 See Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 499. It might also be called
.public science," a term which would reflect the prominent role of the state in
funding open science. "Reputational science" is another possible designation, to
signal the importance of reputation in this mode of scientific production.
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tained, even under strain and where undertaken by loose-knit
groups.
A. The Basic Model of Open Science
A basic account of open science as a system of production
begins with the foundational work of Robert Merton.265
Merton, an influential sociologist, described science as a sys-
tem of institutional control governed largely by norms.266 One
of the most important norms, he argued, was the rule that
scientific results are the common property of all scientists.267
Merton also proposed that science is characterized by a partic-
ular reward structure, which places a premium on the priority
of discovery, and that awards recognition accordingly, so that
"[rlecognition and fame then become symbol and reward for
doing one's job well." 2 68
Partha Dasgupta and Paul David connected Merton's work
to information economics, proposing that what Merton called
"science" was in fact a particular model of public or open sci-
ence. In this system, priority of discovery is the basis for repu-
tation, and reputation in turn "is the fundamental 'currency' in
the reward structure that governs the community of academic
scientists."269 Funding comes from patrons, typically govern-
ments.270 When deciding which projects to fund, patrons rely
heavily on scientific reputation, amassed through the decen-
tralized processes of peer review and publication.27 1 Compen-
265 Id. at 487, 510. Michael Polanyi's account of the "Republic of Science" is
an important precursor to their model. See Michael Polanyi, The Republic of
Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54, 54 (1962).
266 ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267, 269 (Norman W. Storer
ed., 1973).
267 Id. at 274-75. The other three norms central to the Mertonian account are
universalism (which requires that scientific claims are evaluated objectively); dis-
tinterestedness (which involves commitment to following the rules of science,
rather than acting in narrow self-interest), and organized skepticism (which re-
quires detached scrutiny of results and theories). Id. at 270, 275, 277.
268 MERTON, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THE-
ORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 266, at 286, 294.
269 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 498; see also Strandburg, supra note
42, at 92-95 (showing reputational reward to be an important factor in a scien-
tist's decision to share a discovery).
270 But compare William J. Broad, Billionaires With Big Ideas Are Privatizing
American Science, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/16/science/billionaires-with-big-ideas-are-privatizing-american-science.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZME-AR4X], for a discussion of the significant, possibly
growing role for foundations and philanthropists.
271 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 491-92. These may be embodied, for
example, in scientific peer review panels that score grant proposals, as well as
influenced by the decentralized processes that generate publication records and
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sation "consists of something like a flat salary for entering
science, supplemented by rewards to winners of scientific com-
petitions, with the proviso that the better is the performance,
the higher will be the reward."2 7 2 The system is "open" because
scientists share their knowledge with one another freely and
without charge.273 In open science, then, "the use of others'
output is encouraged and relatively cheap, with the cost being
appropriate citation and possibly some reciprocity in sharing
knowledge."2 7 4
Open science also has its own "cycle of investment and
conversion,"275 that can be visualized as a cycle in which capi-
tal is converted into reputation, and then back again, via in-
termediaries including publications and peer review. To show
the distinctions, we can sketch market-exclusionary science as
a parallel cycle that converts capital into patents, and back to
capital, via intermediaries that include markets and patent
offices.2 7 6
FIGURE ONE






scientific views about the relative importance and interest of different scientific
questions. The allocation of NIH monies (about $30 billion per year), for example,
relies on a peer-review process like this. For a good description, see Bhaven N.
Sampat, Mission-Oriented Biomedical Research at the NIH, 41 REs. POLY 1729,
1732 & n.9 (2012).
272 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 499.
273 Id. at 510.
274 Alfonso Gambardella & Bronwyn H. Hall, Proprietary Versus Public Domain
Licensing of Software and Research Products, 35 REs. POLY 875, 877 (2006).
275 See BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SCIENTIFIC FACTS 200 (1979).
276 This is adapted from a more materialist depiction of the cycles of credibility
in science sketched by Latour and Woolgar. See id. at 201 fig.5. 1.
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Open science can this way be seen as a highly articulated
system of information production, with processes that help it
achieve the two primary values associated with markets: infor-
mation gathering and investment allocation.
Much like the price system, cycles of credibility in open
science (funding - publication -- peer review - funding) help
assemble and actuate widely dispersed information at rela-
tively low cost. Scientists share their discoveries, and credit
rather than permission is the prerequisite for building on the
work of others. Because of this, the cost of identifying projects
and collaborators is low, and scientists are free to invest their
effort wherever they think that it will, via the cycles of open
science, lead to the greatest scientific and reputational re-
turns.2 7 7 Desire for scientific priority encourages both diligent
effort and the disclosure of discoveries, for to earn reputational
points in open science it is important both to be first and to be
seen to be first. 2 7 8 Disclosure, in turn, increases the chances
that the scientists best suited to the task can evaluate and
build upon the advances made by others.2 7 9 In this way, the
system addresses the central challenge to the efficiency of gov-
ernment funding: the quality of government information.
2 8 0 In-
deed, when compared to a system of market exclusion, which
277 See Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 23, at 405, 414-15. For exam-
ple, a scientist need not pay or negotiate permission to write an article on H5N 1.
(She may need funding to pursue the research, and here peer review serves an
important validation function.) Open science thus takes advantage of the effi-
ciency advantages that open systems, such as free software, also have. See id. at
414 (describing how systems that permit self-nomination for creative work can
plausibly allocate human creativity more effectively than more centralized sys-
tems, such as firms).
278 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 499.
279 Id. at 500.
280 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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generates more secrecy about projects and collaborators, and
which often requires licenses for particular lines of research,
the open science system has plausible advantages in its ability
to gather and make use of decentralized information.
Can open science appropriately direct investment toward
social aims? David and Dasgupta argue that it can, because
scientists operate "collectively as an 'agent' for the society at
large," which is otherwise "incapable of screening scientists ...
[and] equally incapable of evaluating the relative importance of
scientific discoveries."28 1 As long as scientists do not abuse
that trust by acting as a cartel, and as long as the political
process respects scientific autonomy, open science can func-
tion "rather well in satisfying the requirement of social effi-
ciency in the allocation of resources."282 Indeed, they argue
that it has an allocative advantage over the market-exclusion-
ary system if research is highly uncertain.28 3
An examination of the Flu Network helps to validate the
basic model, because the Network operates much as the model
of open science suggests that it should. Scientists in the Net-
work report sharing to be a central norm, and in fact share
extensively. They describe functional systems of reputational
rewards and sanctions that are linked to both scientific credi-
bility and to the following of scientific norms. They also de-
scribe their own funding as relying upon reputation, as well as
publications whose value is established by their peers.
The Network's experience also provides some support for
the claim that open science "functions rather well in satisfying
the requirement of social efficiency in increasing the stock of
reliable knowledge."284 Markets cannot reliably produce most
of the kinds of goods that the Network produces, for the rea-
sons described in Part I. The Network, though, has generated
these goods both reliably and well over many decades. At cer-
tain critical moments, states have also responded to scientists'
expert judgment that more resources are needed, and in-
281 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 505.
282 JCL
283 As described above, the market-exclusionary system is known to work
poorly for basic R&D. See supra Section I. Open science, in contrast, may be
particularly suited to such research. Expert judgment about the value of a line of
work is likely a better signal than market returns where such returns are highly
uncertain, far in the future, or unavailable because of the institutional limits of IP
law. See Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 490.
284 Id. at 487.
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creased the resources available to the WHO and the national
labs.285
The Network's experience, however, also offers some im-
portant correctives to the basic model of open science. The
Network's experience requires us to refine our understanding
of the allocative processes of open science, and gives us a better
understanding of its difficulties, particularly as we move be-
yond the single-state setting. It also demonstrates the critical
role that organizations and law have played in sustaining the
Network, particularly in times of strain.
B. Open Science in Practice: Allocation
The basic open science model offers a rudimentary account
of how open science responds dynamically over time to social
aims. Dasgupta and David assume that scientific interest co-
incides with social interest,286 but do not explain why this
must be. We might instead suspect that the two can diverge,
leading scientists to prioritize projects that have high intrinsic
interest (or that may provide the easiest path to striking re-
sults), but that do little to benefit the public. In the basic
version of open science, states are also imagined as simply
deferring to scientific judgment. Dasgupta and David recognize
that states may not in fact defer, but have little to say about
why states would defer, nor do they theorize mechanisms by
which states could be held accountable for not so doing.
287
In the Network, however, we can observe two subtle dy-
namics that may facilitate allocative success in open science.
First, scientists describe motivation in the Network as not
solely responsive to scientific interest. When asked why scien-
tists contribute to the Network, many scientists described not
only its scientific interest but also its public health impor-
tance.28 8 And they reported that scientists in the Network gen-
erally cared about and were motivated by its public health
consequences, perhaps particularly in the national labs that
had fewer resources for research.289 If both public health and
scientific interest are values that dynamically constitute the
research agenda of its scientists, then open science has an
internal means to discipline scientists whose research verges
285 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
286 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 487-90.
287 Id. at 514-15 (noting that funders may be myopic, may fail to appreciate
the importance of scientific autonomy to the system, and may fail to invest
enough to allow open science to thrive).




too far from work that could benefit the public. Scientific repu-
tation, that is, could be expected not merely to reward scien-
tists merely for scientific breakthroughs, but to reward
scientists more if their breakthroughs were of more social
significance. 290
The status of public health as a value in the Network also
helps explain how scientists gain the support of states. Scien-
tists do not merely assert their scientific authority, but instead
argue that their work is of social value. Sometimes they take
their case directly to states. Scientists in the Network, for ex-
ample, described designing and publishing scientific studies to
help show states that influenza is a significant local health
concern.291 They also described the WHO accreditation of na-
tional labs as a means of gaining state buy-in, and reported
directly communicating with states to stress the importance of
the national labs' work when that was needed.292 If states fail
to respond, scientists also have some ability to discipline
states, because their open publication practices can also help
influence public opinion. The Network was, as described
above, for many years very poorly funded.293 Scientists only
secured adequate resources for their work when states became
more acutely concerned about the public health threat posed
by influenza. In the wake of H5N1, though, prominent journal-
istic accounts-informed by influenza experts-were critical to
gaining the attention of states.294 As archival sources reveal,
Network scientists have sometimes provided and urged the
publication of information that their states wish to keep secret
to spur them to action.2 95 Here too, the fact that scientific
290 The prominence of public health as a value in the Network may not be
reflective of open science more generally. A particle physicist would not explain
her work in similar terms. Would she nonetheless perceive and describe a form of
public interest that disciplines her work? Questions such as this can produc-
tively govern future inquiries into open science, and IP without IP generally, as
Part IV describes.
291 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 159, 175 and accompanying text.
293 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
294 See Garrett, supra note 194, at 3-4; Osterholm, supra note 3, at 31.
295 See Telegram to Dr. Payne from Dr. Mulder (July 13, 1957) (on file with
author) (reporting influenza activity, and asking the WHO office to make such
information public to provide "authoritative assistance against officials denying
[the] epidemic spread of Asiatic influenza in Holland," which Dr. Mulder attributes
to "economic reason[s]" and an "irresponsable [sic] attitude" toward the "out-
land"). Governments of course sometimes succeed at preventing reporting of
outbreaks. China's reluctance to admit to the scale of its SARS epidemic was
widely reported and criticized, and was a key part-along with the outbreak of
H5N1-that led to the strengthening of a core WHO agreement that requires
national governments to share with the WHO information about "all events which
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values are linked with public values is important to the success
of the Network.
The publicity of open science thus anchors a second mech-
anism that can facilitate allocative success in open science.
Scientists can pressure states that fail to respond by appealing
to public reason and public concern about the effectiveness of
state action. This of course will be most effective at times and
in states where public reason and political accountability are
closely linked. More generally, open science presumes that
states are themselves responsive to social aims via systems of
political accountability. Mechanisms such as voting are a
widely recognized means of providing such accountability and
of setting social priorities.2 96 In systems that are democratic,
voting helps direct, and indeed define, social aims.297
But what of political systems that are not democratic?
Here we come up against limits of the basic model. Open sci-
ence seems unlikely to command the same support where
states are not politically accountable, and/or where their legiti-
macy does not turn on their ability to provide research goods to
their citizens. Many states do not, as described, provide much
support for the Network's national labs.298 This can be-and
typically is-explained by Network participants as the result of
simple resource constraints. But at least some of the time it
may instead result from failures of political accountability at
the national level. This is hardly a condemnation of the open
science model. All systems of information production-includ-
ing market exclusionary production-rely on a responsive and
effective state.299 But it suggests an important limitation on
the claim that open science can in any simple fashion be relied
upon to advance social aims in global perspective.
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern within its
territory." WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, art. 6 (2d ed.
2005), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/43883/1/9789241580410
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4YT-UZ2S].
296 In democratic states, voting is a key mechanism, for example. See, e.g.,
KENNETH J. ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUE 1 (1951) (contrasting "vot-
ing" and "markets" as different means for making social choices). The mecha-
nisms to hold states accountable in non-democratic states are more obscure-
forming part of the reason that the open science model faces challenges as it
becomes more global.
297 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMIcS 158-59 (1990).
298 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
299 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property's Leviathan, 77 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 131, 140-44 (2014) (exploring the essential role of a "capable state"
in IP law); see also Douglass C. North. Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Per-
fornance, 11 CATO J. 477, 477-81 (1991-1992) (exploring the role of institutions
in facilitating efficient markets).
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Open science also faces another difficulty when it moves
beyond the single state setting. If politically accountable states
invest in open science because they are responding to public
opinion and democratic priority-setting, how can open science
function to serve global social aims in the absence of something
like a global state? The question begs the answer, one that is
also etched into the contours of the Network. The crisis of the
Network reflected some of the coordination problems that can
occur in a multi-state setting: states want assurances that
others will contribute, and that they will have access to bene-
fits, if they are to contribute. Historically, the Network has also
been funded predominantly by wealthy countries, who were
also the recipients of the vaccines that are its most tangible
benefit. The Network has served aims that can plausibly be
called "global" in part because they were coterminous with the
aims of wealthy countries. Frequently, however, countries are
situated differently with respect to health problems.3 0 0 In the
absence of more global governance, open science will have diffi-
culty generating investment in truly "global" priorities where
the gains would be in the South but not the North.
This is in an important sense confirmed by the Network's
experience. First, only because of our rudimentary system of
global governance-in particular the organization of the WHO,
and the availability of the international legal order that made
the PIP Framework (and binding international arbitration) pos-
sible-could cooperation in the Network survive the H5N1 cri-
sis. Second, that process managed not only to stabilize
cooperation, but also to go some way toward ensuring that the
benefits of the Network were more available around the world.
The 10-20% share of pandemic vaccine allocated to developing
countries in the PIP Framework is far less than what global
justice would seem to require-but is also more than any ex-
isting transnational agreement has produced.3 0 Open sci-
ence, in sum, relies critically on international organizations
and law to sustain cooperation between states when under
strain. And it cannot claim to meet the demands of "global
social aims" in a systematic and reliable way, without stronger
300 This leads to the problem of so-called "neglected iseases," or those that
primarily affect countries in the global South that are chronically underfunded.
See Peter J. Hotez et al., Eliminating the Neglected Tropical Diseases: Translational
Science and New Technologies, PLoS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, Mar. 2, 2016,
at 1-2.
301 See Meena Krishnamurthy & Matthew Herder, Justice in Global Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness: An Analysis Based on the Values of Contribution, Owner-
ship and Reciprocity, 6 PUB. HEALTH ETHiCs 272, 280-82 (2013).
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organizations and stronger legal frameworks at the interna-
tional level that could help both define and pursue such
aims.302
C. Open Science in Practice: Collaboration
The basic open science model, like the early IP without IP
literature, describes cooperation in open science as fairly sim-
ple. It notes that open science is susceptible to tensions and
failures, but sees these as largely self-correcting. For example,
because researchers care intensely about priority, they may
engage in wasteful races,3 03 or costly fights over who has prior-
ity.3 0 4 Scientists also may hoard data to preserve future publi-
cation opportunities,3 0 5 or defect to the private market system
if they are allowed to patent.30 6 All but the last problem, Davis
and Dasgupta predict, can be addressed by scientists via a
kind of "outcasting," if they are in small-enough groups.30 7
They will do this because "cooperative behavior furthers their
self-interest in the race for priority, and denial of access to
pools of shared information would place them at a severe dis-
advantage vis-a-vis competitors."3 08 Defection to private sci-
ence is more difficult to control, they suggest, presumably
because exit dampens the power of reputational sanctions.
This risk, they argue, can be prevented in the short term only
302 The chronic underfunding of the WHO as an entity (as distinct from the
Network as a sub-unit) is here a significant problem. The WHO itself has few
resources that it can directly manage, and major donors can dictate priorities via
earmarked contributions. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
303 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 506-07. Scientists may, for example,
see other scientists with a promising project and seek to duplicate it to win the
race, when from a social perspective inore diversity in project selection would have
greater benefits. Id. at 507.
304 Id. at 501.
305 Id. at 500. Dasgupta and David also emphasize the risk of racing, wherein
competition for a prize (here, priority), causes those involved to expend more effort
than is justified by the value of the accelerated advance. See id. at 506-09. The
problem of secrecy in science is well-documented. See Wesley M. Cohen & John
P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, 8 INNOVAnON POL'Y
& EcON. 1, 6, 15-16 (2007); Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 216; Strandburg, supra
note 42, at 91. It also has a long pedigree. Galileo and his compatriots, for
example, sometimes reported their discoveries through the use of anagrams, so
that they could establish priority while still reserving time to work out the details
or to develop valuable extensions of their insights. See Merton, Priorities in Scien-
tific Discovery, supra note 42, at 654.
306 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 513.
307 Id. at 504; see also Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: En-
forcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 308-10 (2011)
(theorizing "outcasting" as a means of enforcing international law).
308 Dasgupta & David, supra note 42, at 504.
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via a "pre-commitment" to sharing,3 0 9 and over the longer term
via cultural conditioning that would encourage young scien-
tists to forego more lucrative private sector work.3 10
Science studies scholars have criticized Davis and Das-
gupta's account of scientific behavior as "idealized"3 11 and as
divorced from the actual everyday experience of scientists.3 12
The Network's experience, in particular, suggests that scientific
collaboration in open science can be far more fraught than the
basic account suggests.
This is in a sense not surprising, because open science in
the Network cannot be described as occurring in a "close-knit"
group. This is not primarily because scientists operate at a
distance, but because the information that scientists need to
accurately enforce open science norms is not always readily
available throughout the Network.3 13 Reputation circuits are
imperfect, particularly for those at the periphery of the Net-
work. A scientist in a national lab in Madagascar, for example,
reported that his data had been used in published papers with-
out proper acknowledgement, and that he had no effective
means to retaliate.3 14 Similar complaints were raised by Indo-
nesian scientists3 1 5 and by Chinese scientists. 316 While scien-
309 Id. at 513.
310 Id. at 514-15 (describing, for example, conditioning to "value scientific
inquiry for its own sake").
311 Philip Mirowski & Esther-Mirjam Sent, Introduction, in SCIENCE BOUGHT AND
SOLD: ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE 50 (Philip Mirowski & Esther-Mirjam
Sent eds., 2002). As they also recognize, David's more recent work is more
nuanced. See id.; see also Paul A. David, The Republic of Open Science, SIEPR
Discussion Paper No. 13-037 (June 14, 2014) (a more recent elaboration that
treats open science in more historical and contingent fashion).
312 Mirowski & Sent, supra note 311, at 51; see also Stephen Turner, Scien-
tists as Agents, in SCIENCE BOUGHT AND SOLD: ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE,
supra note 311, at 380 (criticizing Merton and arguing that the empirical practices
of scientists are more diverse, and involve more deviation from Merton's norms,
than his account allows); DOMINIQUE VINCK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC WORK: THE
FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 50-54, 111-19, 184-87
(2010) (similar); see also STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC LIFE: A MORAL HISTORY OF A
LATE MODERN VOCATION 113-14 (2008) (similar).
313 Cf Strahilevitz, supra note 27, at 365 n.31 ("[Ilt is the community mem-
bers' ability to monitor instances of noncooperation and communicate with fellow
members about each member's reputation .. . rather than group size [that] frame
the likely mechanisms by which cooperation might arise. Thus, the eBay auction-
ing network exhibits extremely impressive levels of user cooperation, despite its
millions of members, thanks to an ingenious mechanism for tracking each user's
reputation.").
314 See Interview with JM Heraud, supra note 139.
315 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
316 See Zamiska, supra note 261, at Al (describing a scientist in the Chinese
Ministry of Agriculture who was angered by lack of credit for his work in a paper
by a scientist from the U.S. CC at St. Jude).
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tists in these examples could refuse to cooperate with those
responsible, this sanction is costly to open science, and was
clearly not always sufficient to change behavior.3 17
Decades ago, Merton coined the term the "Matthew effect"
to designate the problem that eminent scientists receive dispro-
portionate credit as compared to unknown researchers.3 1 3 He
argued that in science the reputationally rich tend to get richer,
for example because they have memorable names, so tend to
receive more credit than their co-authors. Plausibly, the ability
to effectively sanction via reputational harms is also not evenly
distributed. In the Network, the problem is amplified by its
vast resource divides and divisions of labor. While scientists in
national labs do engage in publishing, they are far less able to
accrue reputational capital by publishing in top journals than
are those in the CCs, so may be both less likely to get credit for
their important data gathering work, and also less likely to
exert the influence needed to successfully sanction others.
Scientists in the Network might be able to easily identify (if
not sanction) failures to give credit to their work, because they
routinely read papers in their field. But violations of other
norms, such as those against patenting, are exponentially
more difficult to detect. Before the H5N1 crisis, Network scien-
tists began to develop suspicions about who held patents, but
none understood precisely what labs in the Network held pat-
ents, much less exactly what they covered. Patent analysis was
important because norms in the Network are not simple and
binary. They require not that scientists associated with the
Network never seek patents, but that they not seek patents on
Network-related work.3 19
But patents are hard to interpret, and Network scientists
have neither the time nor expertise to evaluate them. When the
avian flu crisis ignited, NGOs and the WHO initiated patent
mappings to help identify the bounds of the Network's patent-
ing activities. These efforts took many months, and are still far
from comprehensive.3 2 0 The protracted and bitter fight that
317 See id. at A6 (describing the difficulty of continuing cooperation); Interview
with JM Heraud, supra note 139 (saying, of those who do not properly credit work,
"my philosophy is that I know these people and I won't work anymore with these
people. I am careful when I am sharing something.").
318 VINCK, supra note 312, at 114.
319 Some Network scientists defended patents if they were on their own scien-
tific work, for example, as opposed to the work of the Network. See, e.g., Interview
with Alan Hay, supra note 101. Indeed, the rules of the new Framework only
exclude patents on Network materials, carefully defined.
320 See Appendix B.
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began in 2007 can be attributed in part to the fact that scien-
tists have extreme difficulty knowing when others have de-
fected from open science via patents. Where scientists cannot
detect violations of open science norms, suspicion may take
over.
Despite these difficulties, collaboration in the Network has
persisted and expanded over time, and survived the challenges
posed by the H5N 1 outbreak. It thus provides us with a valua-
ble opportunity to theorize the means by which IP without IP
can be sustained in larger, loose-knit groups.
The two problems described above-the difficulty tracing
and punishing violations of norms-have been managed in the
Network not merely through the use of norms, nor via intrinsic
motivations or technology. Critically, fights over both credit
and patenting were solved in the Network with recourse to
organizations and law.
The Network scientist who led the national lab in Madagas-
car, and who was not accurately credited, for example, turned
to the WHO. 3 2 1 The problem was "fixed," he recounted, by the
new click-wrap contracts that now mandate credit-sharing in
the GISAID database.322 The WHO, and codified agreements,
have played a similar role in the credit disputes described by
China.323 The concerns raised over failure to credit were also a
major component of the PIP Framework negotiations, which
concluded with codified obligations to share built into standard
material transfer agreements.3 2 4
321 See Interview with JM Heraud, supra note 139; see also supra notes
250-53 and accompanying text (providing details on GISAID and EpiFlu's require-
ment for credit). For an example of scientists using the WHO to address disputes
over sharing, see supra note 257.
322 See Interview with JM Heraud, supra note 139.
323 See Zamiska, supra note 316.
324 Medical and scientific journals have played an important clearinghouse
role as well, by both codifying and enforcing norms about acknowledgement and
appropriate sharing. In the Chinese example, the scientific journal in which the
offending paper was also a key intermediary: the complaining party brought their
concern to the editors, and the journal published a formal erratum, acknowledg-
ing the contributions of the local lab. See Elena A. Govorkova et al., Author's
Correction: Lethality to Ferrets of H5N1 Influenza Viruses Isolated fron Humans
and Poultry in 2004, 80 J. VIROLoGY 6195, 6195 (2006). As this reflects, journals
self-consciously play an intermediary role around issues of credit. For example,
the International Committee of Journal Medical Editors has since 1978 published
guidelines for scientific manuscript submission that includes an elaborate defini-
tion of who should count as an author. See Defining the Role of Authors and
Contributors, INT'L. COMM. OF MED. JOURNAL EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/rec-
ommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/deflning-the-role-of-authors-
and-contributors.html [https://perma.cc/KT2L-MRF4]. Recently, the ICMJE
also proposed that journals create obligations on authors to share their datasets.
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The WHO office also consciously facilitates reputational re-
wards for national labs that are more fine-grained than publi-
cation alone.3 2 5 These help smooth over the resource
inequities in the Network, and keep reputational rewards flow-
ing to those activities that are essential to the Network's work.
Similarly, the tensions caused by the incursion of patents
into the Network could not be resolved without the help of the
WHO. The WHO facilitated a patent mapping that helped to
identify how patents had been used, and then convened negoti-
ations that resulted in a legal commitment that precluded pat-
ents on Network materials.326 Among insiders, law is used
with a light touch, to buttress what remains primarily informal
and reputationally driven cooperation. It is the WHO, for ex-
ample, that mediates any disputes about the terms of reference
and PIP Framework between Network labs.3 2 7 The Network's
formal organizational structure, and its use of legal tools, have
both intensified over time, as conflicts became more intense,
and as the Network has grown in size and complexity.
Organizations and law help create infrastructure for more
accurate monitoring and enforcement of norms in the Network.
But their role reaches still broader. They help not just to "en-
force" norms but also to adjust them, and to resolve disputes
about their application. They redress concerns about fair-
ness-such as those raised by the national labs-that are cor-
rosive to cooperation over time. Critical to the reconstruction
of the Network was also the benefit sharing agreement, which
controls not Network participants, but the third-party firms
that produce vaccines and medicines.
See Darren B. Taichman et al., Sharing Clinical Trial Data - A Proposal fron the
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 374 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 384,
384 (2016).
325 See, e.g., Besselaar interview, supra note 118 (noting that more active
national labs are rewarded with speaking slots at the biannual meetings, in part
to "encourage[ I the others that are possibly not as well developed to make efforts
to reach that sort of stage," and describing the importance of thanking national
labs and providing them with opportunities for training).
326 Like the relationship to patents in the Network, the relation to private
funding is not a simple one, but one that must constantly be managed, via a kind
of boundary-work that constructs a separation between open science and market-
exclusionary science. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. This is not
reflected in the basic model, which imagines that open science is exclusively
funded by governments.
327 PIP Framework, supra note 131, annex 1, art. 7.2. This makes sense, if we
consider the delicate balance of a system based upon reciprocity, and the possibil-
ity that too much formal legal obligation may disrupt forms of trust that are
important to the workings of the open science system.
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All of this suggests that an emphasis on "close-knitted-
ness" leaves out functions that have been important to the
success of open science in the Network. We can understand
these functions better if we turn to the well-developed literature
on the preconditions of successful cooperation in the material
commons. This literature has been developed over decades by
a group that has empirically tested Elinor Ostrom's theories of
the conditions of sustainable community management of re-
sources such as fisheries and grazing pastures.32 8 The Ostrom
group has identified a series of factors that are important to
effective group management of a common pool resource: clearly
defined boundaries for both the resource and the group; rela-
tively low-cost monitoring; graduated sanctions (e.g., gossip for
mild infractions but more serious consequences for more seri-
ous infractions); fair distribution of benefits and costs; group
decision-making procedures; conflict resolution mechanisms;
internal authority to organize to influence the rules; and "ap-
propriate coordination" with outside groups where the group
interacts with a multi-level system.329
In the Network, many of the factors that Ostrom and her
followers stress as critical to group management of resources-
which reach significantly beyond the simple monitoring and
enforcement described in the open science model-would be
absent without the support of the WHO, bolstered at key mo-
ments by legal agreements. It is the WHO, supported by con-
tractual terms of reference and material transfer agreements,
that creates the group boundaries of the Network. The WHO
office also creates subtle means of recognition and rebuke, to
supplement the sometimes crude and weak sanctions that
328 See DIGITAL LIBRARY OF THE COMMONS, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/
[https://perma.cc/WV98-YEGLI.
329 David Sloan Wilson, Elinor Ostrom & Michael E. Cox, Generalizing the Core
Design Principles for the Efficacy of Groups, 90S J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. S21,
S21-S22 (2013). Ostrom first theorized a set of factors similar to this in 1990.
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COL-
LECTIVE AcTION 90-102 (1990). These were refined into the factors above via doz-
ens of case studies. Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold & Sergio Villamayor-Tomds, A
Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource Management
15 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 38, 38 (2010), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll5/
iss4/art38/ [https://perma.cc/7BNU-3YNH]. This account has been very influ-
ential in the resource management field, but it can also profitably be linked to a
much broader literature on the evolution of governance, or the move from dyadic
to triadic relations. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of
Governance, 32 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 147, 148-51 (1999). Ostrom and her follow-
ers, we might say, have been developing an account of when and why groups need
governance, focusing on one specific context: the management of tangible
resources.
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scientists alone can mobilize. Informal rule-making and dis-
pute settlement has long occurred in the Network, but as the
Network grew, and particularly during the recent ensions, the
elaboration of rules and resolution of disputes have been criti-
cally facilitated by the WHO, here too with important reliance
on law. The WHO also plays an important role in modulating
the terms on which outsiders can access the Network's materi-
als and data. Formal law is especially important as regards
this last function. The "outsider licenses," after all, are en-
forceable not via informal WHO dispute settlement, but via
binding international arbitration.
Even this broader account, however, fails to account fully
for what Network participants see as essential to their success-
ful collaboration. As described in Part II, participants also reg-
ularly described the important role that the Network played in
deliberately cultivating a sense of community, equality, and
trust.3 3 0 The WHO office does this in part by coming in to help
resolve disputes and ensure norms are enforced. Also impor-
tant, though, may be the normative power of its negotiations
and legal agreements. The PIP Framework, for example, makes
numerous references to the value of a "trust-based system,"
articulates the primacy of values such as "the protection of all
people of the world from the international spread of disease,"
and describes the importance of a "fair, transparent, equitable
and efficient framework" for virus sharing.331 The WHO also
facilitates trust through more mundane day-to-day activities
that help keep the more distant national labs in personal con-
tact with one another.332
We can make sense of this via the sizeable literature
describing the difficulties of explaining collective action solely
through rational actor models and the logic of self-interest.
These models have long been known to have problems account-
330 See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text. The Flu Network's
archive also suggests that activities to better connect the various nodes of the
Network have long been a central component of its work, even at times when
funding was very meager. Much of the archive is comprised of letters and memos
about arrangements for visits that WHO officials or CC members are making to
various laboratories, as well as efforts to bring scientists to WHO for training.
331 PIP FRAMEWORK, supra note 131, arts. 1.4, 1.9, at 3. See also id. art. 7.2.1,
at 23-24 (references to a "trust-based system"); id. annex 3, arts. 1.1, 1.2, at 37
(same); id. art. 1.4, at 3 (universal protection from disease).
332 Interview with Wenqing Zhang, supra note 130 (describing how the WHO
office holds global meetings for the national labs every two years in part for this
purpose). It has also created a secure website dedicated to the GISRS where
discussions occur, and regularly facilitates communication between the CCs,
national labs, and ERLs. Id.
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ing for stable collective action except under the most narrow of
circumstances.3 3 3 Trust, for example, is often critical to suc-
cessful cooperation, because it permits individuals to contrib-
ute in the belief that others too will contribute, even where
rules are sometimes broken and violations sometimes go un-
punished.334 And though the open science model might not
predict it, participants in the Network see enforcement of
norms in open science as inevitably imperfect. As one scientist
put it, "if you don't trust [people], . . . and you are going to
check where they are at each moment, then they cannot work
anymore."3 35
The Network's success, as this all shows, was not sus-
tained via norms and decentralized action alone. Rather, orga-
nizations and law stand in at crucial moments to help
scientists in this loose-knit group not only monitor and enforce
norms, but also to interpret and revise rules, resolve disputes,
and define the boundaries of the group and exert control over
the outside. Finally, organizations and law have also helped to
foster trust, as well as what Elizabeth Anderson calls the
"normativity of norms"-the "understanding of group members
that they all ought to obey the standard of conduct defined by
[the] norm . . . ."336 The Network's experience, in fact, demon-
strates the need to move beyond a simplified rational actor
model of open science and IP without IP, as we begin to recog-
nize the role that law and organizations play in sustaining
both.
333 See Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in
Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 177-81 (2000); Ernst Fehr &
Simon Gtchter, How Effective Are Tr-ust- and Reciprocity-Based Incentives?, in
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 337, 337-38 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Put-
terman eds. 1998).
334 See Anderson, supra note 333, at 175 ("Trust appears to be a key factor
behind the willingness to cooperate. The norm of trust tells people to act as if they
believe others will reciprocate their own cooperation. It is expressed in a persis-
tent willingness to put oneself at risk, even in the face of short-term losses due to
failures to reach cooperative equilibria with one's group."); see also Fehr &
Gachter, supra note 333, at 338-40 (showing that trust in reciprocal behavior
promotes the enforcement of contracts); Kahan, supra note 42, at 74 (same).
335 Interview with Sylvie Briand, Project Leader, Disease Monitoring, Assess-
ment & Control, Global Influenza Programme (Nov. 11, 2011).
336 Anderson, supra note 333, at 171. See also Jane Mansbridge, Starting
With Nothing: On the Impossibility of Grounding Norms Solely In Self-Interest, in
Ben-Ner & Putterman eds., supra note 333, at 151-66 (concluding that rationality
and self-interest alone cannot explain behavior).
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IV
REORIENTING THE IP WITHOUT IP LITERATURE
The Network's example offers important lessons not only
for those interested in open science but also for those con-
cerned with information production more broadly. As Part I
describes, critics have argued that there is no persuasive evi-
dence that IP without IP can be sustained under pressure,
where information value and capital costs are high, and/or
where creators are loose-knit. To the contrary, as this study
decisively shows, IP without IP can succeed under all of these
circumstances.
The Network's example reveals that capital-intensive infor-
mation production can occur without any recourse to IP, yet
plausibly be reasonably effective and responsive to social aims
if it combines a source of capital with processes like those
described in the open science model. The two key processes
here are 1) reputational circuits that help generate reliable sig-
nals of quality and value for funders, and 2) mechanisms that
render the system accountable to public priorities.
These criteria are general, but will be helpful in structuring
future inquiries into information production settings that are
funded by government or other patrons. The point is not that
such systems are inevitably effective and responsive, but
rather that we can begin, by leveraging the model of open sci-
ence, to inquire systematically into the conditions under which
capital-intensive IP without IP systems can claim to be effective
and normatively attractive.
The Network's example also shows that IP without IP can
succeed in groups that are loose-knit, with the support of orga-
nizations and law. The commons-based strand of the literature
has downplayed the need for management or compulsion in IP
without IP, pointing out that because information is non-
rivalrous, it escapes the problems of congestion and scarcity
that afflict the material commons.33 7 This however misses
something important. The Flu Network produces a myriad of
immaterial goods, but cannot be said to operate beyond scar-
city, or without need for management or structures of com-
mand. It has characteristics of both significant openness-its
information products are almost all freely shared with the pub-
lic-and significant governance. The governance exists not to
prevent the depletion of information, but to address tensions
337 Benkler, Commons and Growth, supra note 26, at 1554.
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that can undermine the cooperation needed to produce high-
quality, and socially oriented open science.
This is not to say, as some have suggested, that IP without
IP inevitably relies upon forms of exclusion that "operate with
an approximately equivalent effect" to IP itself.3 38 Organiza-
tions and law in the Network operate not to support IP-like
exclusions, but rather to support what we might call "Ostrom
goods"-clear group boundaries, low-cost monitoring and ef-
fective sanctions, norm interpretation and revision, dispute
settlement, and management of the boundary with the outside.
They also help facilitate the cultivation of trust and public val-
ues, and normativity itself, working to support sharing despite
a continued risk of defection, rather than to support exclusion.
Moreover, the Network did not reach for conventional IP
law to stabilize cooperation. Rather, it made use of contract
law, loosely with respect to insiders and more assertively with
respect to outsiders. Conventional wisdom in the field of IP
suggests that contract law is inadequate to support the pro-
duction of information because it does not bind third parties
generally.3 39 This is a problem for the market-exclusionary
model, because it depends on the ability to capture value
broadly from third parties. But the Network exemplifies a dif-
ferent system of production-not a demand-side model that
requires that users be prevented from free riding, but a supply-
side model that requires the maintenance of incentives among
a community of producers. Contract may be especially useful
for such systems. Its flexibility means it can be used to codify a
vast range of different rules, helping to clarify expectations and
permitting legal recourse if cooperation ultimately breaks
down.34 0 Relations among Network insiders were anchored,
338 Barnett, supra note 27, at 1754.
339 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1917-21 (1990) (posit-
ing that contract law provides the original creator of a work with inadequate
postdelivery control); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrlnkwrap Li-
censes, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1286 (1995) ("Intellectual property is only margin-
ally susceptible to protection by contract alone, because it is very easy for third
parties to duplicate an idea once it has become public.... Patent and copyright
law both impose liability on third parties who could not have been expected to
contract with intellectual property owners ex ante.").
340 As Karl Llewellyn described many years ago, "the major importance of legal
contract is to provide a frame-work for well-nigh every type of group organization
and for well-nigh every type of passing or permanent relation between individuals
and groups, up to and including states-a frame-work highly adjustable, a frame-
work which almost never accurately indicates real working relations, but which
affords a rough indication around which such relations vary, an occasional guide
in cases of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact
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particularly over time, by contracts such as these-contracts
where individuals and groups bilaterally promised one another
to adhere to certain rules.
Contracts can also be used to govern outsiders, if those
outsiders can be identified and attracted into contractual rela-
tionships ex ante-as exemplified by the Network's "outsider
license." These licenses require outsiders to the Network to
follow certain rules, most prominently regarding benefit shar-
ing. The result is a kind of control over outsiders that is less
stringent than would be available if the Network held and ex-
erted intellectual property rights (because those would bind
third parties without prior agreement). But contract has been
sufficient to sustain the Network, in part because the Network
reliably generates benefits over time, access to which outsiders
wish to maintain.34 1 The "click-wrap" licenses that condition
access to data from databases like GISAID similarly use con-
tract to bind outsiders who access data from the Network.34 2
Here too, contracts provide less comprehensive control than a
more robust property right in this data would do, but have
been enough to stabilize the Network.
The case study offered here confirms the value and viability
of IP without IP, and can also help direct the next wave of
developments in the field. This wave should focus its attention,
at least initially, on other examples of IP without IP that are
capital intensive and produce valuable social goods, especially
if they are also loose-knit and exhibit sustained cooperation
over time, despite threats from within and without. There are
many other possible examples in the vein of open science. The
most interesting will be those that in one way or another chal-
lenge the model described here.3 4 3 Examples drawn from other
to work." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 736-37 (1931).
341 If patents were not so difficult to apply to the Network's work, and not so
corrosive to its open science practices, then these might have been leveraged into
still more assertive power over outsiders. One of the more intriguing possibilities
that the Network's experience raises regards the potential for what we might call
"common IP" to stabilize IP without IP practices.
342 See supra note 251.
343 For example, the open science model predicts that decentralized decision-
making and open publication of research are critical to success. How then can we
explain successful public scientific enterprises that require secrecy, or that em-
ploy far more centralized government control? Defense research is an example
where secrecy may be standard, and where governments may exert more central
control over allocation. National laboratories in the United States-which are
directly government controlled, but some of which have produced an extraordi-
nary number of Nobel prizes-would also make excellent subjects of study. A
good example here Is the Lawrence Berkeley Lab. Supported by the Department
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domains-for example, involving state and philanthropic fund-
ing for the arts, journalism, and scholarship in the academy-
would also be extraordinarily valuable.
We should also return to familiar examples in the field to
consider them anew. For example, we should develop a better
understanding of how examples studied earlier do-or do not-
link creative effort to social aims. For example, does the reli-
ance on in-kind labor bias Wikipedia to production of informa-
tion that satisfies the relatively well-off, who have more leisure
time-and if so, does the organization cultivate public values
that could discipline this tendency, for example by insisting
that priority be given to comprehensiveness?
Revisiting these examples will also allow us to consider
whether mechanisms and tools used in open science also help
to explain some of the success of these other communities. For
example, creative groups that have been described as close-
knit may, upon closer examination, rely on organizations and
law in a manner not dissimilar from the Network.3 44 Even
information producers that appear to be closely connected may
be "loose-knit" in the proper sense of the term, if it is difficult
of Energy and managed by the University of California, it has thirteen Nobel Prizes
associated with its work. See About the Lab, BERKELEY LAB, http://www.lbl.gov/
about/ [https://perma.cc/5WNJ-5SU4]. Because the theory of open science sug-
gests that it is most suited to basic research, we should also study examples
where open science successfully reaches into the domain of "technology." The
Network has some of this aspect, but still more interesting would be cases where
the public sector takes on more conventionally technological tasks, such as late-
stage drug development. We should also consider examples where the private
sector undertakes basic R&D on a large scale. See SHAPIN, supra note 312, at
132-45 (describing basic R&D in Bell Labs, Eastman Kodak, and General Elec-
tric). Finally, the open science model, and the example of the Flu Network, sug-
gests that the most significant problems in open science may relate to the ability
of scientists to command adequate support from the state-particularly where
support from multiple states is demanded. Studies of other transnational scien-
tific networks that have been less successful than the Flu Network are important.
Contrasting the Network to WHO's networks on foodborne infections, human
African trypanosomiasis, and the more multi-purpose Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN)-to name just a few possibilities-would be illumi-
nating. Finally, studies of capital-intensive open science projects supported by
multiple states would also be useful. Here, entities such as CERN, the large
particle collider that is supported by twenty-one countries, would make excellent
subjects. For a basic description of CERN, also known as the European Organiza-
tion for Nuclear Research, see About CERN, http://home.web.cern.ch/about
[https://perma.cc/EY7P-HD8Y].
344 See, e.g., Loshin, supra note 21, at 138 (describing examples in which
magicians who have revealed tricks to outsiders were ejected from illustrious
magician organizations); see also id. at 125 (noting that societies such as the
"International Brotherhood of Magicians" are important venues for sharing of
knowledge among insiders); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 21, at 1815 (noting that
comedy clubs and booking agents refuse to book joke-stealers).
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for creators to cheaply monitor and enforce norms. It would in
fact not be surprising if this were often the case with respect to
information goods, for example because the boundaries of in-
formation goods are notoriously hard to define.
Returning to consider Wikipedia and open source and free
software anew, we can now see the significance of the organiza-
tional and legal structures that have emerged to sustain them.
Wikipedia has developed a welter of specialized norms and or-
ganizationally mediated rules, backed up by formal dispute
settlement systems and sanctions.3 4 5 It is also supported by
the Wikimedia Foundation, a legally constituted non-profit that
employs close to 200 people,346 with an annual budget of over
$50 million. 347 Most prominent open source software projects
are also supported by organizations.3 4 8 These organizations
play a variety of roles that resonate with the account of the
Network offered here: they contract with participants and out-
siders over rights and responsibilities, they set standards and
facilitate collective decision-making, and they manage the as-
sets and licensing strategies of these enterprises.3 49
Open source software and Wikipedia also can now be seen
as relying heavily upon both organizations and law to help
produce "Ostrom goods." Licenses help reinforce group norms
and control outsiders by mandating sharing and sometimes
credit,35 0 thus helping to prevent forms of defection that would
destabilize the community. They also help create group bound-
aries and prevent incursions from the outside. They are sup-
345 See, e.g., JEMIELNIAK, supra note 32, at 7-8 (2014) (describing Wikipedia as
relying upon "hundreds of rules, norms, policies, and guidelines"); id. at 17-22,
29-84 (describing ten different formal organizational roles, and active systems for
monitoring, internal adjudication, and different levels of sanctioning); id. at 8
(describing Wikipedia as characterized by a degree of "regulation [that] is much
higher than in many even explicitly bureaucratic organizations").
346 Id. at 129.
347 See Wikimedia Foundation 2014-15 Annual Plan, WIKIMEDIA FoUND. 3,
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/foundation/e/eO/2014-15_Wikimedia_
FoundationPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DUT-WFBP (last visited Aug. 30,
2014).
348 Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions in the Commons Communities, 50 JURIMETRICS 275, 288 (2009).
349 Id. at 290-96.
350 See, e.g., GNU General Public License, GNU OPERATING SYS. (last updated
June 29, 2007), https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html [https://perma
.cc/GH22-8QNG] (the most prominent free software license, which requires con-
tributors to share their developments under the same terms); Wilcipedia Copy-
rights, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Copyrights [https://perma.cc/
W9Q6-LV9K ] (describing the license used by Wikipedia, which permits free repro-
duction and revision of the covered works, but requires attribution and the licens-
ing of derivative works under the same licensing terms).
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ported by organizations that help lower the cost of monitoring,
enforcing, and revising group norms, and also-very promi-
nently in the case of both Wikipedia and organizations like the




The importance of the case study here is not that it shows
us another point on the spectrum of IP without IP. Rather, it
allows us to see the field-and some of its most canonical ex-
amples-differently. It also decisively both proves the impor-
tance of, and reorients, this new literature.
It can no longer be said that IP without IP is limited to
"niche" fields or products of low social value, nor that valuable
forms of IP without IP are eventually replaced with a property
model. The open science model described here identifies a sus-
tainable, well-configured system that works very differently
than does the market-exclusion model. The system has been
durable over time, and can claim to do as well-and indeed at
times far better-than IP at effectively producing information
goods in response to social priorities. For more than six de-
cades, the Network has produced data, analysis, and standard-
ized inputs to critically important vaccines and diagnostics-
when for reasons described in Part I, none of these could be
well produced in markets. IP without IP does not only work,
but it is essential to our collective well-being. Indeed, as this
single example amply shows, it is essential to our very lives.
We must do more to understand open science, and the
structures that permit it to work well, and that cause it to fail.
The Network is a remarkable example of success, for example,
but it has also struggled at times for state support, and has
been buffeted by tensions from within and without. Even to-
day, it cannot claim to be truly responsive to social aims at a
global level-as in truth no system of information production,
including the market exclusionary one, can. With other global
diseases on the horizon, and other emergent global scientific
priorities-climate change, for example-we urgently need a
new literature that better maps the potential and limits of open
science, particularly at the global level.
351 See, e.g., WIMMEDIA FouND. (last modified Nov. 26, 2016), https://wiki
mediafoundation.org/wiki/Home [https://perma.cc/5NWW-Q886 (describing
the function and goals of the Wikimedia Foundation); FREE SOFIWARE FOUND.,
http://www.fsf.org/ [https://perma.cc/G248-M76V] (stating the mission of the
Free Software Foundation).
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The example and model described here can also help us
better understand production of non-scientific goods, whether
magic tricks, online encyclopedias, or legal scholarship itself.
It offers us a window into how reputational systems, especially
when linked to public-minded values, can help guide socially
responsive information production. We can also move beyond
a conception of IP without IP as requiring small communities,
or, at the other end the spectrum, emerging in large online
cohorts that operate with no governance at all. Many instances
of IP without IP-plausibly the most important ones (i.e., that
are under strain, and producing goods of high value)-will re-
quire concerted support from organizations and from law. We
will see the kinds of solutions that have helped sustain the Flu
Network much more broadly in high-stakes IP without IP, I
believe, if we look for them. And only by training our eyes
differently to look for these interventions, can we learn better





The case study method, like other methods, has certain
advantages and disadvantages.3 5 2 A case study, or "an inten-
sive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a
larger class of units,"35 3 is particularly well-suited to generat-
ing theories and to "clarifying previously obscure theoretical
relationships."364
The main purpose of the case study here is an exploratory
one. I use the example of the Network to theorize the condi-
tions under which IP without IP may be viable, particularly in
high-stakes settings, where information production is expen-
sive and temptations to defect substantial. The primary
sources of data for understanding the operations, rules, and
motivations of actors in the Network, as well as the recent crisis
and reconstruction, are interviews, textual material on the Net-
work (from the WHO archives,35 5 as well as current documents
available on the WHO website), and databases and secondary
materials that facilitated tracing of the activity of Network
members.
I conducted thirty-six semi-structured interviews, recruit-
ing participants through a supplemented snowball method.3 56
Interviews were conducted in November 2011, and in October
2013 to June 2014. Each interview typically lasted between
352 For an account 'of the impossibility of achieving all analytic goals at the
same time, and a general framework for understanding the value and limits of
different quantitative and qualitative social science methods, see ADAM PRZEWORSKI
& HENRY TEUNE, THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY 20-23 (1970) (describing
trade-offs among accuracy, generality, parsimony, and causality).
353 John Gerring, What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?, 98 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 341, 342 (2004).
354 Timothy J. McKeown, Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative
Worldview, in RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 153
(Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004). Put another way, case studies have
an advantage in "exploratory" as opposed to "confirmatory" research. Gerring,
supra note 353, at 349-50.
355 The WHO archives are accessible through the WHO library in Geneva, and
include a selection of internal papers from WHO offices from the 1940s to the
1980s. Library and Information Networks for Knowledge, About Us, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/library/en/ [https://perma.cc/4KGY-GJGE].
356 Snowball sampling is "a method for generating a field sample of individuals
possessing the characteristics of interest by asking initial contacts if they could
name a few individuals with similar characteristics who might agree to be inter-
viewed." JOHN LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL SETNGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE
OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 43 (2006). I did not rely on referrals alone, but used the
WHO's list of Network laboratories, and the assistance of an NGO participant
closely involved in the negotiations, to seek some representativeness among the
interviewees, for example on basis of geography and type of participant.
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forty-five minutes and an hour, and all but five (according to
the wishes of the subjects) were recorded and transcribed. In-
terviewees included seventeen scientists in Network labs (eight
who worked in CCs, eight who worked in national labs, and one
with experience in an ERL), six WHO officials with responsibili-
ties related to the Network, three private sector actors familiar
with the Network, eight ambassadors or members of missions
that participated in the PIP Framework negotiations, and two
NGO participants closely involved in the Framework negotia-
tions. Each interviewee was asked whether they were comfort-
able speaking on the record and being cited and quoted in
research. Nearly all agreed to speak on the record, with some
also asking to review quotations before publication (which I
agreed to do).
Once I developed an understanding of the basic dynamics
of the Network and negotiations, I sought representation from
important constituent interests, which for the Network meant
seeking scientists working in different regions of the world, and
in national labs as well as CCs and the WHO central office. In
seeking interviews with negotiators, I focused on those who
were acknowledged by others as important to, or particularly
involved in, the negotiations, and I also sought to speak to
representatives from both the global North and South. I was
relatively successful in both regards, speaking to scientists in
Network labs from Latin America, Africa, East and Southeast
Asia and Australia, and the US and Europe.
Important limitations on the sample should be noted. It is
neither a random nor strictly representative sample. Inter-
views were conducted in English, limiting interviewees to those
who are very comfortable in English (which many but not all
Network scientists are), and for all scientists except those in
Geneva and London, were conducted on the telephone. Finally,
I particularly sought out scientists who had been involved in
the Network for a long time, in positions that gave them an
overview of the Network's activities and rules. It was relatively
more difficult to interview heads of national labs, reflecting
both language barriers and some of the structure of the Net-
work itself. The Network is most interconnected at the CC
level, and has some national labs that are only loosely inte-
grated into its activities. This-along with the limits on who
was willing and able to speak with me-meant hat the sample
includes disproportionate representation from those involved
with the CCs and the WHO office, who may in turn be better
resourced and less likely to emphasize problems affecting na-
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tional researchers, perhaps particularly in resource-poor set-
tings. Nonetheless, participants in both national labs and CCs
did acknowledge similar problems in the Network, perhaps
aided by the recent negotiations which made many of those
problems a matter of public record.
One major limitation of interview-based research is that
people may inaccurately report facts, their own views, or their
motivations. Memories are inaccurate, people do not always
clearly perceive events or their own state of mind, and people
are more likely to report more socially acceptable behavior and
less likely to report less socially acceptable behavior.3 57 Where
possible, I therefore sought to triangulate interview data with
other evidence, for example from the PIP Framework or WHO
archives, or from the Web of Science3 58 and the databases that
track and make visible the sharing activities of the Network.35 9
I also rely on the Network's recent crisis and renegotiation to
help trace the processes and conditions that are most essential
to the Network.3 60 Because the negotiations were intense and
contentious, the resulting rules can be thought of as a kind of
revealed preference, which can usefully be triangulated with
the historical and experiential accounts of how the Network
operates.
Finally, generalizing from case-based research is challeng-
ing.3 61 Recognizing this, I primarily use the example here to
refute deterministic theories (such as those suggesting that IP
without IP cannot succeed where information is high value or
357 See H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN ANTHROPOLOGY: QUALITATIVE
AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 247 (4th ed., 2006). This may be particularly so
when interviewees are speaking "on the record." Cf. Id. at 245-50 (discussing
several of the difficulties in maintaining factual accuracy that may arise from
interview-based research). Notably, however, the accounts of those few interview-
ees who wished to remain anonymous did not differ in significant ways from those
who were willing to be publicly cited.
358 See infra Appendix C.
359 See infra Appendix D.
360 Studying examples that involve failure or crises facilitate what case study
methodologists call "process tracing," which relies on within-case variance to help
to isolate the causes of an outcome in that case. See David Collier, James Maho-
ney & Jason Seawright, Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias, in
RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 92-93 (Henry E.
Brady & David Collier eds., 2004). The goal of process tracing is to connect the
various phases of a policy process or change, in a way that permits us to deter-
mine why a particular outcome occurred. See Alexander L. George & Timothy J.
McKeown, Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making, in 2
ADVANCES IN INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ORGANIZATIONS 34-41 (1985).
361 See Collier, Mahoney & Seawright, supra note 360, at 96-98.
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cannot succeed over time and under pressure),362 and to elabo-
rate new theories (for example of certain potential failures of
open science, and certain conditions of success for high-stakes
"IP without IP").
362 Case studies can empirically refute deterministic theories, because a the-
ory that asserts that "X is not possible" can be disproven if a single instance of X




PATENTS IN THE NETWORK AND IN INFLUENZA MORE GENERALLY
This Appendix gathers and analyzes evidence of patenting
practices related to influenza in the Network, and in the public
and private sectors more generally. Patent searches are re-
source- and time-intensive, but fortunately, several published
reports have mapped patents related to pandemic influenza. I
draw significantly upon them, because they provide good evi-
dence of the Network's orientation toward patenting. Given the
importance of and interest in recent pandemic strains, if the
Network is patenting extensively, it would almost certainly be
visible in this domain. A broader secondary literature provides
some additional evidence of patenting, particularly about pat-
ents that may hinder responses to a pandemic.
1. Patenting in the Network.
There is very little evidence of patenting activity among the
labs that make up the Network. Before getting into the evi-
dence, it is worth noting-both on methodological grounds,
and for reasons that are important to the problems that pat-
ents created for the Network-that it is in fact extraordinarily
difficult to determine with precision the extent of patenting in
the Network, or in influenza generally. Methods for searching
patents, particularly globally, are highly imperfect, and there
are particular difficulties with searching for patents in the ge-
nomics area.36 3 When looking contemporaneously, one often
only has patent applications rather than examined patents to
review, and applications themselves are not published immedi-
ately.3 6 4 But applications are commonly rejected or substan-
tially narrowed upon examination.365 Patent claims are
363 For example, as one of the attempts to map genomic pandemic influenza
patents described, digital patent searches are only possible in a small number of
jurisdictions. See INFLUENZA GENOME TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE REPORT, PATENT LENS,
http://www.bios.net/daisy/influenza/ext/navaggregator/navaggregator [https:/
/perma.cc/QZ5Z-SJANI [hereinafter PATENT LENS REPORT]. And "[elven for those
jurisdictions with some searching facility, finding DNA or protein sequences dis-
closed in or claimed in patents is extraordinarily difficult if not impossible," be-
cause of the variety of ways that such sequences can be claimed, and the lack of
search infrastructures adequate to track these variable techniques of claiming.
Id.
364 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012) ("[Elach application for a patent shall be
published, in accordance with procedures determined by the Director, promptly
after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which
a benefit is sought under title.").
365 See, e.g., PATENT LENS REPORT, supra note 363 (documenting the narrowing
of influenza sequence patent claims in examination); WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
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difficult to interpret,3 66 and in the genomics area often tend to
be especially so, not only because of the limits of language and
ambiguity of doctrine, but also because it may be very difficult
to predict the possible consequences of a patent until later
scientific developments emerge.3 67
If it is hard for experts in patent law to determine the
import of patenting in the Network, it is still more difficult for
scientists in the Network. In interviews, some Network scien-
tists exhibited their understanding of patents by questioning
the obviousness of certain patents,3 68 expressing concerns
about patent quality that mirror recent debates,3 69 and making
distinctions between the legitimacy of different kinds of pat-
ents; for example, patents on organisms (disfavored) versus
patents on scientific methods or products such as monoclonal
antibodies (more acceptable or even desirable, though only for
non-Network work).37 0 But it was also clear that even those
scientists most comfortable discussing patents were rarely if
ever intimately familiar with the claims of particular patents.
Interviews, while a good source of information about how scien-
tists perceive patents in the Network-an issue that turns out
to be critical-are a poor source of the fact of the matter.
Fortunately, the task of determining the role that patents
have played in the Network is facilitated by four publicly availa-
ble patent mappings that were conducted in the aftermath of
WIPO PATENT SEARCH REPORT ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS (PIP)-RELATED
PATENTS AND PATENT APPLICATIONS 8 (2011) (explaining the challenges presented for
mapping by the withdrawal of applications, the rejection of patent applications,
and the narrowing of the scope of claims in patent applications) [hereinafter WIPO
2011 REPORT].
366 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1748, 1791-92 (2009).
367 On some of these points, see Lori B. Andrews & Laura A. Shackelton,
Influenza Genetic Sequence Patents: Where Intellectual Property Clashes with Pub-
lic Health Needs, 3 FUTURE VIROLOGY 235, 238-39 (2008) (describing unresolved
issues in the interpretation of genomics patents on highly changeable viruses).
368 Interview with John McCauley, Director of the WHO Collaborating Centre
for Reference and Research on Influenza, United Kingdom (Nov. 18, 2011).
369 Id. (criticizing a patent as obvious, and noting the fact that often "you just
let everything go till it's challenged. Nobody challenges because it's too
expensive.").
370 Id.; Interview with Alan Hay, former Director of the WHO Collaborating
Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, United Kingdom (Nov. 18, 2011);
Interview with Michael Shaw, Senior Advisor for Laboratory Science, WHO Collab-
orating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza (Feb. 5, 2014) (expressing
a policy at CDC against patenting "a naturally occurring virus," but distinguish-
ing these from "patents on our techniques"); see also Interview with JM Heraud,
Head, Virology Unit and National Influenza Center, Madagascar (Feb. 6, 2014)
(objecting to patents on virus sequences as "against science"); Interview with
Julian Druce, Head, National Influenza Centre, Australia (Oct. 16, 2013) (similar).
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the avian flu outbreak.3 7 1 Most of them limit their searches to
patents and patent applications relevant to recent pandemic
influenza strains, and all reflect the difficulty of finding patents
outside of those few jurisdictions that make patents available
online. They each also use slightly different techniques to de-
fine and find relevant patents. The result is that even after
these substantial reviews, no definitive accounting of Network-
held patents and their implications is possible.
However, by triangulating between these reports and inter-
views, one can develop a clear, if general, picture of the role of
patents in the Network over time. Scientists with a long history
in the Network report that patents were unheard of in most of
its history.37 2 The patent mappings show that as early as the
mid-1990s, a few Network labs did begin to seek patents re-
lated to their influenza work.3 7 3 Over the years, such patents
371 The World Intellectual Property Organization undertook an extensive pat-
ent mapping in 2011 to identify patents and patent applications "in connection
with the H5N1 and HiN1 pandemic virus." WIPO 2011 REPORT, supranote 365, at
3. This review searched U.S., European, and PCT patents and patent applications,
dividing potentially relevant patents into two categories. The first were patents
that clearly claimed either parts of the H5N1 and H1Ni viruses themselves or a
"derivative of the virus, for diagnostic, therapeutic or prophylactic purposes." Id.
at 3; see also id. at 17 (describing "Group 1" patents in further detail). Note that
patent applications may not have been granted or may have been narrowed if
granted. Id. at 4-5, 8. A second report by CAMBIA focused more narrowly on U.S.
patents and patent applications claiming either isolated genetic sequences or
expressed proteins of H5N1 viruses. See PATENT LENS REPORT, supra note 363.
This study used search techniques complementary to those used by WIPO, relying
on searches based upon flu genetic sequences themselves (instead of keyword
searches, which would miss patents that did not use key terms, such as "H5N1").
A third report was prepared by Edward Hammond for the Third World Network,
and searched the WIPO international patent application database for claims that
mention H5N 1. EDwARD HAMMOND, SOME INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES RELATED TO
H5N 1 INFLUENZA VIRUSES, RESEARCH AND VACCINES 3 (2009) [hereinafter HAMMOND
STUDY]. The patent applications were included in the study if the claims could be
classified as covering medicines, vaccines, microbes, peptides, nucleic acids, or
immunoassays. Id. at 4. A fourth report prepared by the WHO Initiative for
Vaccine Research cast the broadest net, looking for patents related to many
dimensions of vaccine technology, such as processes involved in influenza vaccine
production, and adjuvants used to make vaccines more potent. MAPPING OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RELATED TO THE PRODUCTION OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINES,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INITIATIVE FOR VACCINE RESEARCH (Oct. 23, 2007) [here-
inafter IVR REPORT 2007].
372 See Interview with Ian Gust, former member of WHO expert committee on
virus diseases (Oct. 16, 2013); Interview with Anne Kelso, Director of the WHO
Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, Australia (Oct. 29,
2013); Interview with John McCauley, supra note 368.
373 Two of the earliest patents found in the mappings are: U.S. Patent No.
5,824,536 (filed June 17, 1996) (assigned to St. Jude) and U.S. Patent No.
5,976,551 (filed June 7, 1995) (assigned to Pasteur Institute in Paris). This does
not provide definitive evidence of the date when patenting by Network labs began.
Existing mappings focus largely on existing patents. But because patents expire
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emerged only sporadically, sought by individual labs rather
than the Network as an entity, with just a few labs and very few
patents involved. While each mapping found at least one pat-
ent or patent application stemming from a Network lab in their
relevant pool of patents, collectively they show patenting activ-
ity in only five out of the more than 100 labs associated with
the Network, with fewer than 20 total patents and patent appli-
cations, and more than half of these stemming from one influ-
enza lab with close ties to the animal sector, at St. Jude.
Patents stemming from the Network are dwarfed, in every case,
by the much larger number of patents from other entities. Only
two patent applications by Network labs identified in these
mappings include in their claims natural nucleotide sequences
of Network viruses (an important issue when controversies
emerged over whether patents were being obtained on "Net-
work material" itself).3 74
Interpreting and generalizing the claims of the 20 pan-
demic-strain related patents and patent applications identified
as associated with the Network is difficult, but they tend to fall
into two subsets. One subset claims selections or modifica-
tions of influenza virus components designed to elicit a better
immune response for vaccines or therapeutics,375 and the
other claims ways to stabilize or maximize the production of
vaccine viruses.3 76 The latter category includes one notable
suite of patents held by St. Jude that are important to a pro-
after a term of twenty years, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012), these mappings are not
a good source of information about patenting practices in the 1980s or earlier.
374 See HAMMOND STUDY, supra note 371, at 5, 15 (within discussion of patent
applications including H5N1 genetic material, identifying two patent applications
by Network labs that included natural virus sequences, one in the context of
claims involving DNA vaccines and the other in the context of claims involving
monoclonal antibodies and potent HA molecules); see also PATENT LENS REPORT,
supra note 363 (within mappings of patents and patent applications claiming
influenza nucleotide sequences, listing no patents or patent applications by Net-
work labs that exclusively claim natural virus sequences).
375 For example, a patent application by St. Jude, WO 2007/019094 A3, uses
reverse genetics to design specific changes to HA molecules that induce greater
vaccine potency. Claim 7 of the application does claim a strain that came from the
Flu Network, but only insofar as it includes the modified HA molecules. A subse-
quent and similar patent application by St. Jude, WO 2008/033105 A8, claims
very potent HA molecules that can induce the production of antibodies that are to
be used for diagnosis and therapy. See Hammond Study, supra note 371, at 15.
Note that patent applications may not have been granted or may have been
narrowed if granted.
376 In the second category, U.S. Patent No. 6,951,754 (filed Apr. 27, 2001)
(assigned to St. Jude), claims broadly and generally reverse genetics techniques to
produce compositions of various influenza genes and viral components, which is
an efficient method for producing vaccine viruses.
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cess known as reverse genetics.37 7 These patents are general
in nature, covering processes important to new techniques for
building viruses from scratch, and in this sense are not directly
related to influenza or the work of the Network.37 8 These pat-
ents may well be relevant to the production of pandemic vac-
cines, because they cover the process used by the Network to
create reference strains for pandemic vaccines.379 In recogni-
tion of the sensitivity of the access to medicine issues posed by
these patents-and perhaps also the fact that some of them are
held by a CC-Medlmmune has publicly announced that it will
license these patents to government organizations and develop-
ing countries at no cost to develop vaccines for public health
purposes.30
With the exception of these reverse genetics patents (which
were not perceived as the result of Network work) the sporadic
patents that Network labs have secured have apparently gener-
ated no revenue for the Network or its labs, nor impinged di-
rectly on its activities.3 8' CC participants described a few
377 See IVR REPORT 2007, supra note 371, at 18-19; Anatole Krattiger et al.,
Intellectual Property Management Strategies to Accelerate the Development and
Access of Vaccines and Diagnostics: Case Studies on Pandemic Influenza, Malaria
and SARS, 2 INNOVATION STRATEGY TODAY 67, 94-96 (2006). Influenza reverse ge-
netics is the process by which scientists choose which HA and NA genes they will
express in a particular virus strain, relying on their chosen HA and NA genes to be
expressed from pre-designed plasmids, rather than resorting to natural assort-
ment between different HA and NA strains like in conventional virus production.
See Reverse Genetics, Flu (Influenza), NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS
DISEASES (Jan. 14, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20140710042216/
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/Flu/Research/basic/Pages/ReverseGenetics
Illustration.aspx [https://perma.cc/8UY2-T99Q].
378 The technique is, however, critical to Network's work creating seed strains
for pandemic vaccines. There are many patents beyond those belonging to St.
Jude that are relevant to the process of reverse genetics, and the suite of relevant
patents was assembled by a private company-which licensed the St. Jude's
patents among others-called MedImmune. Press Release, MedImmune, MedIm-
mune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse Genetics with New Rights from Mount




379 IVR REPORT 2007, supra note 371, at 18.
380 See id. MedImmune requires licensing fees for commercial producers of
vaccines, and recently was acquired by AstraZeneca with uncertain implications
for these policies. Id. at 19.
381 See, e.g., Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 370 (reporting that the
CDC has no revenue stream coming from the CDC's diagnostic patents); Interview
with Alan Hay, supra note 370 (stating that "generally throughout the Network,
people aren't patenting anything that really impinges on the Network"); Interview
with John McCauley, supra note 368 (indicating, vis-d-vis the emergence of pat-
enting in the viruses and genomics, "I don't think within the Network it changed
much in practice"). While the reverse genetics patents at St. Jude's were licensed,
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patents that could theoretically have interfered with Network
work, for example because they covered techniques related to
flu diagnosis. Why did Network labs seek these patents? A
lead scientist at the CDC, one of the few labs to hold such
patents, described the reasons as "defensive."3 8 2 More specifi-
cally, he described them as intended to prevent private firms
from taking unfair advantage of the Network's work.3 8 3 More
broadly, they may also be intended to preserve freedom to oper-
ate for Network labs,38 4 though there is no obvious evidence
that patents, held by public or private entities, have interfered
with the Network's work to date.
The recent seeking of patents by Network labs reflects-in
attenuated fashion-a broader shift in attitudes toward pat-
ents that occurred in public scientific institutions in the 1980s
and 1990s.385 Government entities and academic institutions
rarely patented before this period, and many had policies
against patenting. The broader trend has been described as
the result of factors that include the rise of biotechnology, ex-
pansions in the scope of patentability, and legislative shifts
(particularly in the United States, where the Bayh-Dole Act
they are not influenza specific, and the head of the CC there also suggested that
any revenues that came to their lab from this patent would only be indirect,
because the revenues go to St. Jude generally, which then sets the overall budgets
for sub-units such as the influenza lab. See Interview with Richard Webby,
Faculty, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital and Director, WHO Collaborating
Center for Studies on the Ecology of Influenza in Animals and Birds (May 22,
2014).
382 Interview with Michael Shaw, supra note 370. This is consistent with what
others from some CCs also perceived. See, e.g., Interview with Alan Hay, supra
note 370.
383 Dr. Shaw from the CDC reported, for example, that there had "been situa-
tions where we've sort of been caught, . . . [where] we had published some se-
quences of primers that were useful for sequencing of influenza viruses and a
fairly large multinational company started marketing them." Interview with
Michael Shaw, supra note 370. In response to this, the CDC has occasionally
taken out patents on techniques the CC there has developed; for example, for a
real-time PCR assay used in diagnosing influenza strains. These seem to be U.S.
Patent No. 8,568,981 (filed July 20, 2012) (concerned with methods of detecting
various influenza strains using different PCR primers) and U.S. Patent No.
8,241,853 (filed Aug. 13, 2008) (a continuation-in-part, specifically including
probes that can detect variations of the H5 and H7 types of influenza).
384 See, e.g., Interview with Alan Hay, supra note 370 (reporting that while the
CDC had sought IP related to Network materials, that they had always insisted
that the "reason they took out patents on things was to prevent others doing so.
And so it was to protect the Network.").
385 See, e.g., David C. Mowrey et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by
U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30
RES. POL'Y 99, 103-04 (2001) (giving evidence of the expansion of patenting by
universities in these decades).
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was passed to encourage patenting of the results of federal
research).386
2. The Broader Context: Patenting in the Public and
Private Sectors Generally
The Network's approach is clearly distinct from the more
general trend in influenza. As these same patent mappings
also show, patenting in connection with pandemic influenza
viruses has grown dramatically in recent years, particularly
around the re-emergence of H5N1. This explosion of patents
includes applications and granted patents for genetic se-
quences, and those that are directed to primers, probes, diag-
nostic tests, and vaccine technologies.3 37  The public and
especially academic sector outside of the Network has actively
participated in this new patent race, with a particularly high
share of sequence patents (though altogether these are rela-
tively few), and a more minor but not trivial share of patents
that relate to vaccine production and manufacture.3 8 8
These mappings are incomplete and do not reveal, in par-
ticular, whether public sector and academic institutions seek
to profit from such patents, or rather also view them as defen-
sive in nature. However, they do make clear that many public
sector institutions have begun to seek patents that could cover
key vaccine components or processes.
In the private sector, patents related to vaccines are com-
mon, reflecting the broad importance of patents in the business
model of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
Patents related to vaccines may be multiple and fragmented,
386 Id. at 100, 116.
387 See HAMMOND STUDY, supra note 371, at 4 (showing that 36% of patent
applications for influenza vaccines filed between 1983 and September 2008 have
been filed since January 1, 2006); Krattiger et al., supra note 377, at 94-104
(collecting granted patents on sequences and important techniques for vaccine
production, etc.); PATENT LENS REPORT, supra note 363 (documenting granted pat-
ents on genetic sequences, reassortment viruses, and amino acid sequences);
WIPO 2011 REPoRT, supra note 365, at 3-4, 20, 23 (identifying 73 patent applica-
tions directly or indirectly related to the H5N 1 and H IN 1 viruses that claim virus
sequences, isolated antigens, and sequences included in patents on novel vectors,
vaccines, and adjuvants); IVR REPORT 2007, supra note 371 (documenting 123
patents relevant to the production of pandemic influenza vaccines).
388 For sequence patents, see, for example, U.S. Patent No. 6,685,946 (filed
Sep .19, 2002), U.S. Patent No., U.S. Patent No. 6,287,570 (filed Nov. 28, 1998),
and U.S. Patent No. 6,824,784 (filed May 8, 2003). See also PATENT LENS REPORT,
supra note 363. The other patent mappings do not break out the public sector
specifically, but tallying them reveals that public sector institutions account for
less, and in certain cases significantly less, than a third of the patents identified.
See HAMMOND STUDY, supra note 371; IVR REPORT 2007, supra note 371; WIPO
2011 REPoRT, supra note 365.
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and relate not to single vaccines but to broader systems that
are used in processes of many different vaccines.3 89 This is
broadly reflected in influenza, particularly in recent years.
The most common form of influenza vaccine, grown in
eggs, is more than sixty years old, and therefore unpatented.3 9 0
However, there have been extensive efforts to improve the man-
ufacturing and efficacy of vaccines, resulting in many patents
(mostly-but not only-held by the private sector), that could
potentially be critical to the production of vaccines in a pan-
demic.39 1 The clearest example of a key patent stake is the
suite of patents assembled by MedImmune that cover the pro-
cess of reverse genetics, described above.392 Several therapeu-
tic drugs that target the influenza virus are also covered by
patents, but in forms far less complex than the patent land-
scape for influenza vaccines.393
As this shows, the Network exists at one end of a spectrum:
private sector entities have patented aggressively around influ-
389 See Hillary Greene, Patent Pooling Behind the Veil of Uncertainty: Antitrust,
Competition Policy, and the Vaccine Industry, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1404-05
(2010).
390 IVR REPORT 2007, supra note 371, at 3.
391 For example, improvements in the conventional process (that, for example,
create higher yield) are under patent, at least in some countries. Id. at 3-5. In a
pandemic setting, the use of adjuvants, which increase immune response and
thus allow for smaller doses, may be critical, and many are under patent. Id. at
10-13 (discussing adjuvant-related patents, most of which are held by private
companies). Cell-based techniques to grow viruses outside of eggs also are the
subject of many patents, particularly-but not only-by private sector companies.
Id. at 5-10. Of the 27 such patents identified in the IVR report, five were held by
the University of California (which is home to a scientist who is a leader in the
science of cell-based manufacture), one by the patenting entity of Wisconsin Uni-
versity, and three by St. Jude. Notably, even in the absence of patents, regulatory
requirements may make it difficult to use cell-based techniques without the coop-
eration of the entity holding the original cell-line. Id. at 6. Live-activated vaccines
("FluMist" in the United States), which are administered as nasal sprays, are built
on backbones of modified strains that give the vaccine virus its attenuated qual-
ity, and so patents could be important barriers to production of certain such
vaccines. See id. at 13-15.
392 See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
393 For example, the most well-known such drug is oseltamivir phosphate
(Tamiflu), which according to the FDA Orange Book was until recently covered by
two patents: U.S. Patent No. 5,866,601 (filed June 6, 1995) and U.S. Patent No.
5,763,483 (fied Dec. 27, 1996). FDA ORANGE BOOK OF APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, N021087, http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent info.cfm?ProductNo=003&ApplNo=021087&
Appl-type=N [https://perma.cc/2CQB-65RP]. The Orange Book is not compre-
hensive. (For example, it excludes process patents. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).)
However, the landscape is clearly less complex than the landscape for vaccines,
which may be impacted by patents on nucleotide or amino acid sequences, other
intermediaries, on reverse genetics, on cell-based or other manufacturing
processes, as well as on other techniques to optimize or test their efficacy.
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enza, public sector entities outside of the Network have pat-
ented in significant numbers, and Network labs have patented
hardly at all. Notably, the fact that private, and some public
entities, have sought patents does not contradict the point
above that the market-exclusionary mode is inadequate to gen-
erate the information goods we need to address influenza.
Much of the work resulting in patents, in both the private and
public sectors, has received substantial public funding, as de-
scribed above. Patents do create some profit opportunities-for
example, if a pandemic occurs-and companies rationally seek
them for this reason. Nonetheless, we cannot expect patents
alone to provide adequate incentives for the range of informa-
tion goods that we need to address influenza, for the reasons
detailed in Part I.
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APPENDIX C
PUBLICATION RECORD OF CURRENT HEADS OF NETWORK LABS
The following reports instances of publications where the
current head of a national lab, regulatory lab, or CC was at
least a co-author. The data is up to date as of November 2,
2016.
The data was compiled by searching for each head of a
national lab, regulatory lab, or CC3 9 4 as an author in the Web
of Science database.39 5 Web of Science is a citation index sys-
tem maintained by Thomson Reuters that indexes journals,
books, and conference proceedings from all scientific disci-
plines and many social sciences and arts and humanities disci-
plines. It has over 90 million records of scholarly work.3 9 6 It
aspires to index the world's most important research, covering
publications from 80 different countries, and has nearly 1 bil-
lion cited references.397
The search sought to capture potential authorship (or co-
authorship) in all publications with no past time limits. The
number of publications was found by searching in Web of Sci-
ence Advanced Search for (1) a given author's last name and
first and middle initials and (2) his or her country of residence.
The search was then repeated with the topic "influenza" to see
how many of those publications included the word in their
titles.398 For common names that returned an inordinate
number of results, the results were limited according to the
author's institution or via the Web of Science "Article Groups"
feature, which attempts to identify unique authors via a propri-
394 Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), WHO INFLU-
ENZA, http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrsilaboratory/en [https://perma.cc/
BCA5-RFM3].
395 Web of Science, CLARIVATE ANALYrICS, http://clarivate.com/scientific-and-
academic-research/research-discovery/web-of-science/ [https://perma.cc/
GM8E-KLCF].
396 Web of Science, CLARIVATE ANALYIcs, http://wokinfo.com/citationconnec
tion/ [https://perma.cc/PAE5-5ED6].
397 Id., Web of Science All Databases Help, https://images.webofknowledge.
com/WOKRS 516B3/help/WOK/hpadditionalresources. html [https://
perma.cc/YFU7-25CU].
398 For general publication counts, a search query of the following form was
used: "AU=([author's last name and initials]*) AND CU=([author's country])",
where "AU" indicates the author field and "CU" the country field. For "Influenza
Publication" counts, a search query of the following form was used: "AU=([author's
last name and initials]*) AND CU=([author's country]) AND TS=(inluenza)", where
"TS" indicates the topic field. For "Other Publication" counts, the influenza publi-
cation counts were subtracted from the general publication counts.
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etary algorithm.39 9 The results are not exact, since they are
inflated by the publication counts of other authors with the
same last name and initials as the authors in question. Be-
cause Web of Science catalogues authors by last name and
initials, this effect is impossible to avoid. Limiting the search
results to the author's country of residence helps attenuate the
effects.
There are three additional noteworthy limitations to the
data generated. First, the publications selected for indexing in
the Web of Science are likely skewed towards the global North.
Second, the tenure duration and activity level of a NIC head
impact his or her ability to compile a publication record. Third,
many important influenza scientists have been affiliated previ-
ously with the Network but are not the current head of a lab, or
are affiliated with the Network but not the head of a lab. The
results below should be understood as illustrative of the dy-
namics of publication in the Network, and generally as under-
estimates of both individuals' total publications and of the role
of Network scientists in publishing.
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TABLE ONE
Publicationsby Country & Head4 0 0 :
Inaluenza Other
Country Head Name Lab Publications Publications
Afghanistan Gulam Eshan Central Public HealtiLaboratory 0 0
___________ Sharifi
Albania Silvia Bino Institute of Public Health 0 47
Algeria Fawzi Derrar Institut Pasteur d'Algirie 0 1
Instituto Nacional de
Enfermedades Infecciosas
Jorge Camara Instituto de Virologia 0 3
Osvaldo Uez Intituto Nacional de 10 0
Epidemiologia
Country Total 33 11
Julian Druce Victorian Infectious Diseases 12 31
Reference Laboratory
David Smith PathWest Laboratory 24 23
Dominic Dwyer Westmead Hospital 95 209
Australia Ba Victorian Infectious Diseases 151 25
Reference Laboratory
Mandvi Therapeutic Goods 3 53
Bharadwaj 4 Administration Laboratories
Country Total 285 341
Austria Franz X. Heinz Medical University of Vienna 20 173
Bahrain Amjad Zaed Public Health Laboratory 0 0
Bangladesh Mahmudur Institute of Epidemiology 10 35
Rahman
Republican Research & Practical
Belarus Natalia Gribkova Center for Epidemiology and 0 0
Microbiology
Belgium Isabelle Thomas Scientific Institute of Public 8 ill
Health
Wyller Alencar Instituto Evandro Chagas 0 0
de Mello
Bril Marilda Siqueira Instituto Oswaldo Cruz 37 67
Terezinha Maria Instituto Adolfo Lutz 0 0
de Paiva
Country Total 37 67
Bulgaria Nell Korsun National Centre of Infectious and 9
Parasitic Diseases
Cambodia Philippe Dussart Institut Pasteur in Cambodia 2 5
Cameroon Richard Njouom Centre Pasteur du Cameroun 9 49
400 Y denotes heads of WHO Collaborating Centres, with a total of six such
individuals: Barr, Shu, Odagiri, McCauley, Katz, and Webby. t denotes heads of
Essential Regulatory Laboratories, with a total of four such individuals:
Bharadwaj, Odagiri, Engelhardt, and Ye. All others are heads of NICs.
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Health Canada Canadian Science
Canada Yan Li Center for Human and Animal 50 41
Health
Central African Emmnanuel
epralAfica au I Institute Pasteur de Bangui 0 0
Republic Nakoune
Chile Rodrigo Fasce Instituto de Salud Publica de 16 10
Chile
Yuelong Shu Chinese National Influenza
China Center
Janice Lo Centre for Health Protection 3 22
Country Total 128 27
Colombia Juliana Barbosa Instituto Nacional de Salud de 1 2
Ramirez Colombia
Costa Rica Jenny Lara Laboratorlo Naconal de 3 2
Influenza
C6te d'Ivoire Herv6 Kadjo Institut Pasteur de C6te d'Ivoire 0 0
Vladimir Croatian Institute of Public
Drazenovic Health
Betsy AcostaCuba errera Instituto de Medicina Tropical 4 2
Herrera
Czech Republic Martina National Instituteof Public 19 11
Havlickova Health
Democratic Central Hygienic Antiepidemic
People's Republic K. Dong Guy Sttin 0 0
of Korea
Denmark Thea Kolsen Statens Serum Institut 7 59
Fischer
Ecuador Alfredo Bruno Instituto Nacional de Higiene y 0 0
Calcedo Medicina Tropical
Marwa Egyptian Holding Company for 0 0Abdalhamid Biological Products and Vaccines
Egypt Amel Mohamed Central Public Health Laboratory 1 5Naguib
Country Total 1 5
M6nica Jeannette Laboratoro Central Ministerio
El Salvador Barahona de de 0ud Pub0lca
Gadmez
Estonia Natalja Laboratory for Communicable 0
Kuznetsova Diseases
Fiji Eric Rafai Center for Communicable 0 6
Disease Control
Finland Niina Ikonen National Institute for Health and 27 2
Welfare
Bruno Lina. Centre de biologie etde 114 121
pathologie
Martine Valette Centre de biologie et de 75
France pathologie
Sylvie Van der Institut Pasteur 0 0
Werf
__________Country Total 167 196
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French Guiana Dominique Institut Pasteur de la Guyane 0 11
Rousset
French New Dominique Pasteur Institute 0 0
Caledonia Baudon
Ann
Georgia A h National Influenza Center 1 1Machablishvili
Germany Robert Koch-Institute 83 59
Schweiger
Ghana William Ampofo National Influenza Laboratory 18 45
Andreas Mentis Institut Pasteur Helnique 7 133
Nikolaos
Greece Misoas National Influenza Center 11 27
Malisiovas
Country Total 18 160
Guatemala Leticia Castillo Centro Nacional de Influenza 0 0
Signor
Maria Luisa Laboratorio Nacional de
Honduras 2 3
Matute Vigilancla de la Salud
Hungary lstvan Jankovics B. JoharNational Center for 16 37
Epidemiology
Iceland Arthur Lave Landspitali- University Hospital 3 35
Usha Soren Sing National Influenza Center 0 22
Ranjana Acharya Donde Marg 3 3
India Deshmukh
D T Mourya National Institute of Virology 0 88
CountryTotal 3 113
Indonesia Pretty - Center for Biomedical and Basic 1 0
Multihartina Technology of Health
Talat Mokhtart Iranian National Influenza 12 32
Azad Center
Iraq Imam M. Aufi National Influenza Centre 0 0
Ireland Cillian De Gasc National VirusReference 0 0Laboratory
Michal
Israel Mal Ministry of Health 37 10
Mandelboima
Italy Maria Rita Istituto Superiore di Sanita 48 1
Castrucci
Jamaica Sandra Jackson University of the West Indies 1 10
National Institute of Infectious 106 105
Japan Takato Odagiri7 I Dis6s05Diseases
Jordan Ha Laboratory Directorate 1 8
Haddadin
Gauhar National Reference Laboratory 0 0
Nusupbaeva for Control of Viral infections
Kenya Japeth Magana Center for Virus Reearch 4 2
Kuwait S. AlMufti Ministry of Public Health 0 9
Kyrgyzstan Gulbarchyn National Virology Laboratory 0 0
Saparova





Namaia Riga East University Idspital 0 1
Latvia Znj
Gatis Pakarna Riga East University Hospital 0 1
Country Total 0 2
Pierre Zalloua National Influenza Centre 0 76
Lebanon Nisrine Jamal National Influenza Centre 0 0
Country Total 0 76
L Vilnele National Public Helth
Lipnickiene Surveillance Laboratory
Luxembourg Matthias Opp Laboratoire National de Santt 5 12
Madagascar JeanMichel Institut Pasteur de Madagascar 16 22
Heraud
Zainah Saat Institute of Medical Research 6 15
Malaysia Jamal lChing University of Malaya 0 2
Sam
Country Total 6 17
Malta Christopher Virology Laboratory of Mater Dei 0 13
Barbara Hospital
Mauritius Sanjiv Central Health Laboratory 0 50
Irma Lopez Instituto de diagn6stico y 1 5Mexico15
Martinez Referencia Epidemiologicos
Moldova Constantin Spinu National Influenza Center 0 3
National Center for
Mongolia Y. Buyanjargal Conal eses 0 0Communicable Diseases
Morocco Amal Barakat Institut National d'Hygiane 3 1
Myanmar Htay Htay Tin National Health Laboratory 1 7
Nepal Geeta Shakya National Public Health 2 27
Laboratory
Netherlands Marion National Influenza Centre 66 139
Koopmans
Margaret C. Auckland City Hospital 0 60
New Zealand Croxson
Sue Huang National Influenza Centre 5 68
Country Total 5 128
Nicaragua Angel Balmaceda Centro Nacional de Diagnostico y 0 0
Echeverria Referenda
Nigeria D. Olaleye College of Medicine Ibadan 4 31
Nor-way Olav Hunignes Norwegian Institute of Publich 32 17
Health
Oman Amina A] Jardani Central Public Health Laboratory 0 0
Pakistan Bilees Mazher National Institute of Health 3 10
Kazi
Panama Brechla Moreno Instituto Conmemorativo Gorgas 1 21
de Estudios de la Salud
Papua New Amanda Lang Institute of Medical Research 0 0
Guinea
Paraguay Cynthia Vazquez Laboratorio Central de Salud
Publica
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Victoria
Peru Guttierez Instituto Nactional de Salud 0 0
Peceros
Philippines Socorro P Department of Health 2 13
Lupisan
Poland Lidia B. Brydak National Influenza Centre 64 0
Portugal Raquel Guiomar National Influenza Reference 12 5
Laboratory
Qatar Ajayeb Al-Nabet Hamad Medical Corporation 0 1
Republic of K Korea National Institute of 0 0
Korea Health
Costin Cernescu. National Influenza Centre in the 0 31
Institute of Virology
Viorel
R aaresu Cantacuzino Institute 4 38
Romania Alexandrescu
C. Apetrei Last University of Medicine & 0
Pharmacy
Country Total 4 135
Petr Grigorievich Ministry of Health of the Russia 8 15
Deryabin Federation
Elena Ivanova Ministry of Health of the Russian 16 4
Russia Burtseva Federation
Anna A. Research Insttute of Influenza 5 1
Sominina I
Country Total 29 20
Senegal Mbayame Niang Institut Pasteur de Dakar 10 67
Jasminka
Seiankv Institute of Immunology 6 103
Serbia Nedelikovic
Vera JerantPatic Institute of Public Health 0 3
Country Total 6 106
Singapore Raymond Tzer National Public Health 12
Pin Lin Laboratory
Slovaktia Edita Starofiovd Public Health Authority of the 1 0
Slovak Republic
Slovenia Katarina Prosenc National Laboratory for Health, 10 13
Environment and Food
Diana Hardie University of CapeTown 1 30
South Africa Florette National Institute for 10 33
Treurnicht Communicable Diseases
Country Total 11 63
Tomas Pumarola Universidad de Barcelona 54 132
Inmaculada Centro Nacional de 9
Casas Microbiologia
Spain Francisco Pozo Centro Nacional de 2 3
Microbiologia
Ratil Ortiz de
Universidad de Valladolid 0 0
Lejarazu
Country Total 59 144
Sri Lanka Jude Jayamaha Medical Research Institute 0 0
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Sudan Hayat Salah Federal Ministry of Health 0 0
Eldin Khogali
Sweden Mia Brytting Public Health Agency Swden 14 42
Switzerland Samuel Cordey University of Geneva Hospitals 1 24
Syria Hazzaa Al Khalaf Public Health Laboratories 0 1
Tanzania Fausta Mosha National Influenza Laboratory 0 2
Thailand Mahn National Institute of Health 41 8
Chittaganpitch
Trinidad and Victoria Moris- Caribbean Epidemiology Centre 0 0
Tobago Glasgow
Tunisia Amine Slim Laboratoire de Microbiologie 6 46
Turkey Gulay National Influenza Centre 11 46
Korukluoglu
Uganda Julius Lutwama Uganda Virus Research Institute 4 44
L.V.Gromashevsky Institute of
Ukraine Alla Mironenko Epidemiology & Infectious 5 3
Diseases
Pamela
mleau Aberdeen Royal Infirmary 0 35Molyneaux
Peter Coyle Royal Victoria Hospital 3 75
William Carman Gartnavel General Hospital 9 73
Maria Zambon Health Protedion Agency 181 35
UK WHO Collaborating Centre for
John McCauley Reference and Research on 92 86
Influenza
Othmar National Institute for Biological 25
Engelhardt f Standards and Control
Country Total 310 305
HF. Maassab University of Michigan 71 30
Jacqueline Katz CDC 275 27
Viral and Rickettsial Disease
John Janda Laoaoy0 10Laboratory
New York State Department of
USL. Grady Helh1 37us Health
WHO Collaborating Center for
Richard Webby Studies on the Ecology of 308 22
Influenza in Animals
Zhiping Ye I FDA 50 6
Country Total 705 132
Uruguay Hector Chiparelli Departamento de Laboratorio de
Salud Publica
Venezuela Esperanza Instituto Nacional de Higiene 0 8
Bricehio
Le Quynh Mai National Institute of Hygiene and 22 11
Epidemiology
Vietnam Nguyen Thanh Pasteur Institute 7 89
Long
Country Total 29 100
Zambia Mwaka Monze University Teaching Hospital 3 36
1634
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FIGURE ONE















Influenza Publications Mean Median
All Network Lab Heads 17.53 3
Head of CCs 176.17 138
Head of Regulatory Labs 46 37.5
Head of National Labs 10.79 2
TABLE 3
Influenza All
Total Number of Publications by All Heads 2700 6612
Percent Publications by Heads of CCs 39.15% 20.07%




NETWORK HEAD'S AVERAGE NUMBER OF INFLUENZA







0 20 40 60 80
401 For this and the next figure, the following countries were grouped as Africa:
Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, COte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan,
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
The following countries were grouped as Asia: Afghanistan, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan,
Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand,
Turkey, and Vietnam.
The following countries were grouped as Europe: Albania, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and Ukraine.
The following countries were grouped as North America: Canada, Costa Rica,
Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Trinidad and Tobago, and United States.
The following countries were grouped as Oceania: Australia, Fiji, French
Guiana, French New Caledonia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.
The following countries were grouped as South America: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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INFLUENZA SAMPLES COLLECTED AND SEQUENCES SHARED
BY EACH COUNTRY
The following reports the number of influenza samples re-
ceived and collected by Network laboratories worldwide, as re-
ported to the Network through WHO FluNet 4 0 2 as well as
influenza virus sequences hared on GISAID EpiFlu by labora-
tories across the world, which include (but are not limited to)
Network labs.4 0 3 This data is up to date as of October 17,
2016.
The FluNet data was compiled by searching the FluNet
interactive database4 0 4 for the category "Influenza laboratory
surveillance data from any week." For the date range, the
search used a range from week 1 of 1995 to week 40 of 2016.
This data reports the number of recorded influenza virus sam-
ples collected/received as reported to the Network within each
country, where each instance of collection or receipt is tallied
as a unit.
The GISAID data was compiled by searching the EpiFlu
database4 0 5 for the "collection date" from 1/1/1995 to
10/7/2016, and selecting every "originating laboratory" from
an individual country. This data is the number of influenza
sequences shared on the GISAID network for all users to ac-
cess, where each sequence shared is tallied as a unit.
There are four noteworthy observations in this data.
First, there is extensive sharing of genetic sequences by
influenza scientists, and even more extensive reporting of sam-
ple collection by WHO labs. The number of shared sequences
on GISAID from each WHO region is quite high; even the region
contributing the fewest sequences (South-East Asia- 11 coun-
tries) had 1/10 of the number of sequences of the region con-
tributing the most (Europe-53 countries). Furthermore,
Network labs in every WHO region reported collecting hun-
dreds of thousands of samples during the last 20 years.
Second, there is regional differentiation in terms of sample
collection and data sharing, consistent with observations made
402 FluNet Database, WHO, http://apps.who.int/flumart/Default?ReportNo=
12 [https://perma.cc/2ZJQ-BEAK].
403 About GISAID, GISAID INITIATIVE, http://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/frontend
- l7a8de [https://perma.cc/B2E6-FTNU (click "About GISAID" on the top navi-
gation bar).
404 FluNet Database, supra note 402.
405 EpiFlu Database, GISAID INITIATIVE, http://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/
frontend - l7a8de [https://perma.cc/B2E6-FTNU (click "EpiFlum DATABASE").
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by Network scientists. Generally, there are more samples re-
ported and shared from Europe and US labs, and relatively
fewer samples reported and shared from countries with re-
source-poor labs.
Third, despite this differentiation, even in Africa, Latin
America, and especially Asia, there is very extensive reporting
and sharing of influenza sequence information. In fact, Asia's
contribution is on par with (and regarding viruses, exceeds)
contributions from Europe and the US, while Africa and Latin
America's contributions are within the same order of magni-
tude as contributions from Europe and the US.
Fourth, overall, the number of specimens received and col-
lected in FluNet looks consistent with the number of sequences
shared on GISAID for each country. This seems to suggest hat
collecting and sharing influenza samples are generally corre-
lated. However, it is noteworthy that Mexico, Japan, Austria,
Ukraine, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, and Moldova all made sig-
nificant contributions to GISAID (> 100 samples), but were not
recorded as making any collections in FluNet; this is true for a
few more countries with less significant GISAID contributions,
as well. These countries may be reporting their sample collec-
tion in another database.
Regional Comparisons:
Total Sequences Total Viruses
Region Shared in GISAID Collected in FluNet
Americas 16,726 5,342,118
Western Pacific 13,890 3,523,758
Europe 17,143 901,826
Eastern Mediterranean 1,149 344,982
Africa 2,643 321,490
South-East Asia 1,788 259,968
Percent of countries
with no GISAID Top country's GISAID
Region contributions contribution percent
Americas 31% 76%
Western Pacific 26% 27%
Europe 11% 19%
Eastern Mediterranean 29% 30%
Africa 53% 14%




Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet
Africa 2,643 321,490




















Central African 7 3,986
Republic
Niger 3 1,051
Democratic Republic of 0 14,942
the Congo






Cape Verde 0 0
Chad 0 0
Comoros 0 0





Sequences shared on Total Viruses







Sao Tome and Principe 0 0
Seychelles 0 0




Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet
Americas 16,726 5,342,118







Trinidad and Tobago 147 0
Paraguay 117 2,698
Guatemala 108 3,024
Costa Rica 90 4,914
Colombia 81 0
Dominican Republic 81 0
Bolivia 79 0
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Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet
Cuba 0 4,565
Suriname 0 21






Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 0
Saint Lucia 0 0
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
WHO Western Pacific Region:
Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet







New Zealand 494 50,468
Cambodia 214 24,710
Mongolia 138 33,455








Solomon Islands 7 0
Palau 4 0
Kiribati 3 0
Cook Islands 0 0
Marshall Islands 0 0
Niue 0 0
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Sequences shared on Total Viruses






Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet
Europe 17,143 901,826
Spain 3,249 14,009






























Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet
Hungary 100 0
Luxembourg 99 0

















San Marino 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 0
Uzbekistan 0 0
WHO South-East Asia Region:
Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet










North Korea 0 0
Timor-Leste 0 0
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WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region
Sequences shared on Total Viruses
Country GISAID collected in FluNet
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APPENDIX E
TOP PUBLISHERS IN THE INFLUENZA FIELD
The following table seeks to identify the 100 most prolific
authors and their number of publications in the influenza field.
The data is up to date as of September 25, 2016.
The data was compiled by searching for the topic of "influ-
enza" in the Web of Science database. The search captured
authorship (and co-authorship) in all publications for pub-
lished articles with no past time limits. The results were then
filtered to return the top 100 authors in terms of publication
output. The results again are subject to important limitations,
mirroring those described in Appendix C. Because of these, the
method likely underestimates actual representation of the Net-
work among these prolific authors.4 0 6 Even without this con-
sideration, 7% of the top-100 prolific researchers are Network
lab heads (bolded in the below).





















406 For example, Nancy Cox, Richard Webster, and Masato Tashiro have been
key members of the Flu Network for many years, but are not bolded here because
they are not current heads of Network labs.
407 Bolded authors denote heads of WHO Collaborating Centres, Essential
Regulatory Laboratories, and national labs in September 2016.
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Author Publications
Swayne DE 222
Chen HL 215
Cox NJ 215
Lamb RA 211
Compans RW 205
Zhang Y 205
Skehel JJ 202
Tumpey TM 196
Wang J 191
Cowling BJ 188
Monto AS 182
Suzuki T 169
Hayden FG 167
Subbarao K 166
Scholtissek C 164
Wang Y 164
Taubenberger JK 158
Finelli L 156
Kim JH 155
Tashiro M 153
Edwards KM 152
CapuaI 149
Chen Y 148
Gao GF 148
LiJ 146
Viboud C 145
Couch RB 143
Shu YL 142
Laver WG 141
Suarez DL 141
Klmov A 140
Uyeki TM 140
Liu Y 137
Rott R 137
Zambon M 137
Yuen KY 136
Krug RM 135
Zhdanov VM 134
Air GM 133
KendalAP 133
Kilbourne ED 133
Nichol KL 133
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Author Publications
Wang W 133
Chan KH 132
Oxford JS 132
Glezen WP 129
Katze MG 126
Ludwig S 124
Govorkova EA 123
Klimov Al 122
Schild GC 122
Shay DK 122
Fry AM 121
Poland GA 119
Brown IH 117
Zhang L 117
Treanor JJ 116
Donis RO 115
Lina B 115
Esposito S 114
Gubareva LV 114
Haller O 114
Kuiken T 114
Nakamura K 114
Zhang J 114
Braciale TJ 113
Chen Z 113
Zimmerman RK 113
Belshe RB 112
Stallknecht DE 111
Donatelli I 109
Odagiri T 109
Simonsen L 109
Wiwanitkit V 109
Bridges CB 108
Potter CW 108
Dimmock NJ 107
McCullers JA 107
Wright PF 107
Perez DR 106
Sakoda Y 106
Li X 105
Alexander DJ 104
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